Early 1930
Frenchman Frederic Joliot-Curie discovers artificial radioactivity and leads research on the neutron bombardment of uranium and the concept of a chain reaction. (Kohl, p. 16)
1939
After the outbreak of World War II, the French government acquires Norway's entire stock of heavy water and, from Belgium, the uranium oxide necessary for an atomic device. (Kohl, p. 16)
Spring 1940
The fall of France cuts short further progress in nuclear research; French scientists leave the country to work on Anglo-Canadian nuclear programs. (Kohl, p. 16; Hart p. 65)
August 19, 1943
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt sign the Quebec Agreement, the "Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration between the Authorities of the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom in the Matter of Tube Alloys." (Tube Alloys is the code for the British uranium production program.) The Agreement signals U.S.-British cooperation in the development of an atomic weapon. Both parties pledge not to use the weapon against each other or "to communicate it or employ it against a third party without mutual consent." The bilateral Agreement also establishes the Combined Policy Committee (CPC) to oversee the implementation of the Agreement. The CPC is to have representatives from Canada, Britain and the United States. (Botti, pp. 1-5)
June 13, 1944
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill sign an executive agreement entitled the "Agreement and Declaration of Trust." This Agreement creates a Combined Development Trust (CDT) which is to work under the CPC for the "control of uranium and thorium supplies beyond the physical and legal jurisdiction of Britain and the United States." Although during the war all uranium supplies have been given to the United States for production of nuclear weapons, the Agreement authorizes that any excess uranium not needed for American weapons manufacture be allocated by the CDT. (Botti, pp. 5, 7)
September 19, 1944
Despite protest from his advisers, President Franklin Roosevelt signs the Hyde Park Memorandum with Prime Minister Churchill, agreeing that "full collaboration in developing atomic energy for `military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement." President Roosevelt's science advisers, Drs. James B. Conant and Vannevar Bush, believe that the agreement "would lead to an unfortunate coupling of British and American post-war foreign policies and result in foreclosure of an atomic energy agreement with the Soviets." However, "full collaboration" is not meant to imply that the United States will give Britain the "secret" of the atomic bomb. Theoretically, it is the President who decides what the British may receive. In practice, however, the authority of the President in nuclear matters would be severely limited by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). (Botti, pp. 5-6)
September 30, 1944
Drs. Vannevar Bush and James Conant, science advisers to President Roosevelt, submit draft proposal papers to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson outlining policy recommendations on the international handling of atomic bomb technology. They advise disclosure of all but manufacturing and military details of the bomb as soon as the United States has tested its own device. Bush and Conant believe that the United States and the United Kingdom can neither maintain complete secrecy concerning the technology nor prevent other countries from acquiring their own programs. (Hewlett1, pp. 325-329)
May 1, 1945
The government of Britain introduces an Atomic Energy Bill to Parliament which would place all atomic energy research under the strict control of the Ministry of Supply. In addition, there is to be an advisory Atomic Board made up of "scientists, industrialists, and representatives of the Ministry of Supply and of the armed forces." An atomic research station is also to be opened at Didcot in Berkshire. This is the extent of Britain's efforts in atomic research immediately following the end of the war in Europe. (British Progress toward a Postwar Defense Policy, 8/1/46*)
July 4, 1945
British and American members of the Combined Policy Committee (CPC) meet in Washington, D.C., in accordance with the Quebec Agreement, and unanimously agree to use the atomic bomb on Japan. (Botti, p. 7)
July 16, 1945
The United States conducts its first test (code named "Trinity") of an atomic weapon at Alamogordo, New Mexico. (Hewlett1, p. 377)
August 6, 1945
The United States drops an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima (population approximately 323,000), killing an estimated 200,000 people. The bomb, called "Little Boy," uses U-235 and has never been tested. Unconditional surrender is demanded from the Japanese, but they reject the proposed terms. (Rhodes, pp. 713, 734)
August 9, 1945
The United States drops a second atomic bomb on Japan, this time on the city of Nagasaki. The bomb, called "Fat Man," uses plutonium because the entire supply of U-235 was expended in "Little Boy." Japan agrees to a conditional surrender and signs the terms for ending the war in the Pacific on August 15, 1945. (Rhodes, pp. 740, 742)
September 1945
Legislation is negotiated in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives for the "control of atomic energy." Several bills are drafted in the fall of 1945. The War Department backs one draft pushed by Representative Andrew J. May (D-Kentucky). However, a proposal sponsored by Senator Brien McMahon (D-Connecticut) passes and eventually becomes the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1946. Also known as the McMahon Act, the AEA restricts the sharing of atomic technology with any nation, even allies such as Britain. The bill makes it nearly impossible to share information with the British, despite wartime commitments. The AEA is later amended in 1954, in order to implement President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. (Hewlett1, p. 7)
September 11, 1945
Secretary of War Henry Stimson writes President Truman suggesting that a proposal be presented to the Soviet Union which recommends Soviet, U.S. and British control of atomic energy and pledges to use it only for industrial and humanitarian purposes. According to the proposal, the United States would "stop manufacturing bombs, halt further weapons development, and impound all bombs already manufactured" as a gesture of good faith. With this suggestion in mind, Truman asks for a review of the possibility of international control of atomic technology. (Botti, p. 8)
September 25, 1945
A top secret memorandum is written to President Truman advising that a policy of secrecy is "both futile and dangerous" and that the conditions for an "interchange of scientific knowledge and international controls" be sought "to prevent a race toward mutual destruction." (U.S. Policy regarding Secrecy of Scientific Knowledge about Atomic Bomb and Atomic Energy, 9/25/45)
October 3, 1945
President Truman presents his views on the international control of atomic weapons before Congress. He proposes initial talks with wartime allies prior to broader discussions, "in an effort to effect agreement on the conditions under which cooperation might replace rivalry in the field of atomic energy." He also indicates that the United States would not disclose information on how to make the bomb. "In other words, the United States would support international control as long as a system could be devised to prevent other nations from building the bomb." Truman's proposal goes against the prevailing American military sentiment, which seeks to prolong the U.S. atomic monopoly for as long as possible. To that end, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) proposes strictly to control all uranium sources, accelerate the development and production of atomic weapons and maintain total secrecy. This, they argue, will be the most effective way to take advantage of the estimated five-year monopoly. (Botti, pp. 8-9; Truman, pp. 362-366)
October 18, 1945
Gen. Charles de Gaulle, president of the Provisional Government of France, issues an ordinance establishing an atomic energy agency, the Commissariat de l'Energie Atomique (CEA). The agency's mission is to develop "the uses of atomic energy in various fields of science, industry and national defense." (Kohl, p. 16)
November 5, 1945
Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, recommends to President Truman that the Quebec Agreement and its provisions for full collaboration in nuclear energy research be re-negotiated now that the war was over. The agreements for nuclear cooperation among the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States should be "compatible with future agreement on international control of atomic energy by the U.N." (Botti, pp. 9-10; Hewlett1, pp. 459, 466-468)
November 10-16, 1945
A conference, initially proposed by British Prime Minister Clement Attlee in response to President Truman's speech regarding international control of atomic energy, is held in Washington, D.C. Attlee, Truman and Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King agree to discuss a common plan for atomic energy development. Vannevar Bush, Leslie Groves, Director of the Manhattan Project and Under Secretary for War Robert P. Patterson, develop the U.S. position, but are not heavily involved in the negotiations. The final U.S. stance comes primarily from Bush, with one addition. The United States insists that cooperation with the Soviet Union must be demonstrated before the United States will transfer authority to the United Nations. The British position is based on the fulfillment of promises made by former President Roosevelt in the Hyde Park Memorandum. As Attlee would discover, Truman does not know about the Hyde Park Memorandum. The miscommunication and confusion produce little agreement among the three nations. Finally, a Memorandum of Intention is signed on November 16, essentially postponing the negotiations; a new Anglo-American atomic agreement is to be written at a later date by the Combined Policy Committee (CPC). However, one positive result is a joint proposal to establish the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), which will also eventually develop a proposal for the international control of atomic energy. (See entry for November 5, 1945.) (Botti, pp. 9-11; Lilienthal, pp. 25-26)
January 1946
A committee is appointed by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes for the purpose of advising the President on what the U.S. position on control of atomic weapons should be. Committee members are: Dean Acheson, James Conant, Vannevar Bush, Gen. Leslie Groves and John J. McCloy. Byrnes expects the committee to advise whoever serves on the UNAEC and to inform appropriate congressional committees on official U.S. non-proliferation policy. (Hewlett1, p. 531)
January 1, 1946
A report by the British chief of staff is presented to Prime Minister Clement Attlee. The report notes that Britain needs atomic bombs to deter attack but states that it would be five years before a British program would be able to produce the necessary fissionable materials. The report recommends that Britain consider building a plant in Canada. This plan is favorably considered for several reasons. Firstly, the United States might be more inclined to help if the raw materials were in North America. Secondly, Canada would share the cost of the plant. U.S. policymakers postpone a decision on the British plant, and in March state that U.N. Article 102 makes it politically impossible to exchange any nuclear technology unless it is approved by the UNAEC. (Botti, pp. 19-20)
January 24, 1946
The U.N. General Assembly adopts its first resolution. The resolution establishes the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), which was created with the mission of making specific proposals for eliminating atomic weapons and other major weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals. Another of the Commission's objectives is to establish control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. (UNGA, I, 1)
February 15, 1946
Great Britain proposes building a large-scale plutonium-producing plant. Gen. Leslie Groves, anticipating this announcement, argues that if the United States helps the British, it will end up bearing the financial burden for British development of atomic energy. He fears that while the British would effectively get a free ride off U.S. aid, the United States would not be able to meet its own nuclear weapons needs. Groves further notes that any assistance given would run counter to the U.S. proposal for international control now being discussed in the United Nations. (Botti, p. 18; FRUS, 2/15/46, pp. 1215-1216)
March 7-10, 1946
The Acheson-Lilienthal team meets at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., to discuss the "plan for security in a world of atomic energy." The team grew initially out of Secretary of State James Byrnes request that Dean Acheson formulate U.S. policy on international control of atomic energy. The committee's report, known as the Acheson/Lilienthal Report, proposes "the establishment of an international Atomic Development Authority (ADA) which would have exclusive control of all `dangerous' aspects of atomic energy." The ADA would also promote the cooperative development of the atoms peaceful potential. The plan that emanates from this report is eventually sent to Secretary of State Byrnes for approval. It later forms the basis for the Baruch plan presented by the United States to the United Nations on June 14, 1946. (See entry for June 14, 1946.) (DD, 1945-1959, Vol. I, pp. 29-36; Hewlett1, pp. 540-549)
March 17, 1946
Secretary of State Byrnes asks Bernard Baruch to be the U.S. representative on the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. Baruch will present a plan for international control of atomic energy to the Commission. The plan will propose that all states completely cease production of atomic weapons, and will require that existing atomic states deposit all information on the construction of their weapons to the International Atomic Development Authority, also referred to as the ADA. Baruch amends the proposal, adding an enforcement plan that provides for actual punishment of states breaking the terms of the agreement. (DD, 1945-1949, Vol. I, pp. 25-42; Scheinman, pp. 50-51)
April 18, 1946
Secretary of State Byrnes cables Prime Minister Clement Attlee to clarify the U.S. interpretation of the November 16, 1945, Memorandum of Intention. Byrnes states that the United States agrees to "full and effective cooperation in basic research, not in development, design, construction, and operation of plants." (See entry for November 10-16, 1945.) (Botti, pp. 20-21; FRUS, 4/18/46, p. 17)
April 20, 1946
President Truman follows up Secretary of State Byrnes' April 18 cable to Prime Minister Attlee with a letter noting that American sentiment for international control is so strong that it will be difficult to build another plant in the United States, much less help the British build one. (Botti, pp. 20-21; FRUS, 4/20/46, p. 1235)
May 7, 1946
President Truman sends a memo to then-acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in which he calls Dr. Robert Oppenheimer a "cry baby" for disagreeing with the Navy's plan to conduct a live test of an atomic bomb on a naval vessel in order to evaluate the bomb's effectiveness against naval resources. Truman does not believe Oppenheimer's claim that the tests would be overly costly and inaccurate and therefore a waste of resources. The tests are held as planned at Bikini Atoll in the summer of 1946. ([Robert Oppenheimer's Concerns about Atomic Testing], 5/7/46)
May 7, 1946
Dean Acheson, Robert P. Patterson and Vannevar Bush realize that the British would be greatly disappointed if the United States rejected an Anglo-American partnership and worry that they will withdraw U.S. access to raw materials from the British Commonwealth states. Thus, after much debate, a memorandum is written recognizing the British right to receive their own stock of uranium. For the period April 1-December 31, 1946, the British would split the Congo uranium with the United States, giving each state 1,350 tons of uranium. (Botti, p. 22; FRUS, 5/7/46, pp. 1245-1246)
June 14, 1946
Bernard Baruch presents the U.S. proposal for international control of atomic weapons, also known as the Baruch Plan, at the first meeting of the UNAEC. (See entry for March 17, 1946.) (DD, 1945-1949, Vol. I, pp. 25-42)
June 19, 1946
At the second meeting of the UNAEC, Soviet Representative Andrei Gromyko submits a counter-proposal to the Baruch Plan. Gromyko's draft involves the exchange of scientific information among atomic states in order to break the U.S. monopoly on the most technically advanced information. His proposal also includes the establishment of a convention prohibiting production and employment of atomic weapons. (DD, 1945-1949, Vol. I, p. 17; Scheinman, p. 53)
July 26, 1946
The U.S. Atomic Energy Act (also known as the McMahon Act) is passed by both houses of Congress. The law stringently guards the secrecy of U.S. atomic energy technology and prohibits the sharing of information even with U.S. allies. The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) set up by the McMahon Act acquires virtual veto power over any proposed international atomic energy agreements. It becomes instrumental in maintaining the monopoly approach to controlling nuclear weapons and stands steadfastly against the idea of international control. Great Britain is particularly offended by the Act and continues research on its own nuclear program. (Botti, p. 23; Hewlett1, p. 530)
Late Summer-Fall 1946
Bernard Baruch holds several meetings with U.S. allies to discuss the progress, or lack of it, in negotiations with the Soviet Union, represented by Andrei Gromyko, on international control of atomic energy. (Notes of an Informal Meeting with Members of the French, Canadian and Australian Delegations, 3:00 p.m., 24 July 1946, 7/25/46; Observations concerning the Attitude of the Soviet Representatives on the Atomic Energy Commission, 8/12/46; Notes on Conversations with Australian, Canadian and Netherlands Delegations, 9/14/46; Sobolev Meeting, 10/21/46)
January 1947
British Ambassador to the United States Roger Makins, meets with David Lilienthal, chairman of the AEC, to try again to conclude a nuclear partnership with the United States. Lilienthal claims that the McMahon Act has officially ended all provisions for cooperation. However, the need for raw materials eventually helps to persuade U.S. policy makers to amend the Act so that some limited cooperation with the British is possible. Until the law is amended in August 1954, agreements on raw materials mark the extent of Anglo-American cooperation in the nuclear field. (Botti, pp. 23-30)
May 12, 1947
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson briefs the JCAE on the history of Anglo-American atomic relations. He notes that despite the fact that war-time collaboration had been very close and valuable and despite the need to foster better relations to ensure adequate raw materials supplies, the McMahon Act would have to be amended and the efforts at international control ended before the United States would be able to offer closer cooperation to Britain. (Botti, p. 29; FRUS, 5/12/47, pp. 806-811)
June 30, 1947
The JCS Evaluation Board produces a report on Operation Crossroads, a series of tests to assess the effects of atomic weapons on naval vessels. The tests were conducted at Bikini Atoll during the summer of 1946. The report reaches 18 conclusions which recognize the cataclysmic potential of nuclear war but at the same time the inseparable link of atomic weapons to U.S. national security. (The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon: The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads, 6/30/47)
August 21, 1947
George F. Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) of the Department of State, proposes that the United States continue negotiating at the United Nations for an international control agreement while entering into discussions with Britain and Canada. U.S. officials suspected that the Soviet Union is merely delaying the vote on international control until they have an atomic bomb themselves. The discussions are designed to foster better relations with both allies, but particularly to ensure adequate supplies of raw materials, i.e., uranium for the United States. The Combined Development Trust (CDT) set up by the McMahon Act allocated the uranium supplies of the three nations evenly. (Botti, p. 30)
October 24, 1947
George F. Kennan writes another PPS memorandum arguing that the United States should verbally accede to British claims on raw materials and promise to broaden bilateral exchanges of information. His views are ultimately incorporated in December bilateral negotiations with the British. (Botti, p. 31; FRUS, 10/24/47, pp. 844-847)
October 29, 1947
Gen. William D. Leahy, chairman of the JCS, writes a memo to David Lilienthal, chairman of the AEC, setting the strategic requirement for the number of atomic bombs a 400. The bombs are to be "of destructive power equivalent to the Nagasaki type bomb." ([Review of the Military Requirements for Atomic Bombs Is Currently Underway], 10/29/47)
December 10, 1947
Bilateral negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom take place in Washington, D.C. The United States is primarily seeking a new agreement increasing its share of the CDT-allocated uranium supply. The British optimistically believe that the negotiations are occurring primarily because of a worsening international situation and U.S. desires to combine technical forces. The British want to secure an information exchange agreement as well as the recognition of Britain's right to build its own plants and acquire atomic weapons. In exchange, they plan to help the United States with its raw materials requirements. (Botti, p. 33)
December 12, 1947
The members of the CPC subcommittee meet during the United States-United Kingdom bilateral talks and agree on nine areas of information exchange. These are:
"1. declassified subjects, 2. health and safety, 3. research uses of radioisotopes and stable isotopes, 4. fundamental nuclear and extranuclear properties of all elements, 5. detection of distant nuclear explosions, 6. fundamental properties of reactor materials, 7. extraction chemistry, 8. design of natural uranium reactors and 9. general research experience with low power reactors." (Botti, p. 33)
January 7, 1948
The Modus Vivendi agreement on raw materials is signed by Britain and the United States. Under the agreement, the United States will receive the entire supply of uranium extracted from the Belgian Congo for a period of two years. If this is insufficient for U.S. needs, Washington will also be eligible to receive portions of the unused British stockpile totaling up to 2,547 tons. The Modus Vivendi agreement officially supersedes all previous bilateral nuclear arrangements, including the Quebec Agreement and the Hyde Park Memorandum. The CPC and CDT are retained, but the United States will no longer have to consult with the British prior to using nuclear weapons. (Botti, p. 34)
February 25, 1948
A communist coup erupts in Czechoslovakia, straining relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. The United States, Britain and Canada begin to consult on possible war plans in the event of a Soviet offensive in Western Europe. (Botti, p. 38)
April 1948
Chief of British Air Staff Sir John Slessor, while lecturing at the United States National War College on British Strategic Problems, claims that the British chiefs of staff have acknowledged the necessity of U.S. support in defending Great Britain. This is significant because it underscores the weaker negotiating position of the British with regard to obtaining information useful to their nuclear program. (Botti, pp. 38, 81)
May 17, 1948
The U.N. Atomic Energy Commission completes its third and final report to the Security Council. Despite two previous efforts, the report notes that the Commission has reached an impasse in the preparation of a draft treaty on the international control of atomic energy. The United States recommends that negotiations be suspended. (DD, 1945-1949, Vol. I, pp. 167-172)
May 28, 1948
A U.S. AEC technical team arrives in Britain to evaluate the status of the British atomic energy program. The team reports that the British have made substantial progress in research and will eventually produce an atomic bomb. AEC member Lewis L. Strauss is surprised at the British progress despite strict U.S. adherence to the McMahon Act, which significantly limited the amount and type of assistance the U.S. could provide to foreign countries in the field of atomic energy. The progress foreshadows the fact that other states may indeed acquire a nuclear weapons capability despite the best efforts of the United States unilaterally to keep the technology secret and to control the raw materials. (Botti, p. 39)
June 1948
The Vandenberg resolution, which calls for the United States to associate itself with the defense of Western Europe, is passed by the U.S. Congress. (Botti, p. 37)
July 6 and 7, 1948
At a meeting of the U.S. members of the CPC, Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense on Atomic Energy Matters and head of the Military Liaison Committee (MLC) Donald C. Carpenter and Chairman of the MLC William Webster inform AEC Chairman Lilienthal that they do not want to oppose British development of an atomic bomb as long as the United States is receiving raw materials from British Commonwealth countries. From this time on, most decision makers at the State Department, the majority of AEC commissioners and military leaders, come to understand the importance to U.S. strategic needs of maintaining access to raw materials and British air bases. (Botti, pp. 40-41)
July 21, 1948
AEC Chairman Lilienthal sends a memorandum to President Truman outlining the Commission's position on transferring custody of atomic weapons from the AEC to the military. Lilienthal states that the "Commission believes that the proposed transfer would involve grave risks to this country's position in the field of atomic weapons and therefore impair to that extent the national security." Lilienthal asserts that atomic weapons are of a fundamentally different nature than conventional weapons and, for this reason, their surveillance is of "an entirely different order of complexity and significance." ([Atomic Energy Commission's Position on the Transfer of Atomic Weapons Stockpile to the Military Establishment], 7/21/48; Custody of Atomic Weapons, 3/13/48; Custody of Atomic Weapons, 3/20/48)
July 21, 1948
President Truman writes Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in response to the National Military Establishment's request for transfer of custody of atomic weapons from the AEC. Truman does not authorize the transfer and restates his conviction that the national security of the United States "will be both safeguarded and promoted if the Armed Services and the Commission continue to collaborate under the present basic division of responsibility...." ([Transfer of Atomic Stockpile to the Armed Forces], 8/6/48)
July 24, 1948
The Soviet Union imposes a land blockade on Berlin. (Botti, p. 37)
September 2, 1948
An official British request for an exchange of information on atomic weapons is made. Dr. F. N. Woodward, director of the British Scientific Mission in Washington, D.C., argues that U.S. claims that British security measures are inadequate are unfounded. He asserts that with or without U.S. assistance, the British will continue to build their own atomic bomb. (Botti, p. 43)
September 10, 1948
President Truman approves National Security Council (NSC) Document Number 30 which states a new policy concerning the usage of atomic weapons. The decision reads as follows: "the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons with the interests of national security and must therefore plan accordingly." (NSC 30: United States Policy on Atomic Warfare, 9/10/48)
Late September 1948
Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett meets with British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks and tells him that the JCS considers that a weapons program located in Britain would be vulnerable to Soviet attack. (Botti, p. 44)
November 19, 1948
The U.N. General Assembly adopts a Belgian draft resolution concerning the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviet Union criticizes the proposal on the grounds that it endorses the theory that security can precede disarmament. The United States argues that international confidence is a prerequisite for the reduction of arms and that this can only be established when the threat of communism disappears. (UNGA, III, 192)
January 24-25, 1949
William Webster, the newly installed chairman of the Military Liaison Committee (MLC), organizes a conference at Princeton University specifically to develop a policy to replace the Modus Vivendi Agreement now thought to be unsatisfactory. As part of the process, Webster wishes to reassess U.S. nuclear relations with Britain. Robert Oppenheimer, President of Harvard University Dr. James B. Conant, Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, George F. Kennan and representatives of the MLC, AEC and State department attend the conference. The participants operate under the assumption that Britain will develop the bomb shortly and that a collective security arrangement with the British would benefit the United States in the long run. The group plans to present its policy proposal to the JCAE for approval. (Botti, p. 49)
February 5, 1949
The AEC adopts the recommendations of the Princeton conference held in January as the basis for a new policy of cooperation on nuclear matters among the United States, Britain and Canada. The recommendations include: consolidating the British production program into the U.S. program to use raw materials, personnel and information more efficiently; initiating a complete interchange of information with Britain and Canada; and establishing procedures for information disclosures to other governments. (Botti, pp. 49-50)
February 10, 1949
President Truman, after being persuaded by Secretary of State Dean Acheson of the need for a reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy, appoints a Special Committee to the National Security Council. The Committee members are: Acheson, James Forrestal, David Lilienthal, Sumner T. Pike and Joseph Volper of the AEC, Executive Secretary of the NSC Adm. Sidney W. Souers, George Kennan, Gordon R. Arneson of the State Department, William Webster and Dwight D. Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University. (Botti, p. 50; Acheson, pp. 314-315.)
March 2, 1949
The Special Committee to the NSC issues its report to President Truman. It recommends going ahead with an Anglo-American-Canadian nuclear pact in order to achieve maximum security and strength, and to "solve the raw materials problem once and for all." The report notes that France might be angered at being excluded from the partnership and might refuse to negotiate access to French bases. The report becomes the basis for official Administration policy. (Botti, pp. 50-51; FRUS, 3/2/49, pp. 435-461)
March 14, 1949
The debate over custody of atomic weapons is revived when Senator Millard E. Tydings (D-Maryland) writes to President Truman strongly recommending that he approve the transfer of U.S. atomic weapons from the AEC to the agencies of the National Military Establishment. Upon meeting with Truman, the Senator changes his position in favor of AEC control. ([Transfer of the Custody of Atomic Weapons Is Encouraged], 3/2/49; [Reply to Letter of Millard Tydings Discussing the Custody of Atomic Weapons], 3/5/49; Custody of Atomic Weapons, 3/14/49; [Transfer of Custody of Atomic Weapons Would Not Be Supported by Senator Millard Tydings], 4/7/49)
April 4, 1949
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreement is signed in Washington, D.C. (Botti, p. 48)
July 14, 1949
President Truman, his advisors and the congressional leadership meet at Blair House, Washington, D.C. Truman announces that the United States will never be able to conclude an effective agreement on international control of atomic energy with the Soviet Union. He states, "[t]he proper policy for the country, therefore, [is] to move in the direction of closer cooperation with the British." A plan to absorb the British program into that of the United States for secrecy purposes as well as control of British raw materials will become U.S. policy. Dwight Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, reports on the military/strategic viewpoint of the British program and notes that the United States would not be able to carry out its current defense plans without British air bases. Once the British have their own atomic bomb, they might not be willing to offer a favorable partnership. (Botti, p. 53)
Mid-Late July 1949
Details of the Blair House meeting are leaked to the press by members of the JCAE who disagree with the plan to share atomic technology with Britain. Some JCAE members resign in protest and introduce resolutions in Congress forbidding negotiations with Britain on nuclear issues without Committee approval. As a result, the Administration eventually backs down. (Botti, pp. 53-55; FRUS, 7/14/49, pp. 476-484; FRUS, 7/18/49, pp. 484-489; FRUS, 7/20/49, pp. 490-498; Acheson, pp. 317-318; Lilienthal, pp. 548-52)
July 25, 1949
The Truman Administration agrees to abandon the idea of expanding a U.S.-U.K. partnership on nuclear matters and will instead attempt to extend the Modus Vivendi agreement. The JCAE approves a public statement by President Truman announcing exploratory talks only. No agreement will be made without prior consultation with Congress, i.e., the JCAE. (Botti, p. 55; FRUS, 7/25/49, pp. 498-499; FRUS, 7/27/49, pp. 503-506; Truman, pp. 402-3; Acheson, pp. 318-19)
August 29, 1949
The Soviet Union successfully detonates its first atomic device. The test temporarily softens the attitude of the JCAE toward sharing information with the British in the interest of strengthening Anglo-American security ties. However, an agreement is still not reached. (Botti, p. 56; Hewlett2, pp. 362-369)
September 20, 1949
Negotiations between the United States and Britain, which were initially planned to extend the Modus Vivendi agreement, evolve into a discussion of the recent Soviet atomic test. Participants come to realize the inevitability of U.S.-British cooperation on nuclear matters. (Botti, p. 58)
October 6 and October 13, 1949
The Truman Administration briefs the JCAE on the Soviet atomic test. The Committee is now anxious for an agreement with Britain and Canada. Senator Brien McMahon (D-Connecticut) declares that he wants to blow the Soviets "off the face of the earth, quick, before they do the same to us--and we haven't much time. (Botti, p. 57)
October 10, 1949
The National Security Council recommends accelerating the atomic energy program, i.e., production of atomic weapons, in order to meet the current strategic requirements. In general, this concern comes in response to the failure to negotiate an international control agreement. (Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on the Proposed Acceleration of the Atomic Energy Program, 10/10/49)
November 8, 1949
Secretary of the Air Force Stuart L. Symington sends a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson evaluating the impact on Air Force needs of the Soviet explosion of a nuclear device. ([Response of the United States to the Soviet Explosion of a Nuclear Bomb], 11/8/49)
November 9, 1949
In response to the Soviet nuclear explosion, an AEC report questions whether the United States should now proceed with construction of a "super" bomb. This is the beginning of the hydrogen bomb debate. (Report by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission [Assessing Whether to Proceed with the Construction of a "Super" Bomb], 11/18/49)
Late January 1950
British authorities arrest Klaus Fuchs, a German-born British scientist and Manhattan Project participant, for passing weapons-related secrets to the Soviet Union. The worst fears of Senators Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) and Brien McMahon (D-Connecticut) and AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss are realized. Any prospect of an agreement on closer cooperation with Britain now disintegrates. The JCAE refuses to approve collaboration with any British government led by a "socialist" party, i.e., the Labor party. (Botti, p. 61)
January 31, 1950
President Truman orders production to begin on a thermonuclear weapon, or hydrogen bomb. (Hewlett2, pp. 406-408)
April 1950
NSC Memorandum 68/4 is released. It depicts U.S. goals and foreign policy as being in conflict with those of the Soviet Union. The document advises that the United States proceed immediately with a unilateral expansion of its nuclear capability. It does not mention the idea of improving nuclear cooperation with U.S. allies, although it does recommend broadening ties in all other respects. (Botti, p. 66; FRUS, 4/14/50, pp. 234-292)
June 1950
A conference is held to compare American, British and Canadian security standards in the nuclear field. The British conclude that thy need to make some improvements--British security is the major stumbling block to renewing negotiations with the United States. (Botti, p. 67-68)
June 21, 1950
The British Embassy requests export licenses from the United States for raw materials needed to complete manufacture of an atomic bomb. This is done only after Attlee asks for "sympathetic consideration" from Acheson for the request in order to ensure no further "misunderstanding and difficulty" between the United States and Britain, thereby to increase the chances for future cooperation. (Botti, pp. 67-68; FRUS, 5/16/50, pp. 559-562; Pierre, pp. 122-23; Gowing1, pp. 299-300)
June 24, 1950
Civil war erupts between North and South Korea when North Korean troops cross the 38th parallel into South Korea. (Whelan, p. 112)
June 25, 1950
The United States reacts to the North Korean invasion of South Korea by calling for a substantial increase in the production of fissile material to build up the U.S. nuclear stockpile (in the event nuclear weapons are needed), in the belief that the national security may be at risk. Cooperation with allies becomes the order of the day. (Botti, p. 66)
July 1950
U.S. troops intervene in the Korean War on the side of South Korea. President Truman orders 10 "nuclear-configured B-29s with non-nuclear components" to Guam. (Whelan, pp. 170, 176)
August 8, 1950
JCS requests the doubling of the strategic requirement for atomic weapons stockpiles to be accomplished by 1958. Stockpile goals, if fulfilled, will require all available uranium to be allocated to the United States, thus heightening the need for cooperation with the British in raw material agreements. (Botti, pp. 68-69; [Expansion of Production of Fissionable Material--Special Committee's Recommendations to the President], 10/2/50)
September 7, 1950
Chairman of the AEC Gordon Dean explains to the U.S. members of the CPC that there will be a raw materials shortage through 1951 and suggests that the British export request of June 21 be granted in exchange for renegotiating the amount of uranium the United States receives from the CPC. (Botti, p. 70; FRUS, 9/7/50, pp. 572-575)
October 1950
Bruno Pontecorvo, an Italian-born British scientist, defects to the Soviet Union. This ends any possibility for renewing U.S.-British discussions for nuclear cooperation despite the growing consensus for coordination and the greatly increased U.S. need for raw materials. (Botti, p. 70)
October 9, 1950
President Truman approves the program to expand production of fissionable materials as requested by the JCS. (See August 8, 1950, entry.) (Botti, p. 66; [Expansion of Production of Fissionable Material--Special Committee's Recommendations to the President], 10/2/50)
December 1950
NSC Memorandum 68/4 is approved by President Truman nearly 7 months after its proposal by the NSC. (See April 1950 entry.) (Botti, p. 65)
Late January 1951
Clement Attlee requests that the United States publish the Quebec Agreement. (Botti, p. 71)
January 31, 1951
The JCS propose a new agreement of cooperation between the United States and Britain. The DOD and JCS want a new agreement in order to preserve the supply of raw materials that could quickly be converted into weapons. They favor arming the British with atomic weapons to a degree commensurate with the British plutonium program. The JCS even want to go as far as coordinating British and U.S. war plans in case of a Soviet atomic attack. The proposal requests maximum security for classified information and the safe location of facilities and weapons stockpiles. However, the exposure of more British spy cases again places any plans for cooperation in jeopardy. (Botti, p. 72)
February 12, 1951
Winston Churchill threatens the United States with trouble over the use of British air bases unless the Quebec Agreement is published. He believes that publishing the agreement will serve to demonstrate to U.S. Congressmen how closely the United Kingdom worked with the United States in developing the bomb and convince them that the British ar now entitled to share in the information. (Botti, p. 72; [Recommendation to Publish the Quebec Agreement], 2/12/51)
March 24, 1951
President Truman declines Churchill's request to publish the Quebec Agreement, arguing that it would be misleading to publish evidence of the past relationship without also being prepared to publish or discuss the current relationship. ([Response to Prime Minister Churchill's Letter on the Recommendation to Publish the Quebec Agreement], 3/24/51)
June 7, 1951
Donald C. MacLean, head of the U.S. Department in the British Foreign Office, disappears and is suspected of defecting to the Soviet Union. (Botti, p. 74)
August 2, 1951
The British request the use of an American test site for the detonation of their first atomic device. They also ask for a full-scale joint exercise. The request is denied despite repeated efforts by Churchill. (Botti, pp. 75-76)
September 1951
The JCS withdraw their support for exchanging U.S. weapons for British plutonium once the AEC informs them how much data would have to be revealed in order to train the British in the use of American weapons. (Botti, p. 75)
October 1951
The JCS propose a second expansion program for plutonium and U-235 production. By November, both the AEC and the NSC support the program. (Hewlett II, pp. 563)
December 11, 1951
Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett notes in a memorandum to the NSC that it is better to err on the side of too much rather than too little in terms of the raw materials expansion program. He concurs with the JCS estimate of the need and the amount required to expand plutonium and uranium production. (Secretary of Defense Comment on Expansion Program, 12/11/51)
January 7-10, 1952
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill arrives in Washington, D.C., for direct talks with President Truman aimed at eliciting cooperation on nuclear affairs. Churchill promises that an adequate security system to safeguard U.S. secrets will be put in place, including full background investigations of all personnel in the British nuclear program. U.S. officials cautiously respond that they will work for "maximum cooperation within the limits of the McMahon Act." (Botti, p. 91; Meeting of the President with Prime Minister Churchill in the Cabinet Room of the White House, January 7, 1952, 5:00 p.m., 1/7/52)
January 11, 1952
The U.N. General Assembly recommends the dissolution of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and the creation of the Disarmament Commission in its place. (UNGA, VI, 502)
January 17, 1952
At the Pentagon, Prime Minister Churchill and his advisers receive a briefing on the U.S. strategic air plan. (Botti, p. 93)
Late February 1952
The NATO Council votes to admit Greece and Turkey to formal membership in the alliance. (Botti, p. 97)
May 14, 1952
Secretary of State Dean Acheson sends a memo to the NSC outlining his position on the proposed expansion of the Atomic Energy program. He fully concurs with the program and recommends that it go forward. (See December 11, 1951, entry for the DOD position.) (Secretary of State Position on the Atomic Energy Commission's Expansion Program, 5/14/52)
May 23, 1952
Hans A. Bethe writes to Gordon Dean, chairman of the AEC, to give his estimate on when the Soviets might possess the hydrogen bomb. Bethe believes that the United States will achieve the H-bomb first if progress continues at the present rate. He also provides a history of the thermonuclear program to date. ([Russian Efforts to Develop the H-Bomb], 5/23/52; Memorandum on the History of the Thermonuclear Program, 5/28/52)
May 27, 1952
Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany meet in Paris to form the European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC establishes a single, unified command and binds West Germany to Western Europe's defense plan. (Botti, p. 97)
June 14, 1952
Robert Oppenheimer, chairman of the General Advisory Committee (GAC), sends a letter to President Truman noting that while atomic weapons are presently regarded as "the shield of the free world," they may in the future become "the gravest threat to our welfare and security." He notes that any major power may now acquire a nuclear capacity. (See entry for General Advisory Committee in the Organizations Glossary.) (Arms Race Potential Leading to an Overall Decrease in Security, 6/14/52*; [Technical Developments in the Fields of Nuclear Energy and Rearmament], 6/14/52)
October 3, 1952
Great Britain successfully detonates its first atomic device. The test is conducted without U.S. assistance at the Monte Bello Islands in Australia. The British announce that the test clearly demonstrates that "they could make a `substantial contribution' to any plan to exchange information." The announcement is part of Prime Minister Churchill's plan to convince the United States that the British nuclear program has information that the United States might find useful enough to warrant amending the restrictive McMahon Act. (Botti, pp. 76, 91-92, 107)
November 1, 1952
The United States detonates its first thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb) at the Eniwetok test site. The British and Canadians are told of the test but are not informed of the nature of the bomb. (Botti, p. 108)
January 1953
A report by the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament entitled "Armaments and American Policy" is forwarded to the State Department. The report details the pros and cons of arms limitation. (Armaments and American Policy: A Report of a Panel of Consultants on Disarmament of the Department of State, 1/53)
January 5, 1953
Prime Minister Churchill arrives in Washington, D.C., to meet with President-elect Eisenhower and to assess his willingness to expand Anglo-American cooperation. Eisenhower believes that the British have been poorly treated on post-war nuclear matters and has lobbied for increased cooperation. Whether Eisenhower will be able to make a difference in actual policy remains to be seen at this point. (Botti, pp. 107-109)
January 20, 1953
Dwight D. Eisenhower is inaugurated as the 34th President of the United States. (Botti, p. 108)
July 1953
An armistice is signed to bring the U.S. involvement in the Korean War to an end. (Whelan, p. 369)
August 12, 1953
The Soviet Union explodes its first hydrogen bomb. The test is significant because it demonstrates that the technological advancement of Soviet nuclear weapons is equal to that of the United States. The Soviet test eventually makes it easier for the United States to amend the McMahon Act and collaborate with British nuclear efforts because there is less concern about the transfer of U.S. nuclear secrets from the British to the Soviets now that the Soviets have progressed so far despite strict U.S. measures. (Botti, p. 118)
October 30, 1953
NSC Directive 162/2, which institutionalizes the theory of massive retaliation, is approved. The directive considers nuclear weapons to be "as available for use as other munitions" in a war. NSC 162/2 also implies that the custody of atomic weapons has to be transferred from civilian control (AEC) to military control (DOD) in order to carry out the new policy of immediate and massive retaliation. (Botti, p. 123; [Interpretation of NSC 162/2, Paragraph 39b], 12/22/53)
November 12, 1953
A hearing of the Special Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels Economic reveals that the United States has its own uranium deposits. No longer is there a need to cooperate with Great Britain for the sake of raw materials. Future collaboration with the British on nuclear matters becomes based on common defense and security interests in the face of the increasing threat from the Soviet Union. (Botti, pp. 123-124)
November 18, 1953
AEC Chairman Lewis L. Strauss sends President Eisenhower a memo describing proposed revisions to the McMahon Act. The memo notes that as "greater cooperation with the allies on atomic weapons matters was permitted...the allies would be able to `participate intelligently' in military planning...." (Botti pp. 124-125, 130; [Portions of NSC 151/2 on Policy of Public Candor on Nuclear Weapons], 5/8/53; [Review of Atomic Energy Act of 1946], 10/21/53; [Review of Atomic Energy Act: Proposal for Total or Partial Disarmament], 11/6/53; Statement on Proposed Changes in the Atomic Energy Act, 11/20/53; Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries, 12/4/53)
December 5-7, 1953
A conference among Prime Minister Churchill, President Eisenhower and French Premier Joseph Laniel takes place in Bermuda. Churchill continues to press for an exchange of weapons data in order to be able to use U.S. bombs in British planes in the event of a Soviet attack. AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss responds that the exchange of basic atomic weapons information is still forbidden by the McMahon Act. However, Eisenhower promises to get Congress moving on a revised bill in the upcoming session. (Botti, pp. 126-127)
December 6, 1953
Lord Cherwell, an adviser to Winston Churchill, sends a memo to Churchill during the Bermuda meetings suggesting that countries with fissionable material make contributions to an International Atomic Energy Administration. Churchill forwards Cherwell's proposal to President Eisenhower. The idea is evident in Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech made to the United Nations two days later. ([Proposed Joint Stockpile of Fissionable Material], 12/6/53; [Winston Churchill's Comments on Atoms for Peace Speech], 12/6/53)
December 8, 1953
President Eisenhower delivers his "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations. Eisenhower's proposal effectively ends the "secrecy" approach to the control of nuclear technology. The development of Soviet and French atomic programs despite U.S. efforts to withhold information signals the failure of United States non-proliferation policy since 1945. Thus, Eisenhower decides to propose the policy of "selective" sharing for peaceful nuclear uses as an alternative approach to controlling the spread of nuclear technology. (Sokolski, p. 3; [Atoms for Peace Speech with Handwritten Notes by President Eisenhower], 12/7/53; Text of the Address Delivered by the President of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City, Tuesday Afternoon, December 8, 1953, 12/8/53)
December 21, 1953
The Soviet Union responds to President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech to the United Nations by pointing out that the U.S. plan proposes only that some portion of atomic materials be allocated for peaceful purposes leaving the majority available for weapons production. (DD, 1945-1959, Vol. I, pp. 404-405)
1954
The Western European Union Treaty of 1954 (WEU) is signed. The Federal Republic of Germany pledges that it "would not manufacture on its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons, or biological weapons." (Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons, 12/12/64, p. 27)
Early 1954
The AEC and the Department of State draft the Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Statute outlines the proposed functions and responsibilities of the Agency. (Scheinman, p. 65)
March 19, 1954
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles passes the draft IAEA statute to Soviet Ambassador Zaroubin. After a month passes, the Soviets reiterate their position that the Agency will not end the arms race. (Scheinman, pp. 64-66)
April 1, 1954
President Eisenhower receives a letter from Prime Minister Churchill announcing that he (Churchill) will publish his own copy of the Quebec Agreement in light of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program and his steps to amend the McMahon Act. This time, Eisenhower approves Churchill's actions. ([President Eisenhower Approves Winston Churchill's Proposed Course of Action on the Quebec Agreement], 4/1/54)
May 1954
After a suggestion by Bernard Baruch, the government of India proposes a worldwide moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. ([Bernard Baruch Suggestion for Worldwide Atomic Disarmament], 4/23/54; Indian Proposal for a Worldwide Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Tests, 5/25/54; A Proposal for a Moratorium on Future Testing of Nuclear Weapons, 4/30/54)
June 25, 1954
In follow-up talks to the Bermuda Conference of December 1953, Prime Minister Churchill and his foreign minister, Anthony Eden, discuss with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles the progress made on exchanges of atomic energy information. They also discuss whether a testing moratorium would be feasible. Eisenhower indicates that a moratorium is probably unwise at this time due to the technical difficulty of detecting tests. Hence, the idea is dropped. (Churchill-Eden Talks, June 25, 1954, 6/27/54)
June 29, 1954
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill make a formal declaration reaffirming their mutual foreign policy goals. (Declaration by the President and the Prime Minister, 6/29/54)
July 9, 1954
Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant, in an attempt to clarify the Atoms for Peace proposal to the Soviet Union, sends a memorandum correcting the Soviet assumption that all forms of atomic energy "necessarily increase stocks of material available for military purposes. Indeed, purely peaceful uses for atomic energy do exist. (Scheinman, p. 67)
August 13, 1954
The NSC adopts a statement of policy (NSC 5431/1) on cooperation with other nations in the peaceful uses of atomic energy in anticipation of the new Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (Cooperation with Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 8/13/54)
August 30, 1954
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is signed into law. This revision of the McMahon Act of 1946 allows the United States to increase its cooperation with other countries in the field of nuclear energy. Specifically, the United States can now exchange information concerning the effects of nuclear explosions as well as information about the external characteristics of warheads to be deployed on missiles based in Europe. (Ullam, p. 6; CRS3, p. 2)
September 6, 1954
President Eisenhower, in a speech at a groundbreaking ceremony for a commercial atomic power plant in Shippingsport, Pennsylvania, announces that the United States will initiate talks for bilateral "Agreements of Cooperation" and negotiations to form an "international agency which will foster the growth and spread of the new atomic technology for peaceful use." ([Chronology of Events after Atoms for Peace Speech], 6/11/56; FRUS, 9/6/54, pp. 1511-1522; Meeting of OCB Working Group on Coordination of Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs, Thursday, September 9, 1954, 11 a.m., Room 7258 N.S., 9/9/54)
September 22, 1954
The Soviet Union agrees to negotiate with the United States on the safeguards portion of the IAEA Statute. (Scheinman, pp. 67-68)
Fall 1954
The ninth U.N. General Assembly session ends with a proposal for an international scientific conference on peaceful applications of atomic energy to be held no later than August 1955. The proposal is carried out and the First Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Conference is held accordingly. (Scheinman, pp. 68-69)
November 15, 1954
In an address to the General Assembly, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge announces that President Eisenhower, in the spirit of the Atoms for Peace program, has just authorized "the Atomic Energy Commission [to] allocate 100 kilograms of fissionable material to serve as fuel in the experimental atomic reactors" abroad. The amount is later increased to 200 kilograms. ([Chronology of Events after Atoms for Peace Speech], 6/11/56; FRUS, 11/15/54, pp. 1511-1522; Draft speech by Ambassador Lodge, 10/20/54)
December 1, 1954
President Eisenhower approves the dispersal of atomic weapons overseas and within the United States "to the extent required by military readiness." (Notes on Meeting with the President, 12/1/54)
December 4, 1954
The U.N. General Assembly adopts a resolution concerning international cooperation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The resolution expresses hope that "an International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] would be established without delay." (UNGA, IX, 810)
January 6, 1955
In an effort to show support for the Atoms for Peace proposal, the Atomic Energy Commission initiates five major projects facilitating a variety of cooperative efforts in nuclear technology. They include: 1) establishing an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); 2) conducting negotiations for agreements on nuclear cooperation with other states; 3) participating in preparations for an international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy (later, peaceful nuclear energy or PNE); 4) initiating a program to train students and professionals of other countries at U.S. facilities on the peaceful uses of atomic energy; and 5) providing AEC libraries with atomic energy materials in foreign countries. (CRS3, p. 3)
January 7, 1955
President Eisenhower approves NSC 5501, which supersedes NSC 162/2. NSC 5501 states that atomic weapons will not be used in all hostilities but will be used automatically in certain cases. (Policy regarding Use of Nuclear Weapons, 3/14/55)
January-February 1955
Chairman of the AEC Gordon Dean releases a report on the effects of large-yield nuclear detonations. (Draft of Statement by the President on Disarmament and Nuclear Tests, 2/11/55)
February 11, 1955
President Eisenhower announces that the AEC will begin a series of nuclear tests on smaller devices (i.e., smaller bombs) and will collect data for civil defense. (Draft of Statement by the President on Disarmament and Nuclear Tests, 2/11/55)
February 11, 1955
The AEC approves the sale of 10 tons of heavy water to India. The sale is part of the Atoms for Peace program. (India to Purchase Heavy Water for Research Reactor near Bombay, 2/12/55)
March 7, 1955
President Eisenhower, anticipating a meeting with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France and West Germany, notes three problems facing him: "the actual rearming of West Germany, the acceptance of atomic missiles as conventional, and the reconciling of our European allies to a stronger Asian policy." ([Department of State Opinion on the Pros and Cons of President Eisenhower Attending a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of West Germany, Britain and France], 3/7/55)
March 12, 1955
The NSC makes a "statement of policy on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy...." The statement notes that in the interests of national security, the U.S. programs should be used to "promote cohesion within the free world and to forestall successful Soviet exploitation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to attract the allegiance of the uncommitted peoples of the world" (emphasis added). (Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy--General Considerations, 3/12/55)
March 14, 1955
AEC Commissioner Thomas E. Murray petitions the President to negotiate a weapons test moratorium arguing that U.S. weapons superiority makes it feasible and offers a psychological advantage over the Soviet Union. Murray's suggestion becomes the agenda of a late March NSC meeting. ([Thoughts on Attempts to Negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium], 3/14/55)
March 19, 1955
Upon the NSC's recommendation that the President appoint someone to review U.S. policies "on the control of armaments" and to report the findings to the NSC, President Eisenhower appoints Governor Harold Stassen to carry out this task. (The Disarmament Problem and U.S. Policy before the NSC, 4/22/55)
March 26, 1955
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) establishes a panel to examine the "Report to the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy...." (PUAE, p. v)
March 29, 1955
The United States presents its proposed draft of the IAEA Statute to the United Nations after three months of negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, Belgium, South Africa and Portugal. (Scheinman, pp. 68-69)
May 26, 1955
Governor Harold Stassen, appointed by President Eisenhower to review U.S. arms control policy, presents a progress report to the NSC. (Volume I: Progress Report--Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament, 5/26/55)
Early June 1955
Negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada regarding atomic information agreements take place. (Canadian and United Kingdom Atomic Information Agreement, 6/7/55)
June 10, 1955
The United States signs an agreement for nuclear cooperation with Turkey, which is the first agreement of its kind allowed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (Hewlett3, p. 236)
June 11, 1955
In a speech at Pennsylvania State University, President Eisenhower proposes that the U.S. government share one-half of the cost of constructing research reactors in friendly foreign countries. This is an attempt to marshall world support for the notion that atomic science can be used peacefully to benefit all mankind. (Hewlett3, pp. 245-255)
June 15, 1955
The Anglo-American Agreement for Cooperation is concluded in Washington, D.C., between the United States and the United Kingdom. The agreement provides for exchanges of information on the civilian and military uses of atomic energy. All information is to be exchanged reciprocally. Therefore, the United States has no obligation to reveal information without receiving something of equal value in return. There is also a military aspect of the Agreement. It states that "since the United States and Britain were participating in `international arrangements for their mutual defense and security...,'" they could exchange information to facilitate their mutual defense plan. However, no "atomic weapons or special nuclear material could be transferred." The Agreement represents the biggest step toward cooperation with the British since World War II. However, many British officials feel that it does not go far enough. (Botti, pp. 147-148)
July 21, 1955
President Eisenhower reveals his "Open Skies" proposal, which calls for an international aerial inspection regime to strengthen verification of arms control agreements. The occasion is a Heads-of-Government Conference attended by the United States, France, the Soviet Union and United Kingdom. The Conferences focus is on arms control and disarmament problems, particularly that of verification. (Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 22, 1955, 12/23/55)
August 1955
The government of India accepts a Canadian offer to provide India with a heavy water/natural uranium 40-megawatt reactor, known as CIRUS (Canadian-Indian-Reactor-United States). (Bhatia, p. 92)
August 8-20, 1955
The United Nations convenes the first International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Proposed by the United States, the conference is labeled "the most outstanding event of 1955 in connection with atomic energy" by the Atomic Energy Commission. It is a watershed event because it results in the publication of previously highly classified materials on nuclear reactors and fuel. (Scheinman, p. 69)
August 22, 1955
The final draft of the IAEA Statute is submitted to all 84 members of the United Nations for review and comments. (Scheinman, p. 69)
August 30, 1955
The AEC extends to Switzerland an Agreement of Cooperation so that the Swiss Commission for Nuclear Research can lease the uranium needed for a nuclear reactor. The reactor is to be used for peaceful purposes. ([Agreement of Cooperation with Switzerland and Leasing Charges for Enriched Uranium], 8/30/55)
October 22, 1955
A telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Paris notes an interview with Michel Debre, the French defense minister, and describes the minister's view that "in the opinion of most Frenchmen, NATO was the wrong kind of alliance in the wrong place...." Debre notes that NATO is essentially a European security pact directed against Soviet armed aggression. The French consider Soviet aggression extremely unlikely. Currently, France's attentions are focused on North Africa where fighting is taking place without any assistance from NATO. ([Conversation with Michel Debre on NATO], 10/22/55)
November 23, 1955
The Soviet Union drops its first thermonuclear device from an aircraft. (Rhodes, p. 778)
November 25, 1955
Norway approves an application for the export of 10 tons of heavy water (deuterium oxide) to France. The agreement does not specify binding commitments on its use or re-export. (CRS1, p. 1)
December 22, 1955
The 271st meeting of the National Security Council discusses a report prepared by Governor Harold Stassen on "U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments." The report, which has been reviewed by the AEC, DOD and the State Department, focuses on an inspection and control system requiring on-site placement of inspectors. President Eisenhower comments that the Soviets are unlikely to allow such intrusion and that aerial reconnaissance alone is likely to reveal a great deal of information. Eisenhower notes that aerial reconnaissance, although originally proposed to increase mutual confidence, might be used along with other measures to make progress toward disarmament. (Discussion at the 271st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 22, 1955, 12/23/55)
December 26, 1955
Secretary of State Dulles meets with President Eisenhower to discuss his idea of holding a multilateral conference of all 42 nations with which the United States has security treaties. The goal of the conference would be to establish an international group which would decide "when and how to use atomic weapons for defense." Eisenhower is supportive of Dulles' idea. ([Nuclear Weapons and the International Security Situation], 12/26/55)
End 1955
By the end of the year, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has completed 22 bilateral agreements for cooperation on nuclear energy and is negotiating agreements with 27 other countries. None of these agreements is subject to IAEA safeguards at this time, but may have stipulations negotiated separately. (CRS3, p. 3)
1956
The United States sells 21 tons of heavy water to India for use in a CIRUS reactor. The agreement stipulates that heavy water is to be used for "peaceful purposes only." The reactor subsequently produces the plutonium used in India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion." (Ribicoff: U.S. Heavy Water and the Indian CIRUS Reactor, 6/17/76)
January 1956
Eisenhower Administration officials secretly negotiate an agreement with Great Britain to share information on nuclear submarine propulsion. However, members of the JCAE force the President to postpone implementation until after the United States receives all British nuclear secrets useful in the commercial application of nuclear power. (Botti, pp. 158-159)
February 9, 1956
At an unscheduled NSC meeting, President Eisenhower evaluates Governor Stassen's policy proposals. Eisenhower states that the "lack of major new ideas or proposals" makes further work on Stassen's report unjustifiable. The reality of the situation, notes Eisenhower, is that the United States and the Soviet Union are "headed for an armaments race that would be ended in only one way, namely, a clash of forces which could not result in victory for anybody...." (See February 10, 1955, entry.) (Memorandum of 275th Meeting of the National Security Council..., 2/9/56)
February 16, 1956
Norway approves an agreement for the future sale of heavy water to France and Great Britain. Norway specifies in this agreement, unlike past agreements with France, a proviso which requires prior Norwegian approval for the re-export of the heavy water. (CRS1, p. 2)
February 20, 1956
President Eisenhower is requested by Lewis Strauss to allocate 20,000 kilograms of U-235 for foreign use in accordance with the Atoms for Peace program in order to fulfill the industrial power needs of developing atomic energy. ([Request for an Additional 20,000 Kilograms of U-235 for Foreign Distribution], 2/20/56)
February 27-April 27, 1956
The first draft of the IAEA Statute is revised by the 12-power working group. This group consists of the original eight members plus the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Brazil and India. There are minor changes made to the draft, which is then submitted to the General Assembly in the all for debate and approval. (See March 29, 1955, entry.) (Scheinman, pp. 69-70)
March 4, 1956
The first meeting of the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation takes place in New York. The members of the committee are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. The goal of the United States regarding the Committee is to "allay unjustified fears" about radiation and to forestall subsequent efforts in the General Assembly to adopt a limitation or ban on nuclear tests because of unwarranted fears of radiation. (Position Paper on Restrictions on Nuclear Weapons Tests, 3/27/56)
March 29, 1956
The Agreement for Cooperation concerning the transmission of atomic information between the United States and NATO becomes effective. The agreement remains subject to the Atomic Energy Act, which requires that the "data transmitted will not reveal important information concerning the design or fabrication of the nuclear components of weapons." The agreement differentiates between information going to the United Kingdom or Canada and that going elsewhere. ([Sharing Nuclear Weapons Information with NATO Countries], 4/10/56)
May 1956
Britain's first dual-purpose nuclear reactor at Calder Hall goes critical. The four units will produce plutonium with electricity as a byproduct. (CRS3, p. 4)
July 26-September 19, 1956
The Suez Canal crisis takes place, testing the dependability of the United States as an ally. The U.S. attempt to restrain the British and French response serves as an impetus for both France and Great Britain to proceed with their own independent nuclear programs. France, in particular, begins seriously to consider changing the emphasis of its nuclear program from one primarily focused on nuclear energy to one which includes the development of nuclear weapons. (Ullam, p. 5)
August 30, 1956
A U.S. government report notes that the United States has completed new General Agreements on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy with Austria, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ireland, New Zealand and West Germany. In addition, an agreement on research and power has been signed with France which provides for the exchange of unclassified information and 40 kilograms of "special nuclear material." ([Ninth Report on Progress of Program for International Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy], 8/30/56)
September 11, 1956
President Eisenhower meets with his advisers to discuss non-proliferation. All agree on the need for some kind of inspection plan. However, they disagree as to how to prevent other states from acquiring or developing their own capability. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, September 11, 1956, 3:45 p.m., 9/14/56; [Discussion of the Proposed United States Disarmament Measures Designed to Stop Global Proliferation, 9/14/56)
September 17, 1956
The government of French Prime Minister Guy Mollet signs a secret agreement with Israel which provides Israel with a plutonium-producing reactor to be built at Dimona in the Negev desert. (Hersh, pp. 39-40)
October 10, 1956
The United States authorizes the sale of 20 tons of heavy water to India. (Commission Decision on Sale of Heavy Water to India, 10/10/56)
October 12, 1956
President Eisenhower drafts a letter responding to Sir Anthony Eden's request that he delay announcing discussions between the United States and United Kingdom on cooperation in atomic matters. ([Request for a Postponement of Discussions on Joint Anglo-American Cooperation in the Nuclear Field], 10/12/56)
October 26, 1956
The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) opens for signature. The treaty comes into full force 90 days later. Seventy nations sign the treaty on its opening day. President Eisenhower offers to make an initial deposit of 5,000 kilograms of U-235. The provisions of the Treaty state that the IAEA will serve to aid in cooperation among its member states and to provide a relatively neutral forum for resolving problems. It will also act as a supplier of technical assistance and service as well as a repository for fissionable material. (Scheinman, pp. 65, 73)
1957
The United States signs an agreement of cooperation with the Union of South Africa. The agreement specifically stipulates that the "[nuclear] materials and equipment transferred by the United States would be used only for peaceful purposes." It also gives the United States the right to carry out inspections of the facilities. ([Background Paper...], 12/12/64, p. 38)
March 21-23, 1957
The United States and the United Kingdom meet in Bermuda to discuss disarmament. During the conference, the initial deployment schedule of IRBMs to Britain is discussed. It is expected that by mid-1958 a handful will be deployed to establish an emergency capability and that by mid-1959 the first squadron will be available. By mid-1960, the British can anticipate that four squadrons will be ready for deployment. President Eisenhower remarks that the IRBM weapon "is one of tremendous psychological importance." He then adds that "when the two sides come to the point of waging war with such weapons, that all sense and logic [will] have disappeared." ([IRBM Warhead Favorably Voted Upon], 3/21/57; [Donating IRBMs to Great Britain], 3/23/57)
March 25, 1957
The Treaty of Rome is signed, establishing the European Atomic Community (Euratom) as the nuclear branch of the European Economic Community (EEC). The treaty is signed by representatives of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Members later include Denmark, Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom. (CRS3, p. 5)
April 1957
The London Disarmament Conference convenes to discuss various arms control proposals. Among the issues considered are the reduction of nuclear weapons, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to "fourth countries," the cessation of atomic materials production, the promotion of on-site and air inspections, the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the adoption of measures to guard against the risk of a surprise attack. Governor Harold Stassen, the U.S. representative to the conference, reports to President Eisenhower that the Soviet Union is showing signs of wanting a "first step agreement," which could lead to an "opening up" of the Soviet Union to intrusive inspection and, inevitably, to further arms control agreements. ([Discussion of the London Disarmament Subcommittee Conference], 4/24/57)
May 11, 1957
Assistant Director of Scientific Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Herbert Scoville, Jr. reports to Director of the CIA Allen Dulles that the United States can reasonably detect all Soviet atomic tests greater than 20 kilotons and that the Soviets are not able to conduct covert tests unless they are of one kiloton or less. (Effectiveness of Nuclear Test Detection System, 5/11/57)
May 15, 1957
The United Kingdom tests its first hydrogen bomb. (Botti, p. 187; CRS3, p. 5)
Late May 1957
President Eisenhower meets with West German Chancellor Adenauer to discuss the implications of the increased development of nuclear weapons and the significance of disarmament for the Federal Republic of Germany. (Your Talks with Chancellor Adenauer, 5/24/57)
June 14, 1957
At the ongoing London Disarmament Conference, the Soviet Union proposes a complete cessation of nuclear weapons testing for two-to-three years and agrees to accept inspection posts inside the country. Harold Stassen, the U.S. representative to the talks, notes that this is an "important and new element" in the disarmament negotiations. (Third Weekly Report to the North Atlantic Council..., 6/18/57)
June 18, 1957
The IAEA Statute is ratified by the U.S. Senate. (Scheinman, p. 73)
August 9, 1957
President Eisenhower is concerned that authorizing a testing series known as Operation Hardtack will not be consistent with trying to carry out disarmament negotiations for a test moratorium. However, the Department of Defense persuades the President that the testing series is needed in order to make technological progress prior to the successful negotiation and implementation of a test moratorium. Hardtack is designed to test large yield, "multi-megaton" weapons, which the moratorium is designed to prevent. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 9, 1957, 2:30 p.m., 8/13/57; Disarmament, 8/13/57)
August 9, 1957
The Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the AEC submit a report recommending the further development of "clean" atomic weapons. They argue that such weapons will enhance the ability of the United States to retaliate effectively against a Soviet attack on Western Europe while reducing the radioactive fall-out damage to nearby friendly countries. President Eisenhower approves the recommendation. (See entry for Clean Atomic Weapons in the Technical Glossary.) (Report to the President by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 8/9/57)
August 28, 1957
President Eisenhower ratifies the International Atomic Energy Participation Act of 1957, (P.L. 85-177), which authorizes U.S. participation in the IAEA and provides for the appointment of U.S. representatives to that body. (Hewlett3, p. 435)
August 29, 1957
The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and France submit the Four Power Joint Proposal to the Disarmament Conference calling for a two-year test cessation and implementation of a control and inspection system to verify the moratorium. (Eisenhower, p. 627)
September 30, 1957
The Department of Defense (DOD) rejects a new disarmament position conceived by the U.S. representative to the London disarmament negotiations, Harold Stassen. The DOD claims that the Soviet Union has not been negotiating in good faith and that nuclear proliferation by certain states (such as France) might be advantageous to the United States. ([Defense and Joint Chiefs Views on Harold Stassen's Memo on Disarmament], 9/30/57)
October 1957
In a follow-up to the secret agreement signed on September 17, 1956, Israel and the French firm St. Gobain Techniques Nouvelle sign a contract to construct several additional facilities at the Dimona reactor site. In addition to the plutonium producing reactor, St. Gobain agrees to provide: a workshop for fabricating fuel for the reactor, a "hot cell" laboratory for the analysis of irradiated material and a storage facility for waste materials. (Hersh, p. 45)
October 1957
The Bermuda Summit takes place between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. They continue to discuss further improvements in Anglo-American cooperation, but real progress does not occur until 1958 after the implications of Sputnik are realized. (See October 4, 1957, entry.) (The Eisenhower-Macmillan Conference, 10/21/57)
October 1, 1957
The IAEA is inaugurated in Vienna. W. Sterling Cole, former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, is elected by the first General Conference as director general. (Scheinman, p. 74)
October 4, 1957
The Soviet Union successfully sends into orbit the first man-made satellite, Sputnik. The launch proves Soviet capabilities in ballistic missile technology. The French, in particular Gen. Charles de Gaulle, are no longer convinced that the United States would intervene on behalf of its European allies because the United States is now threatened by Soviet missiles. Noting this, President Eisenhower pushes for further expansion of the Atomic Energy Act to allow more nuclear cooperation between Washington and its allies. (Botti, pp. 199-200)
October 22, 1957
A report to Director of the CIA Allen Dulles claims that the United States is in a "period of national emergency" because of Soviet progress in their guided missile program. Soviet testing reveals a high reliability in launchings and accuracy. This evaluation comes on the heels of the Sputnik launch. The report estimates that the United States lags two-to-three years behind the Soviets. ([Conversation with Three Consultants Who Express Great Concern over the Soviet Progress in Guided Missiles and Related Fields], 10/28/57)
October 29, 1957
The U.S. Army Chief of Staff recommends not providing military assistance to France in order to prevent the French from developing their own independent nuclear capability. This recommendation runs contrary to earlier Joint Chiefs of Staff policy statements such as (JSC 1731/243) and current Department of the Treasury proposals. (U.S. Policy on France (NSC 5721), 10/29/57)
October 30, 1957
In response to questions from Congress regarding the British security system and the prospects of sharing atomic information with the United Kingdom, President Eisenhower says that the British now have a system that is, at times, superior to that of the United States. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 29, 1957, 10/30/57)
October 31, 1957
As requested by President Eisenhower, The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy discusses proposed changes in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. The changes result from the perceived need for closer cooperation among NATO allies, particularly between the United States and the United Kingdom in light of recent Soviet military developments and the launch of Sputnik. (Changes in the Atomic Energy Act, 10/31/57)
November 14, 1957
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1148 (XII) proposing the "regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armament[s]" is adopted. The resolution petitions the nuclear weapons states to discontinue nuclear testing and to establish international controls to that end. (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
November 21, 1957
The Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) approves a resolution establishing a special committee to draft a statute for the proposed Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission. This Commission will be responsible for coordinating nuclear energy developments among the members of the OAS. (Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission, 12/5/57)
December 16-19, 1957
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announces at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting, that the United States will seek to "cooperate with interested members of NATO in the development, production, and fueling of nuclear propulsion and power plants for submarines and other military purposes." As a result of this statement, and after the U.S. Atomic Energy Act is amended in early 1958, the United States begins discussions with France for the purchase of a nuclear submarine reactor and fuel, with the understanding that the deal will be subject to a finding that the French Navy can provide adequate security to protect the information involved. (Review of Negotiating History of Mutual Defense Agreement with France of 1959, 11/60)
December 16-19, 1957
Participants at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in Paris decide to stock nuclear warheads in Europe and place Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) at the disposal of the Strategic Air Command in Europe (SACEUR). This decision becomes known as the NATO Atomic Stockpile Plan. Also, NATO reiterates the disarmament proposals as given at the London Disarmament talks in April 1957. (NATO1, pp. 108-116; Background Paper on the NATO Heads of Government Meeting, December 1957, regarding Nuclear Policy, 12/4/57*; Background Paper Paper on the NATO Heads of Government Meeting, December 1957, regarding the United Kingdom and IRBMs, 12/9/57*; [Presentation of Herbert Loper Given to the National Security Council's Planning Board on Nuclear Arrangements with NATO Included], 4/26/60)
February 1, 1958
The European Nuclear Energy Agency is established within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). (CRS3, p. 6)
February 14, 1958
The Polish Government proposes that a nuclear free zone be placed in Eastern Europe. The proposal is generally referred to as the Rapacki Plan. ([Both German Governments Respond to the Rapacki Plan], 2/20/58; Rapacki Plan, 2/27/58; [Possible West German Approaches to the Rapacki Plan], 5/8/58)
March 3, 1958
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles meets with Soviet Ambassador Menshikov to discuss the possibility of a summit meeting to be held in Washington, D.C. The Soviet Union believes that a summit could include the question of an atom free zone in Central Europe as well as a nuclear test ban. However, Soviet leaders wish to exclude any discussion on the reunification of Germany or a cessation of fissionable materials production. (Interview with Soviet Ambassador Menshikov, Monday, March 3, 1958, 11:00 a.m., 3/2/58)
March 13, 1958
The Joint Chiefs of Staff report that a nuclear test ban beginning after the Operation Hardtack testing series would result in technological parity with the Soviet Union, but a quantitative advantage for the United States. The JCS estimate that this advantage would remain until approximately 1964. (Nuclear Testing, 3/13/58)
March 21, 1958
In a discussion concerning the merits of "clean" nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower and his advisers agree that the United States can "gain more intangibly in the move toward peace by agreeing to a suspension of tests, if supervised properly, than we can from developing `clean weapons." ([Discussion of "Clean" Nuclear Weapons], 3/21/58)
March 27, 1958
The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Technical Feasibility of a Cessation of Nuclear Testing submits its report to James R. Killian, special assistant to the president for science and technology. The Working Group notes that a cessation of tests before the Hardtack test series is completed would be both undesirable and infeasible. (Report of NSC Ad Hoc Working Group on the Technical Feasibility of a Cessation of Nuclear Testing, 3/27/58)
March 31, 1958
The Soviet Union announces a unilateral suspension of all nuclear tests. U.S. intelligence reports warn President Eisenhower and his advisers of this possibility just days before the announcement. Eisenhower is advised to announce that a U.S. moratorium will begin after the current series of testing (Hardtack) is concluded and that no new testing will begin during the President's current term. Eisenhower will consider this advice. (Memorandum of Conference with the President..., 3/28/58; CRS3, p. 6)
April 11, 1958
Premier Felix Gaillard orders the first French atomic test to take place by 1960. (Kohl, p. 28)
April 14, 1958
The President's Science Advisory Committee submits a report to the NSC entitled, "Some Technical Considerations and Their Implications relating to the Cessation of Nuclear Tests." The report discusses the technical requirements for verifying a test ban and whether such requirements can possibly be achieved. (Analysis of a Report of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee on the Cessation of Nuclear Tests, 5/6/58; [Draft Paper of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee Paper on Nuclear Testing Ban Included], 5/13/58)
May 1958
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany begins to discuss rearmament issues and, in particular, the basing of American nuclear weapons on West German territory as a deterrent to a Soviet invasion. Control of such nuclear weapons will remain completely with the United States. ([Possible West German Approaches to the Rapacki Plan], 5/8/58)
May 7, 1958
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles advises that the United States should continue exploring the possibility of placing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe upon receiving a memo by the President's Science Advisory Committee doubting U.S. willingness to risk its own destruction "to prevent Soviet aggression in Turkey or Western Europe...." Dulles is concerned that unless Western Europe has confidence in the United States, they may opt out of the regional defense agreement and become neutral. ([Possibility that Developing Local European Defenses with Tactical Nuclear Weapons Should Be Explored], 5/7/58)
May 15, 1958
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) W. Sterling Cole writes to President Eisenhower warning him about the safeguards system of the proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and Euratom. All safeguards are to be applied on the basis of "self-inspection." Cole strongly believes that the system will be seriously inadequate and urges reevaluation. ([Appeal for Support of IAEA Safeguards Instead of Euratom Safeguards], 5/15/58)
June 9-11, 1958
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan comes to Washington, D.C., to discuss British troop levels in Europe, cooperation in nuclear energy research and Anglo-American relations with France. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarks that gaining congressional approval for a bilateral agreement with France similar to the one being worked out with the United Kingdom would be "extremely difficult." The United States and the United Kingdom agree that they will keep each other fully informed of any bilateral talks they hold with the French. (Support Costs for U.K. Forces, 6/8/58; Anglo-American Relations with General de Gaulle's Government, 6/9/58)
June 27, 1958
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles receives a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Paris regarding U.S. aid to the French atomic weapons program. In light of upcoming discussions with Gen. Charles de Gaulle, the cable acknowledges that the French are determined to explode a bomb and discusses strategy for the U.S. response. ([Views and Suggestions on Question of Aiding the French Atomic Weapons Program], 6/27/58; [Joint Recommendation for Nuclear Discussions with Charles de Gaulle Being Forwarded], 6/28/58)
June 30, 1958
The Amendment to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act passes both Houses of Congress. This Amendment makes it possible for the United States to share, with restrictions, certain atomic information with its allies. Restrictions are based on information classified as "Restricted Data" and include such things as weapons design information. ([Information on the NATO Agreement on Cooperation regarding Atomic Information of 1954], 11/7/58; Botti, p. 234)
July 1, 1958
The Conference of Experts from the West and East meet in Geneva to discuss a control regime to support the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The participants include representatives from Canada, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. ([Geneva Talks and Possible U.S. Statement on the Suspension of Atomic Testing], 8/18/58)
July 3, 1958
The U.S.-U.K. Agreement for Cooperation on Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes is concluded, establishing a long-term nuclear alliance between the two nations. (Botti, p. 238; Plowden Talks--Status Report, 3/13/59)
July 26, 1958
In discussions with Secretary of State Dulles, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is concerned that France might negotiate aid for its atomic weapons program from the Soviet Union because they have canceled a multilateral deal with the FRG and Italy to work on fissionable materials production. Dulles does not share Adenauer's concern. ([Private Discussions with Konrad Adenauer about Charles de Gaulle], 7/26/58)
July 29, 1958
West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss gives a lecture at the University of Bonn on the "Security Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Atomic Age." He tells the audience that large nuclear bombs have made major wars unlikely because of the insanity of starting a war which might lead to self-annihilation. (Minister Strauss on German Security Policy, 7/31/58)
July 30, 1958
Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani requests of President Eisenhower that the deployment of IRBMs to Italy be carried out quickly and quietly so that it does not become a "highly charged political issue but purely a matter for the military." (Memorandum of Conversation at the White House, 7/30/58)
August 21, 1958
The Conference of Experts, which began July 1, adopts a final report recommending the so-called "Geneva System" of detecting nuclear explosions via a network of approximately 180 control points around the world. The United States originally proposed 650 such control points but compromised based on opposition from the Soviet delegation. (Technical Factors relating to Arms Limitation and to the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Cessation, 3/31/59; A Worldwide Control System for the Detection and Identification of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere or Deep in the Open Ocean, 4/1/59; CRS3 , p. 6)
August 22, 1958
President Eisenhower announces that the United States will refrain from further testing for one year after the beginning of the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Cessation on October 31, 1958, unless testing is resumed before then by the Soviet Union. (See also October 31, 1958, entry.) (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
August 25, 1958
In meetings with the French ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State C. Burke Elbrick discusses control of the nuclear components of the IRBMs that may be based in France. While Gen. de Gaulle insists on French custody, the United States believes that some mutually acceptable formula can be worked out. (IRBMs, 8/25/58)
August 27, 1958
President Eisenhower remarks that if the Soviet Union does not agree to the joint U.S.-U.K. proposal for test cessation, then he expects the United States to resume its testing program. (Memorandum for the Record, 8/27/58)
September 1958
Public Law 85-479, relating to the communication of restricted data, is passed by the U.S. Congress. This law provides that the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission concurrently find that the transmission of information covered in the "Atomic Information Exchange Guide," drawn up along with the 1954 Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, does not "constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States." The Guide provides the necessary information to the countries which receive U.S. nuclear materials and need to know how to integrate the materials into their own training and defense plans. ([Communication of Restricted Data According to Public Law 85-479], 9/5/58)
September 1-13, 1958
The second International Scientific Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy takes place. The Conference is based on the Atoms for Peace initiative forwarded by President Eisenhower in December 1953. (See also August 8-20, 1955, entry.) (U.S. Plans for Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, September 1-13, 1958], 6/26/58)
September 8, 1958
The United States and Euratom sign a "Joint Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation," under which the United States accepts Euratom safeguards. (Fischer, p. 70)
September 17, 1958
President Charles de Gaulle of France sends a letter and attached memorandum to President Eisenhower noting the risks that France has taken as an ally to the United States. He also notes his dissatisfaction with the limited "geographic scope" of NATO and with the consultations requested of France regarding NATO security decisions. President de Gaulle proposes a tripartite Anglo-French-American organization which would enable decisions to be made jointly. This l'organization d'une direction anglo-franco-americaine de l'alliance occidentale would jointly decide when to use nuclear weapons. (Kohl, pp. 70-74)
September 22-24, 1958
British Minister of Defense Duncan Sandys meets with Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy to discuss future cooperation in weapons design and development, now possible as a result of the amendment to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act and a new bilateral agreement between the two nations. (Joint United States-United Kingdom Communique, 9/24/58)
September 25, 1958
In further discussions between the British Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense, the United States indicates its expectation that IRBMs produced by any joint program will be controlled by SACEUR. Sir Richard Powell indicates that this might prevent the British government from participating in any co-production programs. (Support Costs for British Forces in German and NATO Common Production Program for IRBMs, 9/25/58)
October 1958
Ireland submits a draft resolution at the U.N. General Assembly calling for a study of the means to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The resolution is withdrawn after the United States indicates it will not support it. The Eisenhower Administration worries that supporting such a resolution would imply that the United States was unwilling to share atomic information with its allies. This has been a major concern at NATO ministerial meetings which have called for strengthening the security of the alliance. (Seaborg, p. 78)
October 8, 1958
Gen. Lauris Norstad (SACEUR) informs French Ambassador Geoffrey de Courcel that it is up to the French to proceed on discussions of IRBMs and that France's failure to cooperate with NATO on the atomic stockpile have made it difficult for NATO air units in France to carry out their defensive missions. ([Question of IRBMs and Atomic Stockpiles Is Discussed with France], 10/10/58)
October 31, 1958
The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests begins in Geneva and continues until January 29, 1962. The Conference participants--the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union--focus on drafting a treaty on nuclear testing. Three groups of experts report on high-altitude testing, underground testing and seismic detection capabilities. The Conference is unable to reach an agreement on a draft treaty due to a Soviet claim that the employment of national technical means are an adequate control measure against nuclear testing. (ACDA1, p. 39)
November 7, 1958
President Eisenhower announces that the United States has detected additional tests by the Soviet Union subsequent to October 31, 1958, when the United States began a moratorium on further testing for one year. (See also August 22, 1958, entry.) (Hewlett3, p. 548)
November 16, 1958
John Foster Dulles writes President Eisenhower to inform him of a meeting held to discuss the ongoing test suspension negotiations in Geneva. Attending the meeting were: Neil McElroy and Donald Quarles of the Department of Defense, John McCone and Charles Libby of the Atomic Energy Commission, Allen Dulles of the CIA, James Killian of PSAC, Christian Herter, Phillip Farley and Dulles himself. The group reached fundamental agreement on the key components of the U.S. negotiating position. Crucial to the position is the link between continuing the cessation of tests and making progress on control measures to verify the moratorium. ([Report on Meeting on the Status of Suspension of Testing Negotiations at Geneva], 11/16/58)
December 28, 1958
President Eisenhower appoints a "Panel on Seismic Improvement" to review technical problems associated with detecting nuclear weapons tests and to recommend methods of improving seismic detection. ([Comments on the First Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement], 1/17/59; Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
January 1959
Discussions among the French CEA, the French Navy and the United States result in a fuel agreement and a plan to develop a broad accord to include the sale of a U.S. nuclear reactor to France. (Review of Negotiating History of Mutual Defense Agreement with France of 1959, 11/60)
January 2, 1959
President Eisenhower writes to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to inform him that the United States will no longer link cessation of nuclear weapons tests to progress in the ongoing disarmament negotiations. ([U.S. Ready to Drop its Insistence that the Cessation of Nuclear Tests Depends on Progress in the Disarmament Process], 1/2/59)
January 2, 1959
The State Department prepares to update the North Atlantic Council regarding current IRBM production and deployments. At this time, IRBM production in the United States is scheduled to end in 1960. Deployments will correspond to NATO requirements. While there is some flexibility in the production schedule, negotiations for production in Europe are still underway. Deployment in the Federal Republic of Germany is not currently considered a military necessity by the SACEUR at this time. (Actions in re IRBM Program, 1/2/59; [NATO Cannot See Any Military Reason for the Deployment of Two THOR Squadrons in Germany, 1/3/59; [SACEUR Sees No Significant Military Reason to Justify the Deployment of IRBMs in Germany], 1/3/59)
January 6, 1959
New testing data reveals that certain nuclear tests may not be detected as well as previously believed. President Eisenhower and his advisers discuss the implications of this revelation for negotiations on test cessation. They determine that the United States may have to insist on increasing the number of monitoring stations in the Soviet Union, a move which could further delay a treaty with the Soviets, already suspicious of U.S. motives due to Hardtack testing series. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, January 5, 1959, 1/6/59)
January 9, 1959
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles cables guidance to the U.S. mission to NATO in anticipation of the announcement to end IRBM production. In particular, he notes the possibility for the development and production of "second generation" IRBMs in Europe. ([Proposed Statement for Notification of Termination of THOR and Jupiter Production Programs], 1/8/59)
January 21, 1959
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) W. Sterling Cole writes to President Eisenhower requesting that a new system of safeguards be developed to reflect the new abundance of fissionable materials. Cole notes a need to develop uniform safeguards which could be applied to sales which do not originate from the IAEA but come from the growing number of uranium supplying countries. ([Establishment of International System of Safeguards], 1/21/59)
February 25, 1959
In a conference with his science adviser, James R. Killian, President Eisenhower mentions a different approach to the ongoing testing negotiations in Geneva. Eisenhower proposes that tests in the atmosphere and underground tests above a certain size be prohibited. This proposal would preserve the right to establish inspection sites within the Soviet Union, which has been the primary goal throughout the testing negotiations. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, February 25, 1959, 3:25, 2/28/59)
February 25, 1959
Israel acquires 22 tons of heavy water for its nuclear plants in a secret bilateral agreement with Norway. It is thought that Israel needs at least 20 tons to operate the 24-megawatt reactor at Dimona. Because Israel has not acquired such a large amount of heavy water since 1959, as far as is known, it has been speculated that this shipment of heavy water was used at Dimona when the reactor produced the plutonium for Israel's atomic weapons. According to the terms of the agreement, the heavy water is restricted to peaceful uses, a condition Norway retains the right to verify. (CRS1, p. 2)
March 9, 1959
President Eisenhower writes to Prime Minister Macmillan to suggest that the Geneva test negotiations be recessed soon in order to avoid drawn-out discussions, which Eisenhower believes will not result in any further progress. The President reiterates that the primary goal of the negotiations is to establish the precedent of "effective international control" in disarmament negotiations and that stopping nuclear tests is secondary. ([Text of Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan], 3/9/59)
March 11, 1959
Gen. Charles de Gaulle announces the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO. (Review of Negotiating History of Mutual Defense Agreement with France of 1959, 11/60)
March 11, 1959
The United States ends an aide-memoire to the British and Canadian Embassies containing an "Outline of Principles" for a reconstituted Combined Policy Committee, which would supervise scientific and technical cooperation on nuclear and non-nuclear research among the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. This reconstituted CPC would also supervise the Combined Development Agency in the procurement and allocation of materials for research under the chairmanship of the secretary of state. (Other Atomic Energy Matters, 3/13/59)
March 18, 1959
The New York Times releases information about high-altitude tests, which has not been previously announced by the United States. The disclosure highlights the need to make progress on the nuclear test ban issue. President Eisenhower proposes that any agreement be limited to prohibiting tests in the atmosphere. There is an implied assumption that only the West will adhere to the agreements. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 19, 1959, 9:00 a.m., 3/19/59)
March 19-23, 1959
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visits the United States in order to discuss negotiating positions on the nuclear test ban as well as to prepare for the upcoming multilateral talks with France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. A specific date for the four power talks is not yet determined. In addition, new information regarding the possibility of disguising underground explosions so that they appear to have a smaller yield has been brought to light. This capability places in question the adequacy of the currently conceived verification and control system. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 19, 1959, 9:00 a.m., 3/19/59; Nuclear Testing: Future Steps, 3/19/59)
March 25, 1959
In an interdepartmental meeting of the Working Group on Disarmament held shortly after the Harold Macmillan visit, participants debrief each other on the British position. The British believe that breaking off testing negotiations should be based on the Soviet insistence on the veto in the Control Commission and not on the presentation of new technical data held by the United States. In this way, a fallback negotiating position would be to limit the negotiations to certain testing areas, such as the atmosphere, as President Eisenhower has proposed. (Minutes of Meeting: Interdepartmental Working Group on Disarmament, March 25, 1959, 3/27/59)
April 1959
Due to French assistance and cooperation in Berlin, the Department of State decides to go forward with negotiations on the French fuel supply agreement. An agreement is signed on May 7 and ratified by Congress within a few months. However, since the United States refuses to follow through on a promise made by President Eisenhower to assist France in the development of a nuclear submarine, France believes the agreement is for less than what they want. (Kohl, pp. 88-89)
April 16-29, 1959
West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss visits the United States. U.S. officials wish to discuss Chancellor Adenauer's recent decision to resign and to encourage faster progress in the German military build-up. (Your Meeting with German Defense Minister Strauss, April 16, 1959, 4/15/59)
April 23, 1959
Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter sends a memo to President Eisenhower recommending against Prime Minister Macmillan's suggestion that the United States offer a temporary moratorium on non-atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, provided the Soviet Union reciprocates. Herter's recommendation is made after consideration of the proposal by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the CIA and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. (Voluntary Temporary Moratorium on Underground and High Altitude Tests, 4/23/59)
June 1959
A Four Power Conference of the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States is held in Geneva. France announces that it will not allow NATO atomic stockpiles in France unless it can retain control over the weapons. (Kohl, p. 91)
June 17, 1959
In consultation with his advisers, President Eisenhower questions the planned deployment of IRBMs in Greece and Turkey. Eisenhower notes that the bases not only are a "political drain" on our foreign affairs but are costly to maintain and place needed reserves in exposed forward areas. However, Eisenhower also declares that any change in policy should not be understood as a response to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threats to "obliterate Western Europe." (Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 17, 1959, 6/17/59)
June 22, 1959
Technical Working Group One meets in Geneva to study high-altitude detection problems. (See July 10, 1959, entry.) (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
June 27, 1959
The United States tenders a formal offer of NIKE and Honest John short-range ballistic missiles to the government of France. The French must agree that the nuclear warheads for these weapons will be supplied from the NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany. The United States hopes that this offer will increase French willingness to allow the establishment of a NATO Atomic Stockpile in France. (Offer of Nuclear-Capable Weapons to France, 7/1/59)
June 29, 1959
Upon request by President Eisenhower, science adviser James R. Killian outlines the terms for a disarmament policy review to be conducted by early 1960. (Attachments on Terms of Reference for Disarmament Policy Review, 6/29/59)
July 10, 1959
Technical Working Group One issues a proposal to establish a system of earth satellites and installations of additional equipment at control posts to detect high-altitude explosions. (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
July 23, 1959
The United States considers a plan of atomic testing in the event that negotiations on test cessation fail. ([Next Move on Atomic Testing and the Geneva Negotiations], 7/23/59)
August 26, 1959
The United States extends its unilateral nuclear weapons test moratorium through the end of 1959. (Geneva Nuclear Testing Negotiations--Meeting of Principals, 8/26/59; Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
August 27, 1959
The United Kingdom states that it will not resume its nuclear weapons testing as long as the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests shows potential for success. (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
August 28, 1959
The Soviet Union pledges not to resume its nuclear weapons tests unless the Western Powers do so. (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
August 30, 1959
President Eisenhower meets with Prime Minister Macmillan during a trip to Europe to discuss the political aspects of continuing nuclear test negotiations. Macmillan attempts to convince Eisenhower of the advantages of adding an additional moratorium on underground testing to the offer of a ban on atmospheric testing. Eisenhower makes no commitments. (Private Meeting between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, 8/30/59)
Mid-Late September 1959
The Soviet Union requests an exchange of officials with the United States to inspect "peaceful use" reactors. Soviet officials also propose that the two nations build a joint scientific facility in Vienna to research high energy physics. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, September 22, 1959, 9/24/59)
September 22-October 2, 1959
The Third IAEA General Conference takes place in Vienna. The Soviet representatives continue to press the United States on test suspension issues. Soviet representative Novikov repeatedly states the position that the United States must stop all tests and ban the bomb. He suggests that the two nations agree now and work out the details later. U.S. representative John A. McCone reports that the Soviets refuse to take the concerns of the United States seriously. In other developments, the IAEA Board of Governors approves provisional principles for applying Agency safeguards. (Memorandum of Discussions with Mr. Novikov and Mr. Zamyatin in Vienna during the IAEA Conference, 10/2/59; CRS3, p. 8)
November 3, 1959
In a speech, French President Charles de Gaulle asserts that France intends to acquire its own nuclear weapons, a force de frappe. Even after this speech, the French government continues to express hope for cooperation with the United States. (Mendl, p. 57)
November 25, 1959
Technical Working Group Two meets in Geneva to consider data from the Hardtack series of nuclear explosions and the findings of the President's Panel on Seismic Improvement. (See December 18, 1959, entry.) (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
Early December 1959
The National Security Council Planning Board recommends to the President that NSC 151/2 regarding the disclosure of atomic information to allied countries be rescinded since most of its provisions are covered by subsequent legislation or provisions in NSC 5906/1. The President concurs. (Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries, 12/3/59)
December 1, 1959
The Antarctic Treaty is signed. The Treaty designates Antarctica as a region to be used for peaceful purposes and explicitly prohibits nuclear testing or disposal of nuclear weapons there. (DD, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1550-1556; CRS3 p. 8)
December 11, 1959
Science adviser to the President James Killian writes to colleague Dr. George Kistiakowsky inquiring as to the feasibility of a missile test ban. Approximately one month earlier, President Eisenhower mentioned this idea to Lord Plowden, Britain's representative on atomic matters. ([Discussion of a Proposed Missile Test Ban], 12/11/59; Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 12, 1959, 11/13/59)
December 16, 1959
In an article on India's nuclear weapons capability, The Times of London cites an Indian government official as saying:
"The position is that our atomic energy work has reached the stage when we could, without any external assistance, produce atomic weapons if we so wished. It is, however, contrary to our policy to do so. There is no question of India being ahead of the leading atomic powers in knowledge of atomic weapons or the resources to make them. No work has been done in India on atomic weapons, nor is proposed to be done." (Kramish, p. 26)
December 18, 1959
Technical Working Group Two reports from Geneva that a large number of seismic events could not be identified without on-site inspections, even with improved monitoring techniques. The representative from the Soviet Union disagrees with these findings, restating the Soviets' belief that the utilization of national technical means is sufficient to monitor seismic events. (See December 28, 1958, entry.) (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
December 22, 1959
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy appoints Robert McKinney to conduct a review of international atomic policies and U.S. programs. McKinney's report is to be completed by mid-1960. ([Establishment of McKinney Committee to Review International Atomic Policies and Programs], 12/22/59)
Late December 1959
President Eisenhower visits India to demonstrate U.S. support in light of a border dispute with China. ([Indian Reaction to Prime Minister Nehru's Visit to Washington], 12/24/59)
December 29, 1959
The United States announces that it is free to resume testing after the end of 1959, but will not do so without giving advance notice. (See August 22, 1958, and August 29, 1959, entries.) (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
1960
The 1960 French loi de programmation (program law) determines the first developmental phase of the force de frappe. It authorizes the production of 50 Mirage IV bombers, the primary means of nuclear weapons delivery, and 50 nuclear bombs. It also authorizes further research on missiles and production of one nuclear submarine. (Kohl, pp. 100-102; Mendl, p. 151)
January 19, 1960
Gen. Lauris Norstad (SACEUR) writes to President Eisenhower noting that President de Gaulle may be willing to compromise on the issue of completely removing the French Naval Fleet from NATO's Mediterranean Command if the United States suggests a separate NATO naval command, under a French admiral, who would report directly to SACEUR. ([French Nuclear Program, Air Defense and French Mediterranean Force], 1/19/60)
February 11, 1960
The United States proposes an agreement for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, oceans and outer space. The plan becomes known as the Threshold Proposal. The limits of such tests include the greatest distance in space that could effectively be monitored and underground tests above 20 kilotons. The 20-kiloton threshold can be lowered as the capabilities for detection systems are improved. Between 20 and 30 percent of unidentifiable seismic events above the 20-kiloton threshold are to be inspected, according to the proposal. The United States estimates that approximately 20 inspections per year would need to be conducted in the Soviet Union. (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
February 13, 1960
France successfully detonates its first atomic device in the Sahara Desert. (Kohl, p. 103; CRS3, p. 9)
February 17, 1960
President Eisenhower holds a press conference where he clarifies his view on sharing nuclear information with U.S. allies. He notes that although the United States should do all it can to ensure the collective defense of its allies, "[p]resent law does not authorize the United States to transfer the ownership and custody of nuclear weapons to other nations...except under carefully restricted conditions." The President is questioned about the status of France regarding its access to U.S. aid and information, given its recent explosion of an atomic device. Eisenhower declines to comment. ([Extract from President Eisenhower's Press Briefing on the Atomic Energy Act and French Nuclear Test], 2/17/60)
Late February 1960
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission sends a small, technical fact-finding mission to India in order to assess the "technical and economic potential of the Indian nuclear power program." The government of India has approached the U.S. government regarding a cooperative nuclear power program. India is interested in obtaining three to five U.S.-type enriched uranium reactors totalling approximately 250 megawatts. (Toner Report, 2/12/60; [Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and India], 2/15/60)
March 1960
The Departments of State and Defense collaborate to "cut off French access to critical information and equipment in the guidance, propellant and re-entry warhead areas which would directly assist France in obtaining a strategic ballistic missile delivery capability." This represents a significant change in policy toward France. (Differences in Release of Information to U.K., France and Germany, 5/26/61)
March 19, 1960
The Soviet Union responds to the February 11, 1960, cessation proposal by the United States with its own plan. Moscow offers to conclude a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, together with a moratorium on underground tests below 20 kilotons, and agrees to a joint research program on the understanding that weapons tests would be halted during the course of the program. This proposal goes further on underground testing than the U.S. plan. However, the subject of on-site inspections is intentionally omitted. (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
March 24, 1960
Secretary of State Christian Herter sends a cable to the U.S. mission to NATO on the current position of NATO's medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) program. The United States is prepared to provide missiles to European countries where SACEUR has deployment requirements provided they are under SACEUR control. The countries are to produce the launching equipment; however, the United States would be willing to assist if necessary. ([U.S. Position on NATO's MRBM Program], 3/24/60)
March 24, 1960
In a conference with his advisers following an NSC meeting, President Eisenhower remarks that the United States is preparing the necessary facilities in order to continue conducting nuclear weapons tests in the event the Soviets violate an agreed-upon moratorium. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, March 24, 1960, 10:57 (After NSC), 3/24/60)
March 29, 1960
After a meeting between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at Camp David, the United States and the United Kingdom announce that they will agree to a voluntary moratorium on underground tests below 20 kilotons after a treaty for a bilateral nuclear research program is signed. An exchange of proposals in February and March 1960 illustrates progress in the area of a test ban treaty. However, a reversal in the position of the Soviet Union becomes apparent at the June 1961 meeting in Vienna between President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev when the Soviets link a test ban treaty to the issue of general and complete disarmament. Further, crises in Soviet-American relations during the Kennedy Administration delay the completion of a test ban treaty until August 1963. (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66; Seaborg, p. 23)
April 18, 1960
In a memo to the Arms Limitation and Control Panel set up to investigate a variety of proliferation problems, Harold Brown, director of defense research and engineering, notes the possibility of "combining with the Soviets to prevent other countries from getting nuclear weapons." This is one of the earliest indications that non-proliferation might be in the interests of both nuclear superpowers. (Considerations on the Nth Power Problem, 4/18/60)
April 19, 1960
In preparation for Gen. Charles de Gaulle's visit to Washington, D.C., on April 22, Secretary of State Christian Herter suggests that the United States pay tribute to France's great power role in the world, indicating that France's status is on par with the United Kingdom and the United States. Eisenhower is advised to state the "benefits of the NATO stockpile concept and hint at the possible long-term advantages of a multilateral NATO nuclear weapons capability as against the costly and debilitating effect of developing a purely national program...." (Visit of French President Charles de Gaulle, 4/19/60)
April 20, 1960
SACEUR Gen. Lauris Norstad writes to President Eisenhower concerning a suggested plan to place Metropolitan France under a separate air defense region under SHAPE. This is an effort to assuage the French reluctance to rely on NATO defense. France's military leaders approve the plan, but Minister of Defense Michel Debre is unable to discuss it in any detail with President de Gaulle because he simply does not have direct access to de Gaulle at all times. Norstad notes that "[a]s far as I can learn...de Gaulle has not yet given any real consideration of the specific proposal." ([Status of NATO-French Problems and Development of French Nuclear Forces], 4/20/60)
April 22-26, 1960
French President de Gaulle visits the United States to meet with President Eisenhower and to discuss briefly the procedures for the upcoming summit among the Soviet Union, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Eisenhower mentions correspondence received by him from nine African countries protesting French nuclear tests in the Sahara as well as French suppression of the Algerian rebellion, which they claim is driving the African nations out of the Western camp. (See May 16-18, 1960, entry.) (Visit of French President Charles de Gaulle, 4/19/60; Memorandum of Conversation--President's Office, 22 April 1960, 4/22/60)
April 26, 1960
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Herbert Loper presents a briefing to the NSC Planning Board on a plan to increase nuclear sharing with U.S. allies. ([Presentation of Herbert Loper Given to the National Security Council's Planning Board on Nuclear Arrangements with NATO], 4/26/60)
May 1, 1960
An American U-2 surveillance plane piloted by Gary Powers is shot down over the Soviet Union. (Beschloss, pp. 23-24)
May 16, 1960
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Clinton P. Anderson writes to Secretary of State Christian Herter expressing concern over the custody and control of atomic warheads. Current law asserts that all atomic warheads in the NATO stockpile system remain exclusively under the control of the United States. However, an article in the February 29, 1960, issue of U.S. News and World Report indicates the existence of the "2 key" concept, which ultimately gives the second country veto power over any U.S. decision to launch the missiles. ([JCAE Concern re: Control of Nuclear Warheads and Weapons Based in Europe], 5/16/60)
May 16-18, 1960
A Summit Meeting takes place in Paris involving the United States, France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The discussions are primarily concerned with decreasing international tension and with the possibility of disarmament. The prevailing view of the United States is that it is useful to continue the discussions on disarmament and the test ban at least until the Soviet view is known. Overall, the United States expects few results from the ongoing testing negotiations. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 18, 1960, 9 a.m.-- Paris, 6/6/60)
May 27, 1960
Seymon K. Tsarapkin, the Soviet delegate to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, states that the Soviet Union will withdraw from the Seismic Research Program since it has "no doubts regarding the validity of the report of the Geneva experts of 1958." (See July 1, 1958, and October 31, 1958, entries.) (Seaborg, p. 24)
June 15, 1960
James T. Ramey, executive director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), proposes an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which would clarify the "custody and transfer of atomic weapons vis-a-vis foreign nations and organizations." The amendment is made in light of JCAE Chairman Clinton Anderson's concern that U.S. law is not being applied in practice due to confusion over its interpretation. (See May 16, 1960, entry.) (Proposed Amendment to Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act, 6/15/60)
July 1, 1960
President Eisenhower agrees with Secretary of State Christian Herter that the United States should not agree to continue to suspend testing if there is still no nuclear test cessation treaty by September 1960. However, they also agree that this information should not be made public as it will become a focus of the 1960 election campaigns. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 1, 1960, 7/5/60)
July 12, 1960
The Department of Defense Missiles Panel recommends that the Skybolt missile program be discontinued due to technical unfeasibility in the original design and subsequent cost overruns. The Panel believes that the marginal defense advantage of the Skybolt can be adequately compensated for by a combination of the Minuteman and Polaris missile systems. The Missile Panel acknowledges that their recommendation, if accepted, has consequences for the United Kingdom, which has planned to deploy Skybolt as a primary defense system. However, the Panel also points out that the military advantage the Royal Air Force (RAF) would receive from Skybolt "appears weak anyway." (The Skybolt Air-Launched Ballistic Missile Program, 7/12/60)
July 12, 1960
The Science Advisory Committee presents to President Eisenhower the implications that a nuclear test ban agreement could have on Project Vista (the use of nuclear explosions for seismic research) and Project Plowshare (the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes). ([Transmission of a Presentation Entitled "Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations" Made by the President's Science Advisory Committee], 7/20/60)
August 1960
Robert R. Bowie submits his report, "The North Atlantic Nations: Task for the 1960s," more commonly known as the "Bowie Report," to Secretary of State Christian Herter. Herter requested that Bowie prepare the report following the 1959 meeting of the NATO Council which devoted three days to discussing the state of the Alliance with respect to the international situation. In this Report, Bowie proposes a sea-based multilateral force in an attempt to find some common ground between previous multilateral force proposals and France's (among others) objections to U.S. control of land-based nuclear warheads. (The North Atlantic Nations Tasks for the 1960s: A Report to the Secretary of State, 8/60)
August 3, 1960
Gen. Norstad discusses with President Eisenhower the views of the NATO nations regarding nuclear relations with the United States. Eisenhower notes that the United States should not treat its allies as second rate; he adds that all NATO nations could conceivably desire nuclear weapons. Norstad favors a "multilateral solution, in which the weapons are turned over to NATO as an entity." Lamenting the difficulty of nuclear relations, Eisenhower remarks that the "Atomic Energy Act is a very defective and `terrible' law, which has done great harm to the conduct of our relations with our allies." (Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 3, 1960, 2:45 p.m., Newport, 8/8/60)
August 19, 1960
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Chairman John A. McCone discusses the current U.S. position on the test cessation negotiations. The Soviet Union's intransigence regarding inspection of the U.S. seismic research program (Project Vista), despite the U.S. offer of multilateral inspections of test devices, is due to a leak of the United States fall-back position to allow unilateral inspection by the Soviets. McCone emphatically states that the fall-back position would "cause a great deal of trouble in Congress" and is unlikely to be approved. Despite the negotiation stalemate, McCone notes that it would be a shock to world opinion to break off the talks. Nevertheless, the differences between the United States and the Soviet positions in Geneva are seen as enormous. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 15, 1960, 8/19/60)
August 23, 1960
Director General of the IAEA W. Sterling Cole proposes that the United States formalize the suggestion recently made by U.S. Ambassador Lodge at the U.N. Disarmament Committee to place under "international authority" a limited quantity of U-235 material, to be matched by the Soviet Union, which would be dedicated only for peaceful purposes. Cole suggests that at the upcoming IAEA General Conference the United States name the IAEA as the appropriate "international authority" and transfer on a matching basis its U-235 weapons material, or all of its U-235 to the Agency without cost. If taken, this action would be a significant step toward disarmament. ([Transfer of Uranium 235 to the International Atomic Energy Agency], 8/23/60)
August 26, 1960
The U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, reports some concern regarding Israeli efforts to produce uranium and heavy water in Israel. Embassy officials believe that Israel is actually pursuing more research in this area than it publicly admits and notes that any information on Israel's collaboration with France or similar nations should be monitored. (Israel's Uranium Potential, 8/26/60)
September 19, 1960
Members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy visit Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) en route to the IAEA Conference to ascertain the state of storage, custody and control of nuclear weapons based in Europe. (Visit of Senator John O. Pastore, Member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 9/19/60)
September 20-October 1, 1960
The IAEA holds its fourth General Conference. U.S. representative to the Conference and AEC Chairman John McCone urges all members to increase their voluntary contributions to the Agency. He also endorses the IAEA safeguards and inspection procedures that were approved in April 1960. (CRS3, p. 9)
September 20, 1960
The Department of State cables the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv noting that the Department has no information regarding "Israel's collaboration with France or other countries in the exploitation of its uranium resources." ([Department of State Has No Information regarding Israel's Nuclear Collaboration with France], 9/20/60)
October 4, 1960
President Eisenhower discusses with his advisers and Secretary General of NATO Paul-Henri Spaak the concept of an integrated nuclear strike force to reassure European partners of an adequate defense. They also discuss the circumstances under which NATO might want to use the strike force. Eisenhower remarks that there are hardly any circumstances under which a conflict in Europe would not involve the use of nuclear weapons; however, a limited conflict is conceivable in Middle East nations such as Greece, Turkey or Iran. (NATO Atomic Force, 10/4/60)
October 14, 1960
The Air Force Chief of Staff rejects some of the recommendations made in the Bowie Report. He notes that some "piece-meal" changes in strategy based in part on the report have been made without review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or approval by any authority. (See August 1960 entry.) (Department of Defense Position on Nuclear Sharing with Allies, 10/14/60)
October 15, 1960
The progress report on the implementation of NSC 5725/1 concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy is completed for internal U.S. government use. (Progress Report by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State on the State of Implementation of NSC 5725/1--Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 10/15/60)
October 15, 1960
Gen. Norstad, Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess and Ambassador Amory Houghton inform Secretary of State Herter of the European view of the NATO MRBM Force. The European members are concerned that they do not have a significant voice in the decision to use the weapons in the NATO atomic stockpile. However, they believe that the proper way to allay these concerns is through the Alliance and not through a series of bilateral guarantees by the United States. Thus, there is concern that the bilateral approach of the MRBM Force may ultimately be extended to all nuclear weapons in Europe. Norstad, Burgess and Houghton urge that serious consideration be given to a U.S. proposal that would provide the Europeans with a greater voice in the use of existing weapons. ([Observations and Recommendations on Problems of Nuclear Sharing within the NATO Alliance], 10/15/60)
November 8, 1960
AEC Chairman John McCone suggests that NATO create a nuclear stockpile to which all NATO countries contribute. If a country cannot produce the fissionable material itself, then it can purchase it from the United States. It is thought that even France might agree to this, provided President de Gaulle does not insist on a national stockpile, despite its extreme expense. (Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 8, 1960--10:30 a.m., 11/8/60)
November 10, 1960
Herbert B. Loper, assistant to the secretary of defense for atomic energy, submits a report to Clinton Anderson, chairman of the JCAE, on the chronological history of the custody of atomic weapons. ([Transmission of Chronological History of Custody of Atomic Weapons], 11/10/60)
November 16, 1960
An NSC Planning Board meeting discusses "NATO in the 1960s," a joint report prepared by the Departments of State and Defense. The report covers three areas of interest: a) The Future of NATO; b) The Roles and Contributions of the United States and Other NATO Nations; and c) Future NATO Nuclear Capabilities and the Problem of Nuclear Sharing. (NATO in the 1960s, 11/16/60)
November 19, 1960
Soviet Professor Emelyanov remarks to AEC Chairman John McCone that "India could make weapons from the plutonium that would be produced in the natural uranium reactors Dr. Bhabha wished" from the Soviet Union. Dr. Bhabha is director of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. ([Development of an Indian Nuclear Reactor], 11/19/60)
November 22, 1960
Advisers to Vice President-elect Lyndon B. Johnson provide background information regarding French President Charles de Gaulle's views on France's nuclear capability. Johnson is told hat the real reason for France's insistence on developing an independent nuclear force is not because of legal and political intransigence by the United States but because "he [de Gaulle] believes that France cannot in fact be recognized as a co-equal with the U.S., England and Russia unless it has its own nuclear capability." Johnson is advised that in discussions with France he should be most concerned with the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into irresponsible hands and thereby increasing the chance of "nuclear blackmail" or accidental nuclear war. (Visit with President de Gaulle, 11/22/60)
November 22, 1960
Information is passed to the U.S. Embassy in Paris regarding French participation in the Israeli nuclear power program. The French-Israeli agreement is regarded as "internal" as it was not negotiated government-to-government but rather between respective Atomic Energy Commissions. The agreement consists of collaboration in heavy water production and uranium extracting and production from phosphate deposits. The United Kingdom is also participating in the heavy water production. Dr. Bergman of the Israeli AEC has also approached the United States with respect to a joint development project on a nuclear reactor. ([French Participation in the Construction of a Nuclear Power Plant in Beersheba, Israel], 11/22/60)
November 26, 1960
Secretary of State Christian Herter receives "urgent and secret" information regarding the Israeli nuclear power reactor. Although previous information claimed that Israel was not yet building a reactor, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion has secretly leaked information regarding a five-year plan of nuclear development, "...simultaneously revealing construction [of a] nuclear power plant [in the] vicinity of Beersheba." Further information implies that France, despite its denial that it participated in the construction of the plant, apparently has done so without "consideration [of] IAEA or EURATOM implications." (See November 24, 1960, entry.) (["Urgent and Secret" Information on the Israeli Nuclear Program is Obtained], 11/26/60; Research and Training Program in Field of Atomic Energy, 11/30/60)
November 26-December 13, 1960
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy visits the Allied Command Europe and SACEUR "to witness first hand the manner in which the U.S. is discharging its responsibility in the NATO Special Ammunition Storage Program." (Visit of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress to Allied Command Europe, 11/16/60)
December 1960
At the NATO Ministerial Conference in Paris, Secretary of State Christian Herter proposes that a Multilateral Force (MLF) be organized for NATO as a way for non-nuclear nations to have some control over NATO nuclear weapons on their territory. (All MLF nations would have a voice in the release of MLF nuclear weapons.) This control would be subject to the veto power of the United States, and participating states would relinquish their own acquisition of nuclear weapons in exchange. (Critical Assessment of the Multilateral Force, 10/3/64)
December 1, 1960
The United States has confirmation by a U-2 surveillance photo that the Israelis have been constructing a nuclear reactor south of Beersheba. It is believed to be a Marcoule-type reactor which has been under construction for about two years with French assistance. The State Department is advised not to believe French denials of their participation in the project. (Israeli Atomic Energy Program, 12/1/60; Spector1, p. 134)
December 8, 1960
The Central Intelligence Agency completes for classified circulation Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 100-8-60, entitled "Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability." The document remains classified. (Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability, 12/8/60*)
December 13, 1960
The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the People's Republic of China could conduct a nuclear weapons test as soon as 1963. This estimate is made in the classified National Intelligence Estimate NIE) 13-2-60 report entitled, "The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program." (The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program, 12/13/60)
December 16, 1960
Ernest Bergmann, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Israel, calls stories stating that Israel is producing an atomic bomb "flattering but false" and "grossly exaggerated." ([Israeli Press Reports on Alleged Nuclear Power Plant Construction], 12/18/60)
December 18, 1960
During an interview on national television, AEC Chairman John McCone is pressed for information regarding assistance Israel might have received from other countries in constructing its nuclear reactor. He expresses doubt that Israel has received assistance from anyone. (["Meet the Press" with Guest John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission], 12/18/60)
December 20, 1960
The U.N. General Assembly passes Resolution 1577 (XV) which proposes the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. This resolution is similar to U.N. Resolution 1402, which was passed on November 21, 1959. (Significant Dates in Atomic Weapons Development and Subsequent Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 1/1/66)
December 21, 1960
While answering questions before the Knesset, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion admits that Israel is building a nuclear reactor in the Negev Desert. He says that the 24-megawatt reactor will be used for peaceful research and training. He notes that the reactor is similar to the reactor that Canada supplied India, only of a smaller capacity. (The Indian reactor is 40 megawatts.) ([Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's Responses to Questions Asked in the Knesset concerning a New Israeli Nuclear Reactor], 12/21/60)
December 21, 1960
Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman meets with Secretary of State Christian Herter to assure the United States that the Israeli nuclear reactor is for peaceful purposes only. Herter informs Harman that the U.S. government is "firmly opposed to proliferation of nuclear weapon/capabilities and therefore deeply interested in having [a] full and frank account [of] Israeli atomic activities, including plans for disposing of plutonium which will be bred by Israel's new reactor." ([Substance of Conversation with Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman on the Israeli Nuclear Program], 12/21/60)
December 24, 1960
Jordanian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Musa Nasir notes the threat to Arab countries that Israeli construction of a nuclear reactor implies, and states that if "Israel has intention [of] making atom bomb[,] later on [the] Arabs will not delay getting their own." ([Appraisal of Atomic Developments in Israel Is Given to Jordanians], 12/24/60)
December 27, 1960
A "reliable" source informs the Department of State that the reason for Israeli secrecy surrounding the research reactor is to protect foreign contractors who have been providing services and supplies for the reactor from being boycotted by Arab countries. ([Reason for Secrecy in the Israeli Atomic Development Project Was to Protect Foreign Companies with Contracts in Arab Countries], 12/27/60)
January 6, 1961
Secretary of State Christian Herter testifies before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Upon describing the recent revelation of Israel's nuclear reactor at Dimona, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) says that the Israelis have lied "like horse thieves." ([Regarding Israel's Nuclear Capability], 1/6/61)
January 10, 1961
A representative of the U.S. Mission to the European Community informs the Department of State that France did notify Euratom that it had a bilateral agreement with Israel to help in the construction of a reactor. This was the minimum requirement of Article 105 of the Euratom Treaty. However, since the French-Israeli agreement preceded the Treaty, France was not required to seek approval for its exports of nuclear materials to Israel. (Franco-Israeli Reactor, 1/10/61)
January 17, 1961
The Italian Agreement for Cooperation for Military Uses of Atomic Energy is sent to the U.S. Congress for approval. This Agreement will allow the United States to transfer non-nuclear parts of weapons systems to and exchange classified data with Italy. ([Notes on Various Problems in the Atomic Energy Program], 2/21/61)
January 20, 1961
President John F. Kennedy is inaugurated as the 35th President of the United States. (Sorensen, p. 243)
January 21, 1961
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Chester Holifield (D-California) briefs President Kennedy on the activities of the JCAE. Holifield warns Kennedy not to oppose progress on projects proposed by the AEC on the grounds that a requirement" for the project cannot yet be formally established by the military. A "requirement" in this case is understood as a perceived need for a weapons system that will respond to a specific military threat. ([Notes on Various Problems in the Atomic Energy Program], 2/21/61)
January 30, 1961
Newly-inaugurated President Kennedy is apprised of the Israeli nuclear program by his appointed secretary of state Dean Rusk. (Israel's Atomic Energy Activities, 1/30/61)
January 31, 1961
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approves guidelines for safeguards. The safeguards will be subject to review after two years. (CRS3, p. 10)
March 3, 1961
Secretary of State Dean Rusk notifies several Middle Eastern nations that the United States is committed at the highest levels of government to opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities "as firmly in Israel as elsewhere." Rusk also notes that all those concerned must keep vigilant watch over others' nuclear energy programs, not only in the initial stages, but later on as well in order to ensure that they remain purely for peaceful purposes. ([United States Government is Committed at Every Level to Stopping Nuclear Proliferation in Israel and Elsewhere], 3/3/61)
March 21, 1961
Arthur H. Dean, the U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, presents a compromise proposal to the Soviet Union. This proposal, which was produced by a review panel headed by Dr. James Fisk, includes the following:
"1. reducing the number of control (inspection) posts on Soviet territory from 21 to 19, and in the United States from 17 to 16;
"2. extending the proposed moratorium on small underground tests from 27 months to 3 years;
"3. instituting the means to ban all nuclear weapons tests in space;
"4. asking Congress for authority to allow Soviet internal inspection of nuclear devices used in seismic research and peaceful engineering programs;
"5. accepting veto power over the total annual budget;
"6. organizing a Control Commission so that the Soviet Union has a voice equal to the United States and United Kingdom in managing the control system." (Report on the Nuclear Testing Ban Negotiations Held at Geneva, Switzerland, March-September, 1961, 10/2/61)
May 8, 1961
Assistants to President Kennedy outline the essential principles of a statement announcing the resumption of nuclear testing, if it should become necessary. ([Proposals for the President's Statement on the Resumption of Nuclear Testing], 5/8/61)
May 11, 1961
Director of Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown releases a report reassessing the Skybolt missile system. (Report on Project #41A "Reassess the Skybolt Project as Presently Oriented and for Possible Use in Connection with Weapon Systems Other Than the B-52," 5/11/61)
May 16, 1961
The Strategic Air Command's headquarters in Nebraska warns the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Soviet Union may "have been engaged in surreptitious nuclear testing" and recommends that the United States resume testing without delay. ([USSR Resumption of Nuclear Testing], 5/16/61)
May 16-18, 1961
President Kennedy visits Canada to discuss nuclear weapons for Canadian forces, the Nuclear Test Ban, disarmament and NATO developments. (Additional Background Material for President's Trip to Ottawa, May 17, 5/10/61)
May 31-June 2, 1961
President Kennedy visits French President Charles de Gaulle in Paris. Kennedy discusses sharing technical information and weapons systems, such as the Pershing missile, with the French and Germans. President de Gaulle does not discuss France's nuclear program with Kennedy except to explain why it is necessary. (Comments in Existing Policy of Withholding Technical Information..., 5/26/61; Giving U.S. Information on Ballistic Missiles to France..., 5/26/61; Notes of Points Made during the Private Discussion between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan..., 6/8/61)
June 3-4, 1961
President Kennedy meets with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna. The goal is to discuss ways in which both superpowers can prevent their military competition from erupting into war. (President's Meeting with Khrushchev, Vienna, June 3-4, 1961: Progress toward a Viable World Order, 5/26/61)
June 4, 1961
A foreign source close to Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan provides an account of how Israel made the decision to build the atomic reactor at Dimona. The source says the plan was initiated by Dayan and Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres but brought before the Israeli Cabinet for approval. The source goes on to say that Dayan and Peres believed that the United States would turn down any request for aid in building the reactor but that France would not. Lastly, the source adds that the Israelis anticipated that the United States "would do no more than display [an] angry attitude" at not being informed. ([Israeli Cabinet Decision to Build the Nuclear Reactor], 6/2/61)
July 21, 1961
The report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing is completed for the National Security Council. The report, which is also referred to as the Panofsky Report, considers the technical issues related to the decision to resume nuclear testing without addressing the non-technical and military issues which are equally important. (Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing, 7/21/61)
August 1961
The United States and the Soviet Union begin negotiations toward the establishment of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). In December 1961, both nations issue a joint statement announcing the Committee. (Shaker, pp. 71-72)
August 2, 1961
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) submit their comments on the Panofsky Report to Jerome Weisner, special assistant to the president for science and technology. The JCS strongly disagree with the report and reaffirm their view that nuclear testing should be resumed as soon as it is politically feasible. ([Comments on Report By the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing--Joint Chiefs of Staff Comments on the Report Attached], 8/3/61)
August 3, 1961
Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, sends his comments on the Panofsky Report to Jerome Weisner. Dulles notes that the reports conclusions are consistent with Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-9A-61 dated April 25, 1961. He says that the reports estimates of Soviet weapons technology are also consistent with intelligence. This comment contradicts the JCS belief that the report is based on erroneous estimates. (See August 2, 1961, entry.) ([Report of the Panel on Nuclear Testing Appears Consistent with Intelligence Estimates], 8/3/61)
August 3, 1961
President Kennedy notifies British Prime Minister Macmillan of his intent to resume nuclear testing after one last attempt to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Kennedy requests that a British negotiator accompany a U.S. representative to Geneva for one last combined effort. ([Conclusions Reached with Regard to the Nuclear Test Ban], 8/3/61)
August 4, 1961
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Glenn T. Seaborg notes that in addition to deciding whether or not to resume nuclear tests, there is the urgent question of whether the Nevada Test Site has been adequately prepared for carrying out tests, particularly underground tests which take longer and are more difficult to prepare. ([Readiness of the Nevada Test Site and the Question of Laboratory Experiments], 8/4/61)
August 4, 1961
John J. McCloy, President Kennedy's adviser on disarmament, and George Ball, acting secretary of state, recommend to the President that he defer any announcement to resume testing until the end of the year. They believe that taking this action would serve to enhance the position of the United States at the U.N. General Assembly meeting in September and increase support for the Geneva negotiating position, particularly U.S. initiatives on disarmament. (Report of Panel on Nuclear Testing, 8/4/61)
August 10, 1961
Vice President Lyndon Johnson receives a memo noting that some of the Panofsky Report's authors may be possible pacifists reluctant "to commit scientific achievement to destructive purposes...." The memo prompts some doubt as to the validity of the reports conclusion that nuclear testing should not be resumed. (Nuclear Testing, 8/10/61)
August 13, 1961
Construction of the Berlin Wall begins. (Wyden, p. 26)
August 31, 1961
The Soviet Union announces that it will resume nuclear weapons tests. Within hours of the announcement, the Soviets test one device in the atmosphere. (Report on the Nuclear Testing Ban Negotiations Held at Geneva, Switzerland, March-September, 1961, 10/2/61)
September 9, 1961
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev formally rejects the joint U.S.-U.K. atmospheric test ban proposal. On the same day, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests recesses. Despite urging by the United Kingdom and the United States that the negotiations continue after the issue is debated in the General Assembly, the Soviets refuse to commit themselves to a date. (Report on the Nuclear Testing Ban Negotiations Held at Geneva, Switzerland, March-September, 1961, 10/2/61)
September 12, 1961
The proposed Agreement for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes between the government of the United States and the Republic of France is reviewed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. President Kennedy urges Congress to pass the Agreement and put it into effect promptly because "the gravity of the situation compels special action." The "gravity" the President refers to is the erection of the Berlin Wall by the Soviet Union. (See August 13, 1961, entry.) (Proposed Agreement for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes between the Government of the United States and the Republic of France, 9/12/61)
September 27, 1961
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that France "authorize the U.S. to stockpile atomic weapons in France" in order to provide the United States greater flexibility in responding to the Berlin crisis with theater forces. (Vice President's Visit to Paris 29-30 September 1961: Emergency Authority To Stockpile Atomic Weapons in France, 9/27/61)
November 2, 1961
At a meeting of the National Security Council, Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, notes that the current U.S. program of underground tests cannot "compete with an aboveground program, such as the Soviets are now conducting." President Kennedy remarks that no one should conclude from the meeting that the United States will resume testing. At the same meeting, President Kennedy asks Dr. Norris Bradbury about the status of the neutron bomb. Bradbury responds that "from a technical standpoint there was no such thing at present and he regretted that this notion had become so popular." (Notes on National Security Council Meeting--2 November 1961, 11/2/61)
November 2, 1961
President Kennedy gives a statement to the press on nuclear testing. While criticizing the Soviet decision to resume atmospheric tests, the President announces that the United States will reserve the right to undertake such tests "only to the degree that the orderly and essential scientific development of new weapons has reached a point where effective progress is not possible without such tests--and only within limits that restrict the fall-out from such tests to an absolute minimum." ([Presidential Statement on Soviet Nuclear Testing], 11/2/61)
November 16, 1961
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara sends a cable to Lauris Norstad in which he agrees with the decision not to provide enriched uranium to France. This decision s consistent with President Kennedy's policy of not assisting other nations in their efforts to create independent national nuclear capabilities. ([No U.S. Enriched Uranium for Military Purposes Should Be Given to France], 11/16/61)
December 4, 1961
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1665 on the "prevention of the wider disarmament of nuclear weapons" is passed. (UNGA, XVI, 1665)
December 5, 1961
A resolution proposed by Ireland on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is unanimously passed by the U.N. General Assembly. The resolution (A/RES/16650) calls upon
"all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavors to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear states would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons." (Talking Paper for Bilateral Discussion on Disarmament and Nuclear Testing, 9/1/62)
January 5, 1962
A secret memorandum is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on how the U.S. government might articulate to Congress, the American people and U.S. allies why there is a need to resume testing nuclear weapons. (Annex A to Report Entitled Program to Explain U.S. Position on Testing in the Atmosphere, 1/5/62)
February 2, 1962
A National Security Council meeting takes place which focuses on assessing the most recent Soviet atmospheric tests and on discussing the U.S. nuclear testing series planned for spring. (Minutes of Meeting on the Status of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Tests--February 2, 1962, 2/2/62)
February 27, 1962
The National Security Council meets to discuss the resumption of atmospheric testing and the upcoming Geneva Conference on disarmament. Secretary of State Dean Rusk argues that the United States should postpone testing until after it becomes clear that no reasonable progress has been made in the discussions. He prefers that the United States begin the conference having already reached the maximum possible number of concessions. Although Secretary Rusk holds out a small hope for agreement, he recognizes that ratifying a treaty under these circumstances will be unlikely. (Notes on National Security Council Meeting --10:00 a.m., February 27, 1962, 2/27/62)
Late February-Early March 1962
Before the U.N. Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament begins in Geneva, the heads of the Western delegations meet to discuss a variety of issues, in particular the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. ([Third Meeting of Disarmament Conference Heads of Delegation: Discussion of U.S. Redraft Communique on Nuclear Testing], 2/28/62; [Fourth Meeting of the Disarmament Conference Chiefs: Discussion of Proposal for Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles], 3/1/62; [Fifth Meeting of the Disarmament Conference Heads: Discussion of No-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons], 3/2/62)
March 9, 1962
The State Department notes that the signing of the atomic cooperation agreement between the United States and Belgium (agreed to in January) has been delayed due to unresolved questions on the further dispersal of U.S. nuclear weapons to non-U.S. forces overseas. The Department of State urges that the signing take place as soon as possible because a long delay may seriously strain U.S.-Belgian relations. (Atomic Cooperation Agreement with Belgium (144b Agreement), 3/9/62)
March 13, 1962
U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Arthur H. Dean briefs NAC on the negotiating position of the United States for the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. The U.S. position includes calling for the following:
"1) a 30 percent reduction in strategic and conventional weapons over a three-year period;
"2) production of intercontinental and "less than intercontinental" strategic vehicles;
"3) reduction of U.S. military personnel to 2.1 million;
"4) the transfer of 50,000 kilograms of U-235 [to an international authority] for peaceful purposes, an offer which must be matched by the Soviet Union." (NATO Briefing on U.S. Disarmament Proposal, 3/15/62)
March 23, 1962
President Kennedy approves the U.S.-Belgium Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. ([Approval of Agreement between the U.S. and Belgium for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes], 3/23/62)
April 18, 1962
The National Security Council meets and, with the approval of President Kennedy, agrees on the nuclear testing series planned for 1962. They also agree that the "announcements of the tests would be made in the lowest possible key by the Atomic Energy Commission." (Nuclear Atmosphere Test Series, 1962, 4/18/62)
May 28, 1962
The U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, sends a cable to the Department of State regarding a hotel near the atomic reactor site in Dimona. Embassy officials believe that the hotel is housing French scientists who they suspect are helping to build the reactor. (Atomic Reactor Near Dimona, 5/28/62)
June 8, 1962
The Department of State cables guidance to the U.S. Mission to NATO warning that discussions of "NATO reorganization", i.e., integration of British and French nuclear capabilities into a European command structure, should not occur while British entry into the Common Market is being considered. ([No Discussions of NATO Reorganization Should Take Place While the British Entry into the Common Market is Being Negotiated], 6/8/62)
June 9, 1962
Raymond Aron, French sociologist and commentator, writes in the June 8th edition of Figaro, that certain discussions are taking place in Washington regarding the creation of a NATO nuclear force. He also asserts that the British might exchange nuclear expertise for admission into the European Community. (Raymond Aron on the Creation of a European Nuclear Force, 6/9/62)
June 26, 1962
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara delivers the commencement address at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The speech is noteworthy for its unprecedented discussion of the U.S. military doctrine on nuclear war. McNamara states that the United States should approach general nuclear war in the same manner as conventional military operations. He also states that using nuclear weapons to destroy enemy forces while preserving ones own society is feasible. He asserts that it is important not only to have a strong nuclear arsenal but to be able to protect one's command and control against nuclear attack. The speech is one of the first expressions of the new military strategy called "flexible response." (Remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at the Commencement Exercises, University of Michigan, 5/31/62*; [President Kennedy's Concern over Secretary of Defense McNamara's Speech at the University of Michigan], 6/1/62; [Revisions of Defense Secretary McNamara's Speech Are Approved], 6/7/62; Remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at the Commencement Exercises, University of Michigan, 6/16/62)
July 26, 1962
Advisers to President Kennedy meet to discuss the ongoing negotiations of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), sends a memorandum to President Kennedy four days later which outlines ACDA's position on test ban negotiations. Foster recommends that the United States table a treaty banning all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. (U.S. Program regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapon Tests and Other Disarmament Proposals, 7/30/62)
August 4, 1962
Carl Kaysen, an adviser to President Kennedy forwards a cable to Kennedy from British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan containing Macmillan's statement on Blue Water, a naval development strategy. Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara suggest that it not be shared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly Gen. Maxwell Taylor, as it is likely to encourage a public battle on conventional war and tactical nuclear war. ([Comments on Harold Macmillan's Statement on Blue Water], 8/4/62)
August 27, 1962
The United States submits two treaty proposals to the Geneva Disarmament Committee. The first is a comprehensive test ban treaty which would be monitored by "an internationally supervised system of nationally operated control posts." The second is a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space and oceans which would not require any on-site verification procedures. (Talking Paper for Bilateral Discussion on Disarmament and Nuclear Testing, 9/1/62)
Mid-Late September 1962
U.S. representatives brief the North Atlantic Council on Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) proposals. The Kennedy Administration expresses its willingness to consider an MRBM proposal only in the context of a MLF because it is totally opposed to any plan that involves nationally-manned MRBM forces in Europe. ([Instructions to U.S. Representative to North Atlantic Council Following Initial Report of NAC Talks on Multilateral Force], 9/22/62)
October 13-26, 1962
The Cuban Missile Crisis occurs. The United States determines from intelligence photos taken by a U-2 surveillance plane that the Soviet Union has begun construction of an intermediate-range missile facility on Cuba. At the end of 13 days, with international tensions peaking, and in the face of a U.S. naval blockade of Cuba, the Soviet Union consents to withdraw the missiles and agrees not to place any there in the future. Shortly thereafter, the United States withdraws its intermediate-range Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey. The Crisis has wide-ranging effects, including spurring negotiations for a nuclear free zone in Latin America. (The Treaty of Tlatelolco enters into force six years later.) (Medland, pp. 1-30)
October 17, 1962
Senator Chester Holifield (D-California) responds to a news article in The New York Times that reports that the United States has plans to sell the government of France a nuclear submarine. Senator Holifield affirms that no proposal was ever made to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and that the policy of the Committee has been "to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines to other nations." (Statement by Chairman Holifield in Response to Inquiries regarding Possible Transfer of Nuclear Submarine to France, 10/17/62)
December 14, 1962
British press accounts report that the production of Skybolt missiles and the sale of 100 missiles to the United Kingdom may be in jeopardy. The reports state that the United States plans to offer the Polaris missile as a replacement. ([Reaction in the British Press to the Skybolt Affair], 12/14/62)
December 17, 1962
The Skybolt missile program is reviewed in a document entitled, "Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement for a Substitute Weapon Incident to Skybolt Cancellation." The document reveals that all five tests of the Skybolt missile failed and that a number of the major components fell far short of the design goals. The report adds that the planned readiness dates and costs of the program are no longer realistic. The United States "reluctantly" concludes that "earlier doubts about Skybolt are correct...." Based on this document, the United States tries to rectify the situation for the British by telling them that they can continue developing Skybolt at their own expense. After the British decide not to proceed with Skybolt, both governments agree that the United States will provide assistance in acquiring a substitute vehicle on similar terms. The United Kingdom requests that the United States sell the Polaris missile system to them for the cost of production. (Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement for a Substitute Weapon Incident to the Skybolt Cancellation, 12/17/62)
December 19-21, 1962
President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan meet in the Bahamas and sign the Nassau Pact, which transfers Polaris nuclear missiles to the United Kingdom. The Pact also articulates the joint commitment of U.S. and British atomic weapons to a Multilateral Force (MLF) for NATO use. The two parties also release a joint communique which notes, in particular, the need to cancel the Skybolt missile program and the British desire to substitute the Polaris. (Text of Kennedy-Macmillan Communique of Meeting at Nassau, Bahamas, December 21, 1962 in Washington Post December 22, 1962, 12/22/62)
January 7, 1963
President Kennedy writes to British Prime Minister Macmillan, sympathizing with the harsh criticism Macmillan has suffered in the British press as a result of the Skybolt cancellation. He also notes "the real achievement of [the] Nassau [Pact] in blending independence and interdependence." Regarding France, he writes that although there have been some exchanges with Gen. de Gaulle, he is not convinced that de Gaulle is seeking an agreement similar to the Nassau Pact. ([Nassau Agreement and the Skybolt Affair], 1/7/63)
February 12, 1963
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara briefs President Kennedy on the rate at which new countries are likely to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Interestingly, McNamara notes that China, Israel, Sweden and India are the nations that are most likely to acquire such a capacity in the next 10 years and that Chinese possession may spur efforts by Australia and Japan. McNamara warns that a South African nuclear program should not be ruled out. (The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with and without a Test Ban Agreement, 2/12/63)
March 15, 1963
The Department of State notes that the government of Israel is planning to purchase a 125-megawatt-capacity nuclear power reactor. In an interoffice memorandum, William Crawford of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs suggests that the Israelis purchase a General Electric natural water and enriched uranium reactor. This sale would have two implications: first, the reactor would be subject to inspections either by the United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency; and second, the Israelis would have to purchase the fuel elements from the United States because they are not available elsewhere. (Israel's Atomic Energy Programs, 3/15/63)
July 8, 1963
The Soviet Union suggests that a multilateral test ban agreement among the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviets be accompanied by a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This issue will be negotiated this month at the U.S.-USSR bilateral talks. (Allied Attitudes on Linking a Test Ban Agreement with a Non-Aggression Pact, 7/8/63)
July 12, 1963
In a memorandum to President Kennedy, William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), summarizes ACDA's findings regarding the political implications of a nuclear test ban as follows: "In the perspective of the next ten years, the significance of a nuclear test ban lies more in the political doors which it might assist in opening than in the military doors which it might close." (Political Implications of a Nuclear Testing Ban, 7/12/63)
July 15, 1963
The Department of State sends a telegram from President Kennedy to Averill Harriman, ambassador to the Soviet Union, during Harriman's trip to Moscow to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). Kennedy instructs Harriman "to elicit [Khrushchevs] view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to accept U.S. action aimed in this direction." Khrushchev apparently is not interested and views the Chinese nuclear program as inconsequential for the Soviets in the near future. (Seaborg, p. 111)
July 23, 1963
Walt W. Rostow of the Department of State Policy Planning Staff sends a memorandum to President Kennedy outlining the prospects for obtaining French adherence to the soon-to-be-completed test ban agreement. Rostow notes the potential contradictions of a strategy that seeks to obtain France's acquiescence to a test ban by offering to aid their nuclear program. (Attached Memo on "French and the Test Ban," 7/23/63)
July 25, 1963
The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) negotiations are completed. The preliminary text is signed by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow. The Treaty prohibits testing of nuclear devices in space, in the atmosphere and under water. (DD, 1963, pp. 249-250)
September 20, 1963
In bilateral discussions between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, Secretary of State Dean Rusk notes that "[t]he President feels strongly that we must proceed with the MLF. The U.S. believes that if the MLF goes ahead, the U.K. will join." ([International Situation, East-West Relations, NATO, Multilateral Force and European Problems], 9/20/63)
October 1963
General Electric signs a contract with India to build two 210-megawatt light water reactors (LWR) at Tarapur. These are the first power reactors exported by the United States outside the industrialized world, signifying a change in U.S. non-proliferation efforts. The safeguards in the contract are to be project-specific (i.e., applicable only to the two reactors). This safeguards policy is contrary to the policy requirements of the Atoms for Peace program. (Tarapur: A Brief for the United States, 6/21/84)
October 21, 1963
The Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa notifies the United States that the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission has purchased from the South African Atomic Energy Board a quantity of uranium oxide equal to 10 tons of natural uranium. ([Israeli Purchase of Uranium Oxide from South Africa], 10/21/63)
November 15, 1963
Special Adviser to the President Richard Neustadt produces a top secret report for President Kennedy reviewing the events which led to the Skybolt affair. (Skybolt and Nassau: American Policy Making and Anglo-American Relations, 11/15/63)
November 22, 1963
President Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Vice President Lyndon Johnson is sworn into office at 2:30 p.m., less than one hour after Kennedy's death is announced. (Bornet, pp. 7-8)
January 1964
The U.S. intelligence acknowledges that Israel currently possesses two reactors: "a 5 megawatt reactor under IAEA safeguards, and a 26 megawatt reactor built secretly with French help and covered by no safeguards." However, the United States believes at this time that Israel's nuclear program is directed toward research first but recognizes that it is "adaptable to a weapons making program." Neither Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol nor Defense Minister Ben-Gurion rule out ever developing nuclear weapons "if the Near Eastern situation warrants." (Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons, 12/12/64)
January 8, 1964
During contract negotiations over uranium supply with the United States, the South African government notifies the U.S. government that it will not accept deferments of uranium payments unless the United States agrees to sell "certain military equipment." The type of equipment is not specified, although it is most likely nuclear-related. (Uranium Contract Negotiations, 1/8/64)
January 14, 1964
McGeorge Bundy, Spurgeon Keeny and others prepare a set of proposals for the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. Under the rubric of "Nuclear Containment," several aspects of an emerging non-proliferation position are mentioned. They include: non-dissemination of technology, non-reception of nuclear weapons, non-dissemination to individual nations of strategic delivery systems, reciprocal inspections of peaceful nuclear reactors, nuclear production cut-offs, principles for nuclear free zones and reassertion of the comprehensive test ban. ([Set of Possible New Proposals for U.S.-Soviet Negotiations in Geneva on Nuclear Containment and Immediate Reductions or Limitation of Arms], 1/14/64)
January 18, 1964
President Lyndon Johnson sends Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev a letter noting the need for an agreement to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. (Johnson, p. 476; DD, 1964, Vol. I, p. 5).
February 1964
At the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, Poland proposes the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Europe, specifically including the Federal Republic of Germany. (Seaborg, p. 12)
February 6, 1964
In anticipation of the visit of British Prime Minister Douglas-Home, the Department of State prepares its position regarding the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal before the members of NATO. The United States decides that it will proceed with the MLF plan regardless of whether or not the United Kingdom joins. The Department of State points out that the role of West Germany in manning and operating the MLF missiles is much more limited than that required in current NATO procedures. (Visit of Prime Minister Douglas-Home, February 12-13, 1964, 2/6/64)
February 9, 1964
United Arab Republic President Jamal abd al Nasir (Gamal Abdel Nasser) comments for an American newspaper that there is no doubt about the United States willingness to give Israel a "huge atomic power plant" which could also produce fissionable material for atom bombs. The correspondent notes that Nasir seems convinced that President Johnson intends to help Israel develop atomic weapons. (Nasir's Reaction to President Johnson's Speech at the Weizman Institute, 2/9/64)
February 18, 1964
In a discussion with British Labour Party representatives, William P. Bundy, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, states that the Multilateral Force serves a "useful military purpose" in that it gives the West Germans "a proper channel for their strategic nuclear aspirations, at least for some years into the future." (Mr. Fred Mulley, Shadow Secretary for Air, British Labour Party, Meeting with ASD/ISA, 2/18/64)
February 20, 1964
In a meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the shadow foreign minister of the British Labour Party, Patrick Gordon Walker, states that if the Labour Party gets elected it will allow British nuclear weapons to become obsolete. Then they will try to persuade West Germany to announce with them that the "United States should be the sole possessor of nuclear weapons in the West." Walker believes that Europe may not need a Multilateral Force (MLF), but prefers instead a closer strategic consultation with the United States. (Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker, Shadow Foreign Minister, British Labour Party, Meeting with Secretary McNamara, 2/20/64; Visit of Mr. Harold Wilson, Leader of the British Labour Party, 3/5/64)
April 4, 1964
The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, after examining the need for high-yield nuclear weapons as requested by then-President Kennedy, now recommend opposing their development. Agency officials argue that the cost of developing these weapons is unwarranted given that the United States already possesses bombs compatible with the delivery capabilities of the B-52 bombers. (High Yield Nuclear Weapons, 4/1/64)
April 26-27, 1964
Secretary of State Dean Rusk meets with British Foreign Secretary E.G. Butler to discuss how the United Kingdom will participate in negotiating the MLF. It is agreed that the United Kingdom will undertake some technical studies regarding the mixed-manning of bombers and that bilateral consultations will take place in September in preparation for a multilateral negotiating conference to be held sometime in November 1964. ([Summary of Secretary Rusk's Conversation of April 26-27 with British Foreign Secretary E.G. Butler], 4/28/64)
May 30, 1964
Under Secretary of State George W. Ball sends guidance to the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt to warn Gamal Abdel Nasser not to proceed with acquiring surface-to-surface missiles. Ball wants Nasser to recognize that Egypt is the state responsible for escalating the Israeli-Egyptian arms race. ([Warning to Gamal Abdel Nasser Not to Proceed with Acquisition of Surface to Surface Missiles], 5/29/64)
June 1964
U.S. intelligence sources estimate that India now possesses all the basic facilities necessary to produce plutonium and has the capability to produce and test a nuclear device within one-to-three years of deciding to do so. The government of India continues to state that its policy is to "use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only." However, the intelligence report notes that "[t]he pace ad scope of the Chinese program and the nature of Chinese policy will...have much to do with what India does in the future." ([Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons], 12/12/64)
June 9, 1964
The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee reconvenes in Geneva to discuss additional disarmament proposals by Committee members. The United States tables two proposals: one for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the other for destruction of the B-47-TU/16 bombers. (ACDA Special Report No. 58: ENDC Will Reconvene, 6/2/64)
June 15, 1964
Adrian S. Fisher, acting director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, describes the U.S. position on the MLF to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Fisher notes that the MLF proposal is regarded as consistent with U.S. non-proliferation policy as it is designed to hold the "growing nuclear ambitions of the Federal Republic" of Germany in check. Interestingly, Fisher suggests that the United States might have to accept "certain restrictions on our efforts to achieve general international agreement on non-proliferation" while negotiating the MLF. Fisher notes that the Soviet Unions view of the MLF proposal is an obstacle in negotiating a larger non-proliferation agreement with them. (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the MLF, 6/15/64)
June 16, 1964
The National Security Council discusses the "Underground Test Program FY 1965." Secretaries Rusk and McNamara urge President Johnson to approve the program. (Notes on the National Security Council Meeting, June 16, 1964, 7/23/64)
June 18, 1964
NATO member states conclude a formal agreement regarding the sharing of atomic information. The agreement is subject to the requirements of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. (Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation regarding Atomic Information, 6/18/64)
Late August 1964
U.S. Special Emissary John J. McCloy is sent to Egypt to meet with Gamal Abdel Nasser regarding the arms race with Israel. McCloy is directed to inform Nasser that the United States will convince Israel to "exercise nuclear and missile self-denial" and to try to persuade Nasser not to acquire additional offensive missiles. ([John McCloy to Visit United Arab Republic to Probe Gamal Abdel Nasser's Views on the Near East Arms Race], 8/7/64; Second McCloy Mission on Near East Arms, 8/12/64)
September 28, 1964
U.S. Special Emissary John J. McCloy is again sent to Egypt to meet with Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser is cordial but postpones agreement on any understanding with the United States regarding limits on missiles. McCloy believes that Nasser realizes he cannot win the missile race and might take actions which eventually have the effects the United States desires, i.e., freezing or limiting missile production. ([John McCloy's Second Mission to the United Arab Republic], 8/22/64; [John McCloy's Conversation with Gamal Abdel Nasser about Limitations on Missile Production by the United Arab Republic], 9/28/64; McCloy Meeting with President Nasser on September 28, 1964, 10/6/64)
September 30, 1964
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) prepares for the sale of 355 kilograms of plutonium to Euratom. The AEC wants to ensure that adequate safeguards are in place. They believe that any diversion of the material would be detected. ([Sale of 355 Kilograms of Plutonium to EURATOM for Fast Breeder Reactor Program--Cover Note Attached], 9/30/64)
October 3, 1964
Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Chester Holifield (D-California) sends a letter to President Johnson regarding his and other Committee members concerns regarding the Multilateral Force (MLF). Holifield points out that there does not seem to be real enthusiasm for the MLF either in Great Britain or Italy and that France has remained completely detached from it. In order to be able to confer with senior legislators, Holifield suggests that the MLF be reconsidered after January 1965. ([Multilateral Force May Not Have Been As Useful As Previously Thought], 10/3/64; Critical Assessment of the Multilateral Force, 10/3/64)
October 13, 1964
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev is ousted from power. Soviet government officials state there will be no changes in Soviet foreign policy. ([Discussion of the Khrushchev Ouster and the Chinese Nuclear Detonation], 10/19/64)
October 16, 1964
The People's Republic of China tests a nuclear explosive device in the atmosphere at Lop Nor. The U.S. government cables guidance to all of its embassies concerning the official reaction to China becoming a member of the nuclear club. Embassies are instructed to state that the U.S. government has been aware of China's nuclear capability for some time and that it will not affect either treaty arrangements or the posting of representatives to Taiwan. (Guidance re ChiCom Nuclear Atmosphere Test, 10/16/64)
October 16, 1964
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai writes a letter to President Johnson officially notifying the United States of the atmospheric nuclear test by the People's Republic. The Premier states that "China's mastering of nuclear weapons is entirely for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from the U.S. nuclear threat." ([Full Texts of Letters from Zhou Enlai to the Ambassador and the President concerning the Chinese Nuclear Detonation], 10/19/64)
October 16, 1964
In the wake of the People's Republic of China's nuclear test, Premier Zhou Enlai suggests that a Summit Conference of all countries be convened to discuss the prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons. The idea is rejected by British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home. (Text of British Prime Ministers Reply to Mr. Chou En-Lai's Communication of October 17, 10/17/64)
October 19, 1964
The government of Taiwan responds to China's nuclear test, stating that it "will have absolutely no effect on [Taiwan's] policy to recover mainland and deliver our compatriots from tyranny,...if anything Taiwan could speedup its counterattack plans." ([First High-Level Taiwanese Response to the Chinese Nuclear Detonation], 10/20/64)
October 21, 1964
The government of India discusses the effect of China's nuclear test on India's nuclear program. India reiterates a firm commitment to "restrict its nuclear program to the peaceful use of nuclear energy" in the face of possible pressure to alter that policy. (India's Nuclear Policy in the Wake of ChiCom Nuclear Detonation, 10/21/64; [Debate among the Indians As to What Should Be Done in the Wake of the Chinese Nuclear Detonation], 10/29/64)
October 23, 1964
In a report to the legislature in Taiwan, Premier Yen Chia-Kan states that the People's Republic of China must be "crushed by the free world before it achieves nuclear weapons capability." ([Taiwanese Government Statement on the Chinese Nuclear Detonation], 10/24/64; Transmittal of Premier's Statement of October 23 on Chinese Communist Nuclear Explosion, Khrushchev Ouster and U.K. Labor Party Victory, 10/30/64)
October 26-27, 1964
British Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker meets with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, as well as George Ball, McGeorge Bundy and William Tyler to discuss the nuclear organization of the NATO alliance. The meeting is part of the ongoing MLF negotiations. (Visit of Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker, October 26-27, 1964--Europe, 10/26/64; British Ideas on the Nuclear Organization of the Alliance, 10/27/64)
October 28, 1964
The State Department notes that worldwide reaction to China's nuclear test has been "less emotional and fearful" than expected. This is seen as regrettable considering the widespread adherence to the limited test ban treaty which prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere. ([World Reaction to the Chinese Nuclear Explosion], 10/28/64)
October 29, 1964
President Chiang of Taiwan notes that retaliatory efforts by the United States in the event of a nuclear attack against Taiwan by the People's Republic of China will be fruitless as the country will already have been destroyed. President Chiang finds no comfort in the ability of the United States to deter an attack by China. (Effect of CCNE [Chinese Communists Nuclear Explosion] on GRC and Implications for U.S. Policy, 10/29/64)
November 5, 1964
The U.S. Office of Science and Technology provides the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission with a listing of major Japanese nuclear facilities. (Major Japanese Nuclear Facilities, 11/5/64)
November 6, 1964
The Department of Defense recommends against the sale of enriched uranium to France because it could hamper U.S. negotiations on the MLF. The proposed sale would be seen as assisting the French in developing their national strategic nuclear capability--exactly what the MLF is designed to limit. ([Sale of Enriched Uranium to France Is Not Consistent with NSAM-296 and Is Not Advised], 11/6/64)
November 9, 1964
In preparation for the upcoming U.N. General Assembly session, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency drafts resolutions and a negotiating position regarding non-proliferation, which it considers the principal disarmament topic at the session. The position is distributed as the Thompson Committee Report. ([Thompson Committee Report--Two Draft Resolutions for the United Nations General Assembly Included], 11/9/64)
December 7, 1964
The French press reports the testing of a missile at the French missile range in the Sahara Desert. U.S. intelligence sources believe the test to be related to the missile a French firm has been developing for Israel. The missile can carry a 1,500-2,000-pound warhead and will be capable of carrying a nuclear payload. ([Background Paper], 12/12/64, p. 19)
December 7-8, 1964
Prime Minister Harold Wilson visits the United States to discuss the Multilateral Force (MLF), or, as it was later described, the Atlantic Missile Force (AMF). The U.S. position on the MLF is that it is designed to give "Germany and other non-nuclear members of the Alliance a participating role in ownership, manning and control of strategic nuclear weapons without involving proliferation of national nuclear deterrents...." The United States retains veto power over the use of the force and requires non-dissemination/non-acquisition declarations (of national nuclear forces) at the time the new force is set up. The proposal also includes "arrangements for coordination of all strategic nuclear forces, including the force de frappe." (Visit of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, December 7-8, 1964, Nuclear Problems and Policies of the Alliance, 12/3/64)
December 10, 1964
A government report entitled "Value and Feasibility of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" notes that the Multilateral Force (MLF) is the "only apparent obstacle" to a non-proliferation treaty. The report also argues that such a treaty may be the only means to persuade India, Israel, Sweden and Japan (which are regarded as having the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons) not to develop nuclear arms. (Value and Feasibility of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12/10/64)
January 5, 1965
Charles Bohlen, U.S. ambassador to France, speculates about France's position on a variety of NATO issues. He claims that it is now apparent that President Charles de Gaulle's desire to alter some of NATO's structure in reality amounts to the destruction of all elements of integration in the Alliance. Bohlen believes that de Gaulle prefers a bilateral structure based on an exchange of war plans and a promise that they will go into effect in the event of hostilities. Bohlen does not believe there is any immediate threat that France will withdraw from NATO, but that de Gaulle will wait until 1969 when it becomes possible for any signatory to withdraw. ([France's Policy on NATO, Nuclear Cooperation within NATO, and U.S. Presence in Europe], 1/5/65)
January 7-8, 1965
The Gilpatric Committee holds its third plenary meeting. Committee members discuss individual conclusions regarding the desirability of having no additional nuclear powers. They also put forward two models. Model A refers to the conventional belief that the spread of nuclear technology should be halted entirely, whereas Model B favors a world with a limited amount of further proliferation. In general, the committee supports Model A. (Seaborg2, pp. 139-140)
January 8, 1965
Charles Bohlen, U.S. ambassador to France, reports further on French President Charles de Gaulle's views on NATO. Based on conversations and speeches by de Gaulle, Bohlen speculates that France may offer a less supranational plan of coordinating European defense in order to head off proposals for a Multilateral Force (MLF). Bohlen also notes de Gaulle's negative attitude toward the United States as well as an improvement in French-German relations. (De Gaulle and Europe, 1/8/65)
January 12, 1965
Secretary of State Dean Rusk cables guidance to the U.S. Embassy in New Dehli regarding White House aide Jerome Weisner's visit to India. There are two objectives for the trip. The first, in the wake of the People's Republic of China's nuclear test, is to help India demonstrate that "its scientific and technological capabilities are at least equal to those of [Chinese communists]." The second is to reinforce India's decision to keep its nuclear program dedicated to peaceful uses of the technology. Rusk spells out U.S. policy regarding pursuit of a nuclear non-proliferation agreement at this time. He states that an "effective non-proliferation agreement must leave room for adequate security arrangements for non-nuclear powers which have elected to eschew atomic weapons." Rusk is aware that this is a most important issue for India at this time. ([Background Information for Jerome Weisner's Visit to India and Discussion with Indian Officials about U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation], 1/12/65)
January 14, 1965
State Department official Robert W. Komer sends a note to McGeorge Bundy and Roswell Gilpatric suggesting that the best policy for the United States to pursue with India at this time may be "to keep volunteering unilaterally a nuclear umbrella, while constantly reiterating that we ask nothing in return." ([Motivations for Political Moves to India], 1/14/65)
January 17, 1965
Reports from the U.S. air attache in Cairo state that there are indications that Egypt is attempting to purchase a 150-megawatt nuclear reactor. A reactor of this size has the potential of producing fissionable material that could be used in nuclear weapons. ([Attempts to Purchase 150 Megawatt Nuclear Reactor by the United Arab Republic], 1/17/65)
January 21, 1965
The Committee on Nuclear Proliferation meets with President Johnson to discuss ways to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Members of the Committee and their assignments include: Arthur Dean--multilateral agreements; George Kistiakowsky--outside Europe; John McCloy--Europe and NATO; James Perkins--U.S. policies toward existing nuclear powers; Herbert York--peaceful uses; Gen. Gruenther--U.S. weapons policies; and Roswell Gilpatric--chairman. The Committee submits to President Johnson a report of their judgements and findings as well as a draft National Security Action Memorandum that could be used as a basis to follow up the Committees recommendation. (Notes for 1/21/65 White House Meeting, 1/13/65; A Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 1/21/65; Prevention of the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1/21/65)
February 22, 1965
The director of India's nuclear program, Dr. Homi Bhabha, discusses with U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball India's need to make some "dramatic `peaceful' achievement to offset the prestige gained by Communist China among Africans and Asians." Bhabha discusses the role the Soviet Union has played in aiding the Chinese nuclear program. He notes that India could produce a device in 18 months--or six months with access to a U.S. blueprint. This is far less time than even Japan or Germany would currently require. Bhabha warns that incentives will have to be found for India to continue its current policy of pursuing a peaceful nuclear program rather than developing weapons. (Indian Nuclear Energy Program, 2/22/65)
Early March 1965
John J. Hall of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency Henry Smyth and representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department travel to Paris, Bonn and London to urge suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment to adopt a common policy regarding exports to third countries. Their trip is part of a U.S. effort to open a series of discussions to convince European governments that such exports should be subject to IAEA safeguards wherever possible. ([U.S. Initiative for a Common Policy of Safeguards amongst Suppliers of Nuclear Materials], 4/7/65)
March 8-9, 1965
The first U.S. combat troops land in Vietnam. (Summers, p. 33)
May 1965
Harold Beeley of the United Kingdom presents a Draft Treaty for Nuclear Non-Proliferation to William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. U.S. Government officials believe that the draft presents problems for the United States and others, especially the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), as it does not allow the FRG any of the nuclear options which they are trying to maintain, at least theoretically. In addition, sections of the draft are incompatible with the proposed Atlantic Nuclear Force. (U.K. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/19/65)
May 13, 1965
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission notifies the government of Canada of its concern over the sale of Canadian uranium to France. The United States primarily wants to ensure that the uranium will be kept under safeguards so that it cannot be diverted into weapons use. ([Recent Developments concerning the Canadian Sale of Uranium to France], 5/13/65)
Early June 1965
Senator Robert Kennedy (D-New York) makes a speech on nuclear non-proliferation which suggests several issues that should be addressed in a non-proliferation treaty. The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) are concerned that Kennedy's ideas are based either on classified information from the Gilpatric Report or on memoranda from ACDA or Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Upon examining Kennedy's speech and the classified documents, Spurgeon Keeny of ACDA concludes that the speech is "too close to the proposals...to be coincidental." Keeny believes that Kennedy's staff must at least have had some familiarity with the classified findings of the Gilpatric Committee. (Senator Robert Kennedy's Statement on Nuclear Proliferation, 6/22/65)
July 1, 1965
A news article reports that the top secret Gilpatric Report to President Lyndon Johnson recommended that a nuclear non-proliferation treaty be given priority over the establishment of the Multilateral Force. The appearance of the article in The New York Times increases pressure on the President to make sections of the document public. But, with the concurrence of McGeorge Bundy and Roswell Gilpatric, Johnson insists that no portion of the report can be release at this time. (NYT 7/1/65)
July 6, 1965
Masao Kanazawa of the Embassy of Japan meets with Richard B. Freund of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency regarding U.S. non-proliferation policy. In particular, Kanazawa notes that "Japan opposes any domestic nuclear program of its own." He also notes that Japan is not as concerned with the Chinese nuclear program as India might be "especially since the U.S. has satisfactory treaty obligations with respect to Japan." ([Gilpatric Committee, Multilateral Force and Negotiations for Non-Proliferation Treaty], 7/6/65)
July 19, 1965
The British Ambassador to the United States delivers a second Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty proposed by the United Kingdom to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency along with an aide-memoire defending the proposal. The aide-memoire points out that the draft treaty is compatible with an Atlantic Nuclear Force and answers criticisms to earlier draft proposals. (U.K. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/19/65)
August 7, 1965
The U.S. Senate passes the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing President Johnson to "take all necessary measures to repel an armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." (Summers, p. 342)
August 17, 1965
The first draft of the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation written by the United States is submitted to the U.N. General Assembly. The draft leaves open the possibility of a Multilateral or Atlantic Nuclear Force (MLF/ANF). (CRS3, p. 17; The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12/24/68)
September 23, 1965
Eighty-six members of India's Parliament present to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri a letter asking the government "to make an immediate decision to develop...nuclear weapons." (Seaborg2, p. 254)
September 24, 1965
The Soviet Union submits a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the U.N. General Assembly. The Soviet draft prohibits MLF/ANF arrangements since non-nuclear weapon states are not given "the right to participate in the ownership, control, or use of nuclear weapons." (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 9/24/65; The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12/24/68; CRS3, p. 17)
November 3, 1965
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy notes that the Indian CIER reactor, a uranium heavy water reactor supplied by Canada, is only partially covered by safeguards. Specifically, only fuel supplied by Canada can be inspected. Fuel supplied by India cannot be. When the United States supplied the heavy water for the reactor, no inspection requirement existed. Thus, it is thought possible that the Indians might consider themselves "relieved of the responsibilities under their promise to utilize the CIER facility for peaceful purposes only." (India Reactor Inspection, 11/3/65)
November 18, 1965
As a result of congressional discussions on problems within the NATO alliance, Leonard M. Trosten, staff counsel of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, suggests that the United States enter an agreement under section 144 c. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which provides for a greater exchange of restricted data on nuclear weapons than section 144 b. does. Trosten believes that this agreement should be made with France to bring to an end the "unfortunate caste system" within NATO with respect to atomic energy information. (Transfer of Restricted Data to France, 11/18/65)
December 16-17, 1965
President Johnson meets with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to discuss a variety of issues including India/Pakistan, non-proliferation and East-West relations, and nuclear arrangements with West Germany. The U.S. position on these issues is focused on encouraging the British to "`lower the status' of their independent deterrent." (The Wilson Visit, 12/16/65)
January 28, 1966
The Central Intelligence Agency completes a report on nuclear weapons and missile programs in the People's Republic of China. The report notes that Chinese weapons are based almost entirely on Soviet designs and that China's weapons programs benefitted from Soviet aid up until 1960 when that aid was cutoff. (Science and Technology in Communist China, 1/28/66)
March 7, 1966
In a message to President Johnson and in an aide-memoire to the 14 other NATO countries, French President de Gaulle announces his intention to withdraw all remaining French forces from NATO's integrated command. In a subsequent declaration on March 29, 1966, the French Government notes that the withdrawal will be effective July 1, 1966, and that the removal from France of NATO Headquarters and all bases and installations are expected to be completed by April 1, 1967. (Kohl, p. 251)
April 1966
Levi Eshkol, prime minister of Israel, forces the resignation of the last original member of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Ernst Bergmann. He also separates the Commission from the Defense Ministry. (Spector2, pp. 122-23)
April 22, 1966
President Johnson considers offering the International Atomic Energy Agency limited access to a commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant for the purpose of developing safeguards standards. The offer is to "ease the pain" to non-nuclear states and persuade them to accept an amendment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty currently being negotiated in Geneva. The amendment will make IAEA safeguards mandatory for non-nuclear states but not for nuclear states. (Possible Presidential Statement on April 27 Offering U.S. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant for IAEA Safeguards Development, 4/22/66)
April 29, 1966
The Department of Defense proposes that the United States offer to place its own peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and offer to assist in training IAEA inspectors. (DOD Proposals for U.S. Initiatives concerning IAEA, 4/29/66)
May 17, 1966
The Pastore Resolution is unanimously approved in the U.S. Senate endorsing the Administration's efforts to negotiate a Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a positive indication of the tremendous support for concluding a treaty. (The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12/24/68)
May 18, 1966
Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol repeats the words of his predecessor, David Ben-Gurion, that "Israel does not have nuclear weapons and that Israel will not be the first to introduce them into the region." (Spector 2, p. 123)
June 29, 1966
The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide their comments regarding the current draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Joint Chiefs reiterate their support for strong safeguards and state that thus far "there is no provision for clearly defined adequate safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities and other peaceful programs to prevent nonnuclear states from developing nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful research." ([Comments of JCS on Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty], 6/29/66)
July 1, 1966
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) notes that the Soviet demand to interpret the goal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as preventing "the `physical access' by non-nuclear weapons countries, to nuclear weapons" may be problematic. The AEC questions whether the NATO atomic stockpile will be considered proliferation under this interpretation. ([AEC Comments on Proposed Articles I and II of Non-Proliferation Draft concerning Physical Access and Safeguards], 7/1/66)
July 6, 1966
Department of State Legal Advisor Leonard C. Meeker suggests that one way to modify the "physical access" interpretation of proliferation might be to replace it with the idea of prohibiting the "transfer or acquisition of `control over nuclear weapons,' through physical access or any other means." (Proposed Revised Articles of U.S. Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/6/66)
July 23, 1966
The Soviet position on the current U.S. draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is reported by a member of the U.S. negotiating team in Geneva. Evidently, the Soviets still contend that the U.S. version of proliferation would ultimately permit "transfer" of nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany, a prospect the Soviet Union finds disconcerting. ([Report of Soviet Positions on Draft Treaty], 7/23/66)
July 27, 1966
ACDA Director William Foster receives guidance from Secretary of State Dean Rusk on a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Alexis Roshchin to work out differences between the Soviet and American views of "proliferation" for Article I of the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. ([Talking Points for Proposed Meeting with Ambassador Roshchin concerning Article I of Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty], 7/27/66)
August 23, 1966
Secretary of State Rusk suggests that the U.S. representative to the North Atlantic council make a brief statement regarding U.S. efforts to draft a Non-Proliferation Treaty with language that both the United States and the Soviet Union can accept. Rusk assures that U.S. allies will be consulted when a compromise has been reached. ([Notification to North Atlantic Council of Review of Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty by U.S. Government], 8/23/66)
September 1966
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) discovers that 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium supplied to a Pennsylvania company, Nuclear Materials Equipment Corporation (NUMEC), during 1962 and 1965, is missing. The Central Intelligence Agency investigates the loss but does not report the results until 1968. (See 1968 entry.) (Spector2, pp. 123-124, 178)
September 26-27, 1966
West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder meet with President Johnson and the Secretaries of Defense and State to discuss the issues of nuclear sharing and non-proliferation. Chancellor Erhard indicates that the Federal Republic would not insist on ownership of NATO nuclear weapons and also agrees to note in a public communique the need to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including curbing national control of weapons which defend non-nuclear weapon states. (The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12/24/68)
October 10, 1966
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Rusk meet to discuss differences that have arisen in the non-proliferation negotiations. The meeting is unproductive. (The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12/24/68)
October 14, 1966
British Foreign Secretary George Brown visits the United States to discuss prospects for negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. position remains that some on-site inspections are still necessary despite recent technological improvements in the U.S. ability to detect Soviet tests. The on-site inspection requirement was the most difficult point of negotiation during the 1950s test ban talks. (Visit of U.K. Foreign Secretary George Brown, October 14, 1966--Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 10/10/66)
October 27, 1966
The People's Republic of China conducts a test of a nuclear-armed missile. (Spector2, p. 29)
October 31, 1966
India argues at the United Nations that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty currently being drafted places an unequal burden on the non-nuclear weapon states by requiring them to accept international inspections of all their nuclear activities and to renounce the intention to develop nuclear weapons. India believes the Treaty will leave the non-nuclear states in a position of permanent inferiority. (Spector3, p. 31)
December 5, 1966
The Soviet Union formally proposes new language that ultimately becomes part of the final text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. U.S. Ambassador William Foster recommends that the United States accept the Soviet proposal. However, no decision is made at this time. (The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12/24/68)
December 29, 1966
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency William Foster informs President Johnson that the current text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is being discussed by U.S. allies. He notes that the current draft includes the compromise language suggested by the Soviet Union and, if accepted by U.S. allies, should provide a real working basis for concluding the treaty. ([Two Subjects of Greatest Interest in the Disarmament Field Are Non-Proliferation Negotiations and the Strategic Arms Race], 12/29/66)
January 23, 1967
The initial German reaction to the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty centers on whether the Treaty language forecloses the option of developing a European nuclear capability and what effect this might have on growing support for a European confederation. ([West German Reaction to Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty], 1/23/67)
January 27, 1967
The Outer Space Treaty is signed by 88 countries, including the United States, USSR, France and the United Kingdom. The Treaty bans all nuclear weapons from space and sets guidelines for the exploration of outer space. (CRS3, p. 19)
February 14, 1967
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is signed by 14 Latin American states. The principal differences in the negotiations centered on the definition of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. States that did not sign the treaty are: Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago. (CRS3, p. 19; Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin American Nuclear Free Zone), 2/18/67)
April 8, 1967
President Lyndon Johnson agrees to offer to let the International Atomic Energy Agency apply safeguards on "a broad scale" to the United States peaceful nuclear facilities. The offer is contingent on the voluntary cooperation of U.S. industry. However, the U.S. government will determine at a later date whether "additional action" will be necessary to enforce it. ([Application of IAEA Safeguards to U.S. Peaceful Nuclear Facilities], 4/8/67)
May 29, 1967
During a visit to the United States, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson is urged to resume active, public advocacy of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United Kingdom has been awaiting admission into the European Community, where several members oppose certain provisions of the draft Treaty, and has therefore toned down its vocal support for the agreement. ([Paper for the Visit of U.K. Prime Minister Harold Wilson June 1967], 5/29/67)
June 5-11, 1967
The Six-Day War erupts involving Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel. Israeli officials Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres and Ernst Bergmann, all of whom favor Israeli nuclear weapons development, return to political power. (Spector2, pp. 124-25)
June 17, 1967
The People's Republic of China conducts its first test of a hydrogen bomb. (CRS3, p. 19)
July 26, 1967
The Republic of South Africa concludes an amendment to its 1957 agreement with the United States for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. The new agreement extends the original accord for an additional 10 years. (Agreement for the Application of Safeguards to the Bilateral Agreement between the U.S. and S.A. of 07/08/57, as Amended, for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, 8/10/67; [Contingency Press Statement regarding Amendment to Agreement of Cooperation between U.S. and South Africa concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy], 7/18/67)
October 25, 1967
Secretary of State Dean Rusk advises President Johnson to tell the President of Mexico that the United States "intends to sign Protocol II." Additional Protocol II refers to the nuclear free zone provision of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 10/25/67)
November 9, 1967
President Johnson notifies Mexican President Diaz Ordaz that the United States intends to sign Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco "with an interpretive statement" following consultations with Congress. (Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, 11/9/67)
December 2, 1967
President Johnson announces that the United States will permit IAEA safeguards to apply to all nuclear activities in the United States. However, activities with direct national security significance will be excluded. (CRS3, p. 19)
Late 1967-Early 1968
Gen. William Westmoreland forms a small working group to study the feasibility of using small, tactical nuclear weapons at Khe Sahn, Vietnam. However, when word of this reaches the Pentagon, he is told to disband the group. (Summers, p. 271)
1968
After conducting an investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency concludes that the 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium discovered missing from the NUMEC Corporation in 1966 was most likely diverted for use by Israel. (See September 1966 entry.) The conclusion is based on the close ties between NUMEC President Zalman Mordechai Shapiro and the Israeli government and a contract between NUMEC and an Israeli firm for non-military nuclear supplies. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, no concrete evidence concerning the current location of the missing uranium has emerged. (Spector2, pp. 178, 375)
April 11, 1968
The Central Intelligence Agency completes a National Intelligence Estimate on Israel. The report notes that the uncertainty of foreign suppliers is prompting Israel to manufacture much of its own military equipment. Many non-proliferation experts cite a 1968 CIA report on the NUMEC investigation as noting Israel's nuclear weapons capability. However, because of excisions in the publicly released version of this estimate, it is uncertain whether it is the report in question. (Israel, 4/11/68; Spector2, p. 375; Hersh, pp. 186-187)
June 12, 1968
The U.N. General Assembly "commends" the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by a vote of 95-4, with 21 states abstaining. (CRS3, p. 20)
July 1, 1968
The Non-Proliferation Treaty opens for signature. (CRS3, p. 20)
August 24, 1968
France conducts its first test of a hydrogen bomb. (CRS3, p. 20)
October 1968
United States approves the sale of Phantom F-4 bombers to Israel despite Israel's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which U.S. officials tried to make a condition of the sale. Israel also requests that the F-4s be equipped with "specially-wired" bomb racks for carrying nuclear weapons. After this blatant request is refused, the United States approves the sale but still does not insist that Israel sign the NPT. (Spector2, p. 126)
October 26-27, 1968
While at a dinner honoring Rep. Harley Staggers (D-West Virginia), President Lyndon Johnson charges that Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon fails to understand the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that delaying its ratification could prevent its passage. (Johnson2, pp. 1081-1082, 1092, 1096)
October 29, 1968
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency completes a review of its work during the Johnson Administration. (The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Johnson Administration..., 10/29/68)
November 1968
Israeli agents are said to have diverted to Israel 200 tons of yellow cake, or uranium oxide, while it was being shipped from Antwerp, Belgium, to Genoa, Italy. Theoretically, the uranium can be used as fuel for a nuclear reactor; plutonium can then be recovered from the spent fuel and reprocessed into weapons-grade material. Two hundred tons of yellow cake is enough to make approximately 50 nuclear weapons. This event comes to be known as the "Plumbatt Affair." (Spector2, p. 125)
December 28, 1968
While in Key Biscayne, Florida, President-elect Richard Nixon orders Henry Kissinger to prepare a wide range of studies, including two relating to strategic arms. The first concerns the nation's strategic posture, the second the "consequences of a nonproliferation treaty." The latter study strongly endorses the NPT and concludes that the treaty contains no adverse stipulations. Kissinger is reported to urge its approval. (Kalb, pp. 108-10)
1969
Inspection visits by the United States to Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona are stopped after an inspection team complains "in writing that because the Israelis made their earlier inspections hurried and limited and did not permit [the inspectors] to move about freely, they could not guarantee that there was no weapons-related work being done at Dimona." (Pry, p. 15; Spector2, p. 125)
January 9, 1969
Outgoing President Lyndon Johnson urges Senate ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (CRS3, p. 21)
January 20, 1969
Richard M. Nixon is inaugurated as the 37th president of the United States. (CRS3, p. 21)
February 1969
President Nixon's National Security Decision Memorandum number 16 reportedly directs U.S. officials "not to participate in any effort to pressure hold-out nations to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty." (Spector2, p. 127)
February 5, 1969
President Nixon requests the advice and consent of the Senate on ratifying the NPT and urges its quick passage. (CRS3, p. 21; [Urging the Quick Passage of the Non-Proliferation Treaty], 2/5/69)
February 20, 1969
On the eve of President Nixon's visit to Europe, a congressman urges him to open a new era of U.S.-French cooperation, suggesting that the "long-festering irritant, Britain's `exclusive U.S. relationship'," is gone. (Proposals on European Security, 2/20/69)
March 12, 1969
President Nixon's national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, recommends that the President approve the U.S.-Iran agreement for cooperation concerning the civil uses of atomic energy. (Proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. Government and the Government of Iran concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, 3/13/69)
March 13, 1969
The Senate overwhelmingly approves the Non-Proliferation Treaty for ratification. President Nixon congratulates former ACDA Director William Foster on the success of the treaty. ([Note of Congratulations from President Nixon to William C. Foster on Occasion of Senate Approval of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty], 3/15/69; [Formal Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty], 3/5/70)
March 15, 1969
President Nixon sends instructions to Gerard C. Smith, the new director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, regarding the six arms control goals of the United States. ([Instructions regarding the Participation of the United States in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva], 3/15/69)
April 1, 1969
The United States signs Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Vice President Hubert Humphrey serves as the U.S. representative at the ceremony. (Nixon, p. 223)
June 10, 1969
President Nixon approves the U.S.-Austrian agreement for nuclear cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. ([Approval of the New Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and Austria concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy], 6/10/69)
Late October 1969
President Nixon decides that the Federal Government should end its role as the sole owner of uranium enrichment plants in the United States. Nixon believes that because the defense requirements for uranium fall far below the operating capacity of these plants and, while commercial demand is expected to rise very quickly in the near term, it is no longer efficient for the government to maintain the facilities. ([Drafts for Simultaneous Press Releases regarding the President's Decision on the Interim Operation of the Uranium Enrichment Plants], 10/29/69)
November 24, 1969
President Nixon signs the instruments of ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The instruments then must be deposited in London in order for the Treaty to go into effect. (See March 5, 1970, entry.) (CRS3, p. 21)
1970
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi sends Abdul Jalloud to purchase nuclear weapons from China. The Chinese decline the sale but offer assistance in nuclear research instead. (Spector2, p. 150)
January 9, 1970
The U.S. government forecasts that commercial demand for uranium to fuel nuclear power plants will increase rapidly during the 1970s. At present there is an embargo on the importation of foreign uranium. The government believes that unless there is some expansion in the domestic industry, the embargo will have to be lifted and U.S. stockpiles sold. (Uranium Supply Problem, 1/9/70; Uranium Supply Problem, 1/27/70)
March 2-6 1970
The Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions conference, sponsored by the IAEA, takes place in Vienna. (CRS3, p. 22)
March 5, 1970
The Non-Proliferation Treaty goes into effect. As of this date, it ha been ratified by the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, plus 84 other countries. (CRS3, p. 22; [Formal Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty], 3/5/70)
May 11, 1970
A group of eminent Indian scientists, academicians and politicians meeting in New Delhi reportedly decides overwhelmingly to urge the Indian government immediately to reverse its current policy not to build an atomic bomb. (Atom Bomb Urged for India, 5/11/70)
September 1970
The Nixon Administration takes steps to determine whether adequate security measures are being taken at the nations nuclear facilities to protect against terrorist threats. ([Suggestions for Additional Security at Nuclear Power Plants], 9/21/70; [Response to Memorandum on Safety Measures and Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants], 9/25/70; Sabotage of a Nuclear Reactor, 10/23/70)
Late September 1970
Nixon Administration officials discuss the merits of the Atomic Energy Commission Omnibus Bill. Some believe the Bill should be "1/ Bottled up, 2/ Defeated, or 3/ Vetoed" on the grounds that it is defective and reverses some of the President's decisions regarding the commercialization of the nation's uranium facilities. (AEC Omnibus Bill, 9/24/70)
November 1970
The United States sends an aide-memoire to the Indian Atomic Energy Commission which states that "the United States would consider it inconsistent with existing United States-Indian agreements for American nuclear assistance to be employed in the development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices." (Spector2, p. 32)
December 1970
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission develops a plan to provide access to uranium enrichment technology to a few, selected U.S. firms in order to meet the forecasted increase in demand. Private industry would then be able to contribute to the development of enrichment technology. (AEC to Permit Access to Enrichment Technology, 12/14/70)
1971
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto becomes prime minister of Pakistan. Within two months of taking office, he convenes the country's top scientists and announces that Pakistan will develop atomic weapons. (Spector2, p. 73)
January 27, 1971
India concludes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the United States to cover nuclear exports from the United States. (CRS4, p. 17)
April 19, 1971
The U.S. Senate votes to ratify, with a clarifying statement, Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco). The clarifying statement refers to the United States understanding regarding the territories and territorial claims of signatories to the Treaty. Additional Protocol II is aimed specifically at states that are ineligible to sign the Treaty but wish "to associate themselves with the Treaty's objectives." (Ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 5/6/71)
May 8, 1971
President Nixon ratifies Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (Proclamation of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 6/2/71)
Early June 1971
The Nixon Administration initiates a National Security Council study of the United States test ban policy. (Letter from Frank Press on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 6/11/71)
July 1971
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announces India's intention to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions. (Spector2, p. 31)
August 1971
France's first silo-based ballistic missiles become operational. (Duval, p. 9)
December 1971
France's first nuclear-missile-capable submarine becomes operational. (Duval, p. 9)
December 23, 1971
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird notifies President Nixon of a proposed legislative package that would transfer the administration of U.S. foreign military sales from the Department of State to the Department of Defense. The proposed legislation is in response to the President's desire for greater flexibility in providing security assistance to U.S. friends and allies. (Security Assistance, 12/23/71)
1972
Pakistan's first nuclear power plant, KANUPP (Karachi Nuclear Power Project), is completed. It is a 137-megawatt natural-uranium and heavy water reactor purchased from Canada. It is subject to IAEA safeguards. (Spector2, p. 71)
January 27 1972
Dr. Edward Teller provides a listing of "Needed Actions in Atomic Energy" and recommends Dr. Lawrence Hafstad and Dr. Harvey Brooks as candidates for chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. (Needed Actions in Atomic Energy, 1/27/72)
March 24, 1972
Nixon Administration officials discuss selling nuclear technology abroad amid congressional proliferation concerns. ([Roadblocks Have Been Encountered in Discussing Whether Nuclear Technology Should Be Sold Abroad], 3/24/72)
May 22-30, 1972
President Nixon visits the Soviet Union. The goal of the visit is to "place U.S.-Soviet relations on a more stable and constructive foundation." Both states reaffirm the principles of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. (Joint U.S.-Soviet Communique, 5/29/72)
June 1972
A Nixon Cabinet briefing notes that there has been a 72 percent increase in funding during the current Administration for research and development on a liquid metal fast breeder reactor. However, questions concerning the proliferation risks of the reactor program remain unresolved. (Talking Points for Cabinet and Surrogates, 10:00 a.m., Friday, June 23, 1972, 6/22/72)
Late June 1972
The Nixon Administration considers submitting a draft bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The bill would authorize the Atomic Energy Commission to "exempt certain classes or quantities of special nuclear material or kinds of uses or users from the requirements for a license..." if the AEC concludes that the particular exemption would not "constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security or the health and safety of the public." (AEC's Draft Bill "To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended...," 8/1/72)
August 29, 1972
President Nixon approves a proposed U.S.-Republic of Korea agreement for nuclear cooperation concerning the civil uses of atomic energy. (Proposed Agreement for Cooperation with Korea concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, 8/29/72)
September 15, 1972
President Nixon authorizes the "Proposed Amendment to the Additional Agreement for Cooperation of June 11, 1960, between the Government of the United States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)." The Agreement assures the members of Euratom that they will get reasonable access to U.S. enrichment services. (Proposed Amendment to Additional Agreement for Cooperation with Euratom concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, 9/15/72)
1973
Pakistan and Libya are said to have agreed that Libya will finance Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in exchange for access to the capability. In addition, France refuses to sell Libya 20 large electromagnets from the French firm Thompson-CSF. The electromagnets are used in enriching uranium, an old, inefficient technique dating back to the Manhattan Project. (Spector2, pp. 77, 151)
1973
The government of Pakistan begins negotiations with France to construct a large reprocessing facility next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). (Spector2, p. 40)
January 23, 1973
The Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission urge that President Nixon issue a statement reaffirming the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to encourage more states to sign it. (Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1/23/73)
January 27, 1973
A peace treaty is signed in Paris by the United States, South Vietnam, the Viet Cong and North Vietnam. (Summers, p. 57)
March 26, 1973
The chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Khan, asks whether the United States can supply at least five tons of heavy water to fuel the KANUPP reactor. Although Canada usually supplies Pakistan with nuclear fuel, it is unable to meet this request due to a shortage. (Heavy Water for KANUPP Power Reactors, 3/26/73)
March 27, 1973
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission responds to Pakistan's request for heavy water. Although the supply is tight, the AEC will review the situation 30 days in advance of the needed delivery date and advise Pakistan of its decision then. (Heavy Water for KANUPP Power Reactor, 3/27/73)
April 5, 1973
The European Community, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and Ireland conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. (Press Release on IAEA-EC Safeguards Agreement, 3/31/73)
April 24, 1973
The discovery of uranium deposits in Pakistan is reported in the Islamabad press. (Reported Discovery of Uranium Deposits in Pakistan, 4/24/73)
April 26, 1973
The reports of the discovery of uranium deposits in Pakistan are confirmed. The director of the Atomic Energy Minerals Center, Mohammed Aslam, states that the size of the deposit is not unusual and is similar to other low-grade uranium deposits found in the western United States. It is also noted that a U.S. Atomic Energy Commission geologist has evidently assisted Pakistan in training scientists and technicians for several years. (Uranium Ore Deposits in Punjab, 4/26/73)
May 8, 1973
Pakistan makes a formal request to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for 10 tons of heavy water for the KANUPP reactor. Pakistan requests that it be shipped no later than July of this year so that it will reach Pakistan by the end of the year or early 1974. (Heavy Water for the KANUPP Power Reactor, 5/8/73)
June 21, 1973
The United States and the Soviet Union sign agreements on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Further Limitations of Strategic Offensive Weapons. (Signing Ceremony : U.S.-USSR Agreements on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Further Limitations of Strategic Offensive Weapons, 6/21/73)
August 8, 1973
Senate Bill 1993 is forwarded to President Nixon. The bill, sponsored by Senator John Pastore (D-Rhode Island), increases the quantity of enriched uranium that can be sold to the European Atomic Community (Euratom). The new ceiling is based on a "specified total of megawatts of installed generating capacity." All relevant agencies have either approved the bill or have no objection. Additional revenue that the increase could bring to the U.S. government is approximately $1.8 billion. (Enrolled Bill S. 1993--Amends Euratom Cooperation Act, 8/8/73)
October 17, 1973
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargoes oil shipments to the United States. This action creates a severe energy shortage and contributes to President Nixon's decision to increase efforts to find alternative sources of energy. Nuclear power is among the most popular as well as controversial sources that are investigated. (CRS3, p. 25)
1974
Libya seeks open assistance from General Atomic Corporation, a U.S. manufacturer of research reactors. However, the State Department and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy oppose the idea. Also, Libya is reported to have concluded an agreement with Argentina "for equipment and training in uranium processing extraction and purification." At this time, neither Argentina nor Libya is party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Libya signs the NPT in 1975 but does not conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA until 1980. (Spector2, pp. 151-152)
February 1974
White House Office of Planning and Analysis circulates a report outlining a proposal regarding U.S. uranium enrichment policy. This proposal is the next step in President Nixon's plan to privatize the U.S. uranium industry. ([Uranium Enrichment Strategy Paper; Outline and Draft Sections Included]) 2/1/74)
May 18, 1974
At approximately 8:05 a.m., the government of India detonates a nuclear device of 15 kilotons in the Rajasthan Desert. The official purpose of the test is said to be to study the "cracking and cratering effects on rocks." (Spector2 p. 34)
May 22, 1974
The government of Canada suspends all assistance to India for the Rajasthan reactor and Kota heavy water plants declaring that they cannot find any distinction between peaceful nuclear explosions and those intended for military purposes. (Spector2, p. 34)
June 1974
During a trip to the Middle East, President Nixon offers to sell nuclear power reactors to both Israel and Egypt. The offer is made without any attempt to persuade either government to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The reactor sales are eventually postponed due to growing congressional concern about proliferation. (Spector2, pp. 128-29)
June 1974
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission permits the export of a previously approved shipment of fuel for India's Tarapur reactor. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger intervenes personally to obtain the approval. The AEC then decides to withhold approval of further licenses so that the U.S. government can seek further assurances from the government of India that the fuel will not be used for any nuclear explosions. (Spector2, p. 35)
June 5, 1974
The United States prepares a briefing for NATO on India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion. The briefing notes that in the region, the greatest impact is on Pakistan and that normalization of relations between India and Pakistan is unlikely in the near future. It is noted that the Soviets have refrained from comment and that it is not known whether they were informed in advance of the test. (Assessment of Indian Nuclear Test, 6/5/74)
June 14, 1974
The United States and Egypt issue a joint statement announcing plans to negotiate an agreement for nuclear cooperation. The agreement would allow the United States to sell nuclear reactors and fuel to Egypt. (CRS3, p. 26)
June 17, 1974
The United States and Israel announce that the two governments will begin negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement. The government of Israel wishes to purchase nuclear power reactors, but as a provisional step the United States will negotiate for the sale of nuclear fuel. (CRS3, p. 26)
July 3, 1974
The United States and the Soviet Union sign the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The treaty prohibits all nuclear weapons tests larger than 150 kilotons. (CRS3, p. 26)
July 17, 1974
In response to an inquiry regarding President Nixon's offer to provide nuclear power reactors to Egypt and Israel, an Administration official notes that the agreements will require that safeguards be applied to prevent the equipment from being diverted to weapons purposes. The safeguards will go beyond those normally applied by the IAEA and will include stringent controls on all stages of reactor processing up to and including disposition and storage of the plutonium produced. ([Response to Inquiry about the Proposed Sale of Nuclear Reactors to Israel and Egypt], 7/16/74)
August 9, 1974
President Nixon resigns. Former Vice President Gerald R. Ford is sworn in as the 38th President of the United States. (CRS3, p. 27 )
August 20, 1974
The Defense Intelligence Agency completes a report on India's nuclear energy program. The report notes that there are now no formal safeguards on the CIRUS reactor although India has promised Canada that it would be used for peaceful purposes only. Additionally, since the reactors at Kalpakkam and Narora will be indigenously constructed and operated, and India refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, no safeguards will apply to these facilities either. Thus, the plutonium produced in these reactors will be available for a weapons program. (Nuclear Energy Program--India, 8/20/74)
September 4, 1974
In a summary of a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) entitled "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," the CIA concludes:
"We believe that Israel already has produced nuclear weapons. Our judgement is based on Israeli acquisition of large quantities of uranium, partly by clandestine means...and Israel's large investment in a costly missile system designed to accommodate nuclear warheads....Further emphasis is likely to be on improving weapon designs, manufacturing missiles more capable in terms of distance an accuracy than the existing 260-mile Jericho, and acquiring or perfecting weapons for aircraft delivery." (Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 10/2/74; Spector2, pp. 128-29)
October 1974
The French firm Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles signs an agreement with Pakistan for the construction of a large reprocessing facility to be located at Chashma. The plant will have the capacity to produce 150 kilograms of plutonium per year, enough for as many as 30 nuclear weapons. (Spector2, pp. 74-75)
October 11, 1974
President Ford signs the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, P.L. 93-438. The Act abolishes the Atomic Energy Commission and creates in its place the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Energy Resources Council. (CRS3, p. 27; Statement on the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 10/11/74)
November, 1974
The United States sponsors a meeting, to be held in London, of all principal nuclear supplier nations in order to establish a common set of export control guidelines. The meeting is in response to three events: the test of a nuclear device by India; the increase in oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which prompted many states to accelerate their nuclear programs in order to find alternative sources of energy; and recent negotiations between new nuclear supplier countries in Europe and Third World nations for enrichment facilities. The nations which initially participate include Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. The group comes to be known as the London Suppliers Club. The Club establishes guidelines which specify that "IAEA safeguards will be applied to any exported nuclear material and equipment and that the suppliers would `exercise restraint' in making sales of enrichment and reprocessing facilities...." (Spector2, pp. 8, 447, 450)
November 1, 1974
The Defense Intelligence Agency completes a report on nuclear energy programs in Latin America. The study is to "serve as an aid in evaluating the nuclear weapons proliferation potential of Latin American countries...." (Nuclear Energy Programs--Latin America, 11/74)
December 1974
Israeli President Ephraim Katzir states during an interview that "it has always been our intention to develop the nuclear potential. We now have that potential." (Spector2, p. 129)
December 30, 1974
President Ford signs the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, P.L. 93-559. The Act calls for strengthening international procedures for non-proliferation of nuclear materials and requires the President to report to Congress concerning U.S. efforts toward this end. (CRS3, p. 27)
1975
Libya signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. A condition of the agreement is that Libya must sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty when the Soviet Union does. The Soviets will then provide Libya a small 10-megawatt research reactor. (Spector, pp. 152-153)
1975
Iraq tries to purchase a 500-megawatt natural uranium/gas-graphite power reactor from France. Ostensibly, the reactor is for generating electricity. However, this technology is generally considered to be outdated and inefficient for that purpose, although not necessarily outdated for producing large quantities of plutonium. France declines the sale and offers instead a 40-megawatt materials-testing reactor and a 800-kilowatt "mock-up" of that reactor. Iraq accepts the offer and renames the facilities Tammuz I and II, respectively. The governments of Israel, the United States and some European nations protest the deal because the reactors are fueled with highly enriched uranium which can be directly diverted into nuclear weapons. (Spector2, pp. 166-167)
January 1975
A report on peaceful nuclear explosions is released by India's Bhabha Atomic Research Establishment. The report states that India's May 18, 1974, nuclear explosion was an experiment to test the "fracturing effects in rocks, ground motion, containment of radioactivity and the problems involved in post-shot access of the shot-point environment...." (Some Studies on India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Experiment, 1/1/75)
February 1975
President Ford lifts the arms embargo imposed on Pakistan immediately after the 1971 war with India. By this cooperative gesture, Ford hopes to persuade President Bhutto to abandon or at least postpone building a large reprocessing plant at Chashma. Although this attempt is unsuccessful, the United States eventually succeeds in convincing France, which is aiding in the plants construction, to insist that Chashma be subject to IAEA safeguards. (Spector2, p. 79)
Early-Mid February 1975
State Department officials meet with IAEA staff to discuss nuclear power issues. IAEA Deputy Director General Yuri Chernillin notes that the manpower and safety requirements of nuclear waste management and fuel reprocessing have not received as much attention as they should. Dr. Chernillin also points out that although every nation may legitimately desire a reprocessing facility in order to save nuclear fuel, it is very inefficient to operate small facilities. The optimum capacity of a reprocessing plant is about 1500 tons per year. Therefore, it is important that international organizations such as the IAEA plan regional reprocessing facilities and waste storage sites. Chernillin would like to organize a working group to study the prospects for such a plan. (Information on Regional Nuclear Centers from IAEA, 2/18/75)
March 11, 1975
The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, reports on the status of Pakistan's nuclear facilities. It is noted that Canada has signed an agreement to build a small uranium fuel fabrication plant which will be used to fuel the KANUPP reactor. The French are also planning to construct a fuel reprocessing plant in Pakistan and are insisting on a bilateral safeguards agreement for that facility. (Atomic Energy: Information on Various Developments and Plans, 3/11/75)
April 1975
The first meeting of the major nuclear supplier nations is held in London. (Press Conference of Robert W. Fri, Deputy Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration and Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 10/28/76)
April 15, 1975
Reports in the American press describing the sale of 6.35 kilos of enriched uranium to South Africa include references to a comment by Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) that five kilos of uranium is enough to make a nuclear bomb. Aspin's remark highlights growing concern in the U.S. Congress that safeguards on the export of enriched uranium are inadequate. However, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy notes that the reports are somewhat misleading in tone and that the Committee may issue a clarifying press release. The reports neglect to mention that the uranium is under IAEA safeguards. (Sale of Uranium Made in U.S. to South Africa, 4/15/75; Supply of Highly Enriched Uranium to South Africa, 4/15/75)
April 18, 1975
The United States and Canada consult each other regarding their concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program. They agree to share the information they have on Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear facilities. (Nuclear Problems with Pakistan; Consultations with Canada, 4/18/75)
May 5-30, 1975
The Non-Proliferation Treaty First Review Conference is held to review the operation of the Treaty. Article VIII of the Treaty provides for review conferences to be held every five years after the Treaty enters into force and then after 25 years to confer as to whether the Treaty should be extended. There is significant disagreement among participants at the Conference regarding sharing the peaceful aspects of nuclear technology. However, the participants do issue a unanimous Final Declaration statement with an overall positive evaluation of the Treaty's progress and effectiveness. (SIPRI2, pp. 9-11; CRS3, p. 28)
May 30, 1975
Libya signs an agreement with the Soviet Union to establish a nuclear center for peaceful purposes. The center will include a research reactor. (CRS5, p. 9)
June 12, 1975
In an interview, the President of the Republic of Korea states that South Korea will have to develop an independent nuclear capability if the United States withdraws its nuclear umbrella. (CRS3, p. 28 )
June 17, 1975
Munir Khan, chairman of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, informs the IAEA of an urgent need for heavy water due to an unexpected loss from a ruptured heat exchanger. (Transfer of 5,000 kg of U.S.-Origin Heavy Water to Pakistan, 6/17/75)
June 27, 1975
The Federal Republic of Germany signs a nuclear agreement with Brazil to provide it with a complete nuclear fuel cycle. (CRS3, p. 28)
July 11, 1975
The IAEA considers a proposed agreement between France and the Republic of Korea "for the supply of nuclear material, facilities, equipment, other material and scientific and technical information...for the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." (France, IAEA/ROK Trilateral Safeguards Agreement, 7/11/75)
August 14, 1975
The Department of State notifies the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad that a physical security team from the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) will visit the PINSTECH (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology) facility to check the five kilograms of enriched uranium acquired from U.S. supplies. ERDA is concerned about reports that there are Palestinian and Libyan students enrolled in training programs at PINSTECH. ([Visit of an ERDA Physical Security Team to PINSTECH], 8/14/75)
August 15, 1975
U.S. officials are reported to be concerned about the Pakistani request for more heavy water to fuel the KANUPP reactor. Department of State officials have delayed action because they are not sure if existing safeguards are adequate. The United States also questions whether Pakistan has a legitimate need for the heavy water at this time. (Pakistani Request for Heavy Water, 8/15/75)
September 1975
IAEA completes a study on regional nuclear fuel cycle centers. (See Early-Mid February 1975 entry.) (Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers: IAEA Study Project, 9/75)
September 1, 1975
Israel and the United States negotiate an agreement whereby Israel will withdraw its forces from the Sinai Peninsula and the United States will participate in a monitoring force in the region. In addition, the United States agrees to provide Israel with some advanced military equipment such as Pershing missiles. The Pershing offer is later dropped from the agreement. (CRS3, p. 28)
September 2, 1975
The U.S. mission to the IAEA informs the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission representative in Vienna that the United States is willing to approve the transfer of 5,000 tons of U.S.-origin heavy water as long as the Pakistan-IAEA agreement is amended. The amendment would place the heavy water under IAEA safeguards. (Pakistan Request for Heavy Water, 9/2/75)
September 3, 1975
A State Department memorandum of conversation notes the Department's reservations regarding Pakistan's declared intentions to keep its nuclear program peaceful. The memo notes intelligence information that a $1.5 million plutonium handling facility is being constructed at PINSTECH (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology). (Apprehensions regarding Pakistan's Nuclear Intentions, 9/3/75)
September 24, 1975
The U.S. Embassy in Mexico reports on the current status of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The report states that as of July 2, 1975, 20 nations have ratified the Treaty. They are: Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, The Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. (Current Status of Treaty of Tlatelolco and OPANAL, 9/24/75; Correction of the Current Status of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 10/10/75)
November 1975
Iraq signs an agreement for nuclear cooperation with the government of France. (CRS5, p. 8)
November 4, 1975
The Defense Intelligence Agency completes a report on the nuclear energy programs of Western Europe. The report notes the region's technological capabilities but does not discuss any nuclear weapons proliferation concerns. (Nuclear Energy Programs--Western Europe, 9/75)
November 6, 1975
A press account in the Republic of Korea notes reports of U.S. opposition to the French-Korean nuclear agreement, quoting a U.S. government official as having expressed concern to Korea and France "regarding the transfer of nuclear fuel processing facilities and techniques...." (ROK Press Reports U.S. Concern over Reprocessing Plant, 11/10/75)
1976
While Congress continues to hold up President Nixon's 1974 proposal to sell a nuclear power reactor to the government of Israel, it also blocks a 1975 proposal to provide surface-to-surface, nuclear-capable, Pershing missiles to Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir continues categorically to deny that Israel currently possesses any nuclear weapons despite having the scientific capability to build one. (Spector2, pp. 131-132)
Early 1976
Senior CIA official Carl Duckett provides a secret briefing to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Duckett states that Israel is currently making nuclear weapons from plutonium produced at Dimona. The conclusions of the investigation suggest that the Nuclear Materials Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) diversions are academic due to the amount of plutonium available for weapons use from the Dimona reactor. (Spector2, pp. 130-131)
January 30, 1976
After a great deal of pressure from the United States and an agreement not to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea at this time, Korea cancels its plan to purchase a plutonium reprocessing plant from France. (CRS3, p. 29)
February 11, 1976
The Department of State reviews its plan to discuss Pakistan's purchase of a nuclear reprocessing plant from France and a heavy water plant from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Department will first discuss the matter with France and Germany prior to approaching Pakistan on the matter. The United States plans to argue that the London Supplier Guidelines oblige France and Germany to "consult on sensitive export questions...." The Department wants to warn Pakistan that it may be jeopardizing relations with the United States if it is believed that Pakistan is "trying to match the Indian explosion." (Pakistan Nuclear Problem, 2/11/76; [Problems with the French Proposal to Build Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant in Pakistan], 2/12/76)
March 1976
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials discuss the Agency's proposed study of the concept of multinational fuel cycle centers. ACDA Director Fred Ikle suggests that the study be a joint ACDA/ERDA (Energy Research and Development Agency) project. ([ACDA Task Force Studying Feasibility of Multinational Fuel Cycle Centers], 3/9/76)
March 13, 1976
A State Department report on heavy water production in India predicts that there may be a shortage of heavy water after 1986 depending on the amount of nuclear power the government decides it should produce. (Heavy Water Production in India, 3/13/76)
March 15, 1976
Director of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) Robert Seamans agrees with ACDA that the study of multinational fuel cycle centers should be a joint ACDA/ERDA project. Seamans writes to ACDA Director Fred Ikle describing how responsibilities for the study might be divided. ([ERDA Plans for Study on Multinational Fuel Cycle Centers and Response to Ikle Inquiry], 3/15/76)
March 19, 1976
President Ford sends a letter to Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto asking him to "forego, or at least postpone, plans to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities." (Response to Byroade Cable on Pakistan and Non-Proliferation, 4/8/76)
April 1976
The Department of State discusses a proposed review of U.S. non-proliferation policies. (Proposed Review of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policies, 4/8/76)
April 9, 1976
In a draft paper on nuclear power technology and nuclear weapons proliferation, it is noted that the amount of information regarding the design of fission weapons available in the open literature and the availability of many components is such that if a state invests "modest resources" it can develop nuclear explosives. (Nuclear Power Technology and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, 4/9/76)
April 12, 1976
Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto rejects President Ford's request to cancel plans to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities. (Response to Byroade Cable on Pakistan and Non-Proliferation, 4/8/76; Consultation with the Shah on Pakistan's Nuclear Program, 5/11/76)
May 18, 1976
The government of Canada terminates all nuclear assistance to India after New Delhi refuses to accept full-scope safeguards on its nuclear facilities. (Spector2, pp. 38-39; Nuclear Relations with India, 5/18/76)
June 12, 1976
The Senate Government Operations Committee releases a statement noting that "there are now strong and disturbing indications that India used our heavy water in its nuclear explosion program." This marks the "first time that a nation applied peaceful nuclear technology--in this case, a research reactor and heavy water--to set off a nuclear explosion." (Ribicoff Press Release on U.S. Heavy Water in Cirus and Department Press Guidance, 6/12/76)
June 30, 1976
President Ford approves the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, P.L. 94-329. The law contains Senator Stuart Symington's (D-Missouri) amendment which calls for the United States to cut off aid to nations which obtain or export reprocessing or enrichment technology without the benefit of international full-scope safeguards. The Symington Amendment is later applied to Pakistan aid packages in the 1980s. (CRS3, p. 29; Spector2, p. 79)
Summer 1976
The Nuclear Policy Review Task Force holds meetings to discuss draft papers on a variety of nuclear energy and power issues. The Task Force is directed by Robert Fri of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). Its purpose is to examine all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle while keeping four U.S. goals in mind: non-proliferation, U.S. nuclear energy development (particularly maintaining the U.S. share of the world nuclear markets), environmental and safety issues and other foreign policy goals such as "support of less developed countries." A number of related issues to the policy review are also being studied. These issues include pending U.S. agreements to sell reactors to Egypt, Israel and Iran and domestic reprocessing of plutonium, among others. A report to the President will be prepared by September 1, 1976. ([EPA Comments on Two Draft Papers Circulated by DOE/Nuclear Policy Review Task Force (Fri Report) on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy; Draft Report Attached], 8/6/76; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Study, 8/25/76)
July 2, 1976
While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approves an export license for 9,016 kilograms of slightly enriched uranium for India, NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky notes that the State Department should investigate the reprocessing of spent fuel from the Indian Tarapur reactor, as the 1963 U.S.-Indian agreement for nuclear cooperation provides. Gilinsky is concerned about India's potential for developing a national plutonium stockpile, which could then be used in nuclear weapons. (CRS4, pp. 5, 16)
July 7, 1976
Officials at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan report on the status of the Pakistani reprocessing plant. The report notes that although there is information indicating that the French have financed 20 percent of the cost of the plant, French records report that France has paid none of the cost. (Status of Pakistani Reprocessing Plant, 7/7/76)
August 16, 1976
As part of the Nuclear Policy Review Task Force, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) comments on draft papers prepared by the Energy Development and Research Administration on uranium and plutonium reprocessing. EPA states: "[I]f it is proven that non-proliferation benefits out-weigh the negative impacts of increased waste management on the nuclear industry, we would be supportive of any policy decision which would effectively reduce proliferation, even if this entailed a slower rate of growth for domestic nuclear energy, and the assumption by the U.S. of more than its share of the world's commercial nuclear wastes." ([EPA Comments on Two ERDA Drafts concerning Uranium and Plutonium Reprocessing and Changes in U.S. Policy], 8/16/76)
August 20, 1976
The EPA comments further on the drafts of the Nuclear Policy Review Task Force. The comments are in response to papers on strengthening constraints against nuclear proliferation. EPA states that "the analysis presented under this issue casts serious doubts on the initial assumption that our policy on exports can be posed in a way which both achieves nonproliferation goals and which is broadly consistent." The comments go on to note: "[I]t does not seem possible to treat, for example, Belgium and India, or Egypt, alike without either being overly restrictive to the former or being too lax with the latter. A country by country approach appears almost unavoidable." ([EPA Review of Issues 2 and 3 of Nuclear Policy Review], 8/20/76)
August 25, 1976
The Environmental Protection Agency interprets some of the information in the Nuclear Policy Task Force's report. The Task Force report notes that Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, India, South Korea and Taiwan appear to present the major current proliferation problems. The report notes five options in defining a policy on plutonium. The first is for the United States to preempt the reprocessing market "through direct control over nuclear materials and an aggressive program to develop [a] reprocessing capability in the U.S." The second and third options are to relax the demand for returning U.S. fuel and to allow foreign development of reprocessing capabilities. The fourth option "calls for storage of spent fuel and delay [of] the reprocessing decision until alternative technologies can be developed." The fifth policy option would limit exports and thereby "minimize reliance on international arrangements to safeguard plutonium." (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Study, 8/25/76)
September 1976
The Administration team working on nuclear non-proliferation policy submits its report to President Ford. The final report notes three major approaches to controlling plutonium reprocessing to avoid nuclear weapon proliferation concerns. The first approach permits countries to carry out their own reprocessing under stringent international controls. This is also referred to as "national plutonium recycle." The second approach calls for reprocessing to occur outside of developing countries, or "international plutonium recycle." The third approach eliminates the use of plutonium for some countries by replacing spent fuel with new fuel. This last approach is also referred to as "buy back with no plutonium recycle." (Brenner, p. 110; Talking Points on Nuclear Policy Review, 9/1/76; White House Nuclear Policy Study, 9/10/76; Briefing for the Administrator: Nuclear Policy Issues, 9/23/76)
September 17, 1976
The deputy administrator of the Nuclear Policy Review Task Force, Donald Quarles, attends a meeting at the White House to assess the potential passage of the Nuclear Fuels Assurance Act "in exchange for Administration support of tougher nuclear export controls." (Briefing for the Administrator: Nuclear Policy Issues, 9/23/76)
October 28, 1976
A press conference is held with Robert Fri of ERDA and Charles Robinson, under secretary of state for economic affairs, to release President Ford's statement on nuclear policy. The President's policy is based on the report of the Nuclear Policy Review Task Force, which Fri directed. The principal thrust of the statement is that the erosion of the United States position as the dominant world supplier of nuclear fuel and technology requires that efforts to control proliferation should be international. Common standards must be developed by both nuclear suppliers and customers. As a result, President Ford announces that the recycling and reprocessing of plutonium will not "proceed unless there is a sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation." (Press Conference of Robert W. Fri, Deputy Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration and Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 10/28/76; Statement by the President, 10/28/76; Statement by the President on Nuclear Policy, 10/28/76)
December 16, 1976
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France announces that his government will discontinue all further exports of reprocessing facilities. However, this action does not affect the previously arranged sales to Pakistan. (Spector2, p. 80)
January 19, 1977
The Department of State approves the export of 23,8594 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to South Africa. (Comments to NRC on Nuclear Export License Application, 1/19/77)
January 20, 1977
Jimmy Carter is inaugurated as the 39th President of the United States. (NYT 1/21/77)
April 7, 1977
President Carter submits his proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to Congress. (See March 10, 1978, entry.) (CRS3, p. 32)
April 14, 1977
President Carter announces the United States intention to sign Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (See also Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in the Legal Glossary.) (President's Announcement on Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 4/16/77; President's Announcement on Protocol of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 4/20/77)
April 21, 1977
During a meeting of the Organization for the Proscription of Nuclear Arms in Latin America (OPANAL), it is noted that the government of India does not consider itself a nuclear weapons state and therefore has no obligation to sign Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (OPANAL Meeting in Caracas, 4/21/77)
May 1977
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agree in Moscow to establish working groups on a comprehensive test ban and on nuclear non-proliferation. Initial working group discussions are planned to begin June 13. (Discussions with the Soviet Union on Termination of Nuclear Explosions and on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 5/24/77)
May 26, 1977
President Carter signs Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Protocol requires all signatory nations responsible for territories within the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone to apply appropriate denuclearization measures to those territories. (CRS3, p. 35)
Late May 1977
The United States begins negotiations with the Republic of Korea concerning the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. The discussions focus heavily on South Korea's desire to retain the "U.S. nuclear umbrella." (Koreans Intensify Discussion of Nuclear Option, 6/17/77)
June 17, 1977
Reports in the South Korean press discuss the recent U.S. decision to withdraw troops from the peninsula and local concern over the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons as well. There is an increased tendency to regard the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear capability as a consequence of U.S. troop withdrawal. (Koreans Intensify Discussion of Nuclear Option, 6/17/77)
June 28, 1977
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approves the export of 16,804 kilograms of slightly enriched uranium to India. (CRS4, p. 16)
July 18, 1977
Foreign Minister of Israel Moshe Dayan and Iran's Vice Minister of War Gen. Hasan Toufanian meet to discuss Israeli-Iranian "mutual reliance" for peace. (Meeting, Minister of Defense, Gen. E. Weizman, and Gen. Toufanian, of Iran, 7/18/77; Minutes from Meeting Held in Tel Aviv between H.E. General M. Dayan, Foreign Minister of Israel and H.E. General H. Toufanian, Vice Minister of War, Imperial Government of Iran, 7/18/77)
August 4, 1977
President Carter signs an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The amendment, sponsored by Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), is a revision of the Symington Amendment. It calls for sanctions against countries improperly engaging in nuclear trade. (See also Glenn Amendment in the Legal Glossary.) (CRS3, p. 36)
August 9-22, 1977
Reports from the Soviet Union, France ad the United States indicate that South Africa is preparing to conduct a nuclear weapons test. (CRS3, p. 36)
August 23, 1977
President Carter holds a news conference to discuss reports of an impending nuclear test by the government of South Africa. The President states that Pretoria has informed him that it does not intend to conduct any nuclear tests now or in the future. The United States vows to monitor the situation closely and to renew efforts to persuade South Africa to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (CRS3, p. 36)
September 1977
U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan is terminated when French sales of nuclear equipment and technology for the Chashma facility continue. France waits nearly one year before ceasing to export to Pakistan. Two months later, the United States resumes its aid program. (Spector2, pp. 80-81)
September 20, 1977
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is abolished by P.L. 96-110. Its functions are reassigned to various Senate and House committees, including the Senate Government Operations and House International Relations panels. (CRS3, p. 37)
September 21, 1977
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance prepares to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to discuss the Soviet position on South African nuclear matters. Vance is to request "quiet cooperation" with the Soviets on this issue. (Your Meeting with Gromyko: South African Nuclear Issue, 9/21/77)
October 4, 1977
Soviet news services continue to criticize the United States decision to aid South Africa's nuclear program despite Foreign Minister Gromyko's recent moderate statement at the U.N. General Assembly Plenary Session. (Non-Proliferation Issues at the 32nd UNGA: South Africa, 10/6/77)
October 18, 1977
The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires reports on the prospects of Argentina signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Embassy officials note that nationalistic groups in and out of the Argentine government are against ratification. They view it as an encroachment on national sovereignty and believe it might weaken Argentina's position vis-a-vis Brazil. The report concludes that it is highly unlikely that Argentina will sign the Treaty anytime soon. (Tlatelolco Treaty, 10/18/77)
October 19-21, 1977
The Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is held in Washington, D.C. The scope and operating methods of the INFCE are outlined and approved by the 40 attending nations. (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Technical and Economic Scope and Methods of Work, 10/21/77; Final Communique of the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, 10/21/77; The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program (A Possible Approach), 10/21/77)
October 21, 1977
A report from the U.S. military attache in South Africa states that information recently received supports the view that there are no "nuclear bomb test facilities located in the area around Uppington" in the Kalahari Desert. The report goes on to note that the air space over the alleged test facility is unrestricted, allowing anyone to fly over the site legally and to verify this information for themselves. (Nuclear Test Facility at/near Uppington in Kalahari Desert, 10/21/77)
October 31, 1977
President Carter signs the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1978 (P.L. 95-148). The law prohibits the financing of exports of nuclear equipment, fuel or technology to states that have not detonated a nuclear device. (CRS3, p. 39)
1978
As a result of persistent protests by the governments of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United States, France offers Iraq an alternative fuel for Tammuz I and II. The fuel is known as caramel and is unusable for nuclear weapons. Iraq declines the alternative, demanding the highly enriched uranium originally offered. France ultimately acquiesces, but not until March 1980. (Spector2, pp. 168-169)
1978
The Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, holds investigative hearings on Korean-American relations. A former member of the Republic of Korea's Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC) tells the subcommittee how the WEC unanimously voted in the 1970s to proceed with developing nuclear weapons. (Spector2, pp. 20-21)
January 2, 1978
President Carter visits India and addresses the Indian Parliament, assuring his audience that the United States will provide the nuclear fuel for Tarapur. (CRS4, p. 16)
January 6, 1978
Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai meets with a number of U.S. senators in New Delhi. Prime Minister Desai says that India cannot agree to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty until the nuclear weapons states cease all nuclear tests, stop producing new nuclear weapons and take steps to destroy their current stockpiles. (CRS3, p. 41)
January 20, 1978
Because of the links to proliferation, President Carter announces in his State of the Union message that the United States has "deferred indefinitely the commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and plutonium recycling...." (CRS3, p. 41)
February 13, 1978
The South African government announces that the pilot plant for enriching uranium at Valindaba will be converted into a production plant and will be able to provide for South Africa's currently projected needs. The new facility will be large enough to make South Africa self-sufficient for domestic uranium needs but will not allow it to produce uranium for the world market. (SAG Announces Plans for Commercial Uranium Enrichment Plant, 2/14/78)
March 10, 1978
President Carter signs into law the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242). The Act prohibits U.S. exports of nuclear fuel and reactors after March 1980 to nations which have not accepted full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities unless the President issues a waiver of this requirement. The presidential waiver must, however, be submitted to Congress for 60 days of continuous session where it may be overridden by majority-approved resolutions from both houses of Congress. (Spector2, p. 39; SIPRI1, p. 201; CRS4, p. 1)
March 22, 1978
The Soviet Union reacts to the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, noting that as a member of the London Suppliers Club (see entry in Organizations Glossary), Moscow fully supports the control of nuclear materials, "will strictly observe the principles of non-proliferation, and welcomes the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act insofar as it advances these principles." (Soviet Official's Reaction to U.S. Non-Proliferation Act, 3/22/78)
April 7, 1978
President Carter announces that the United States will defer production of neutron weapons, but that U.S. actions will be influenced by the Soviet Union's efforts in conventional and nuclear arms control. (CRS3, p. 42)
April 20, 1978
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission fails to approve an export license for 7,600 kilograms of slightly enriched uranium to India. (CRS4, p. 15)
April 21, 1978
The State Department discusses plans to persuade the government of Pakistan to forego building a reprocessing plant in the event that France cancels its contract. In the meantime, U.S. officials meet with French counterparts to assess when Pakistan would be able to finish the construction if France pulls out. (Pakistan Reprocessing Issue, 4/21/78)
April 25, 1978
The Soviet Union indicates that it will sign Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco "shortly." (Treaty of Tlatelolco Ratification Prospects, 4/26/78; Cuba, Moscow, and Treaty of Tlatelolco, 4/27/78)
April 27, 1978
President Carter issues Executive Order 12055 enabling the United States to export low enriched uranium fuel to India. The Order is the first waiver of the export ban provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Congress does not veto President Carter's actions. (CRS3, p. 42; CRS4, pp. 5-6; [Congressional Concerns about Decision to Export Fuel to India for the Tarapur Reactor], 4/25/78)
May 1, 1978
House Concurrent Resolution 599 is introduced, stating that Congress does not favor the proposed export of low enriched uranium to India. (CRS4, p. 15)
May 17, 1978
The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports that the government of Pakistan will "raise an almighty fuss" if France cancels the construction contract for a nuclear reprocessing plant. The report indicates that President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto will not want the cancellation to be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of the government and will "want to go to considerable lengths" to prove that his government was not an accessory to France's decision. U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Arthur Hummel suggests that a U.S. offer of economic and military assistance might soften the blow. (Pakistan, Iran and Reprocessing, 5/17/78)
May 23, 1978
The Carter Administration withholds export licenses for uranium to South Africa and for plutonium to Pakistan. (CRS3, p. 41)
June 12, 1978
President Carter announces that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state which is party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (CRS3, p. 42)
June 13, 1978
Prime Minister Desai of India meets with the House International Relations Committee and argues that the United States should honor its agreement for cooperation with India and approve the export of nuclear fuel for Tarapur. (CRS4, p. 14)
June 14, 1978
The House Committee on International Relations takes Indian Prime Minister Desai's advice and votes to report negatively on House Concurrent Resolution 599. (See May 1, 1978, entry.) (CRS4, p. 14)
June 20, 1978
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes to allow the export of enriched uranium to India. (CRS4, p. 14)
Summer 1978
The U.N. General Assembly, Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai states that India "would never test a nuclear explosive in the future even for peaceful purposes." However, India still refuses all international inspections of its facilities. In a statement on June 21, 1979, Desai modifies this position significantly. (See June 21, 1979, entry.) (Spector2, p. 41)
July 1978
Libya signs an accord with India for nuclear cooperation. However, when India decides to limit that cooperation to peaceful areas, Libya responds by terminating its oil shipments to that country. (Spector2, p. 153)
August 23, 1978
French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Pakistani leader Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq meet in Paris to discuss the French decision to seek renegotiation of its contract to construct a reprocessing plant in Pakistan. (Surfacing of French-Pakistan Reprocessing Issue, 8/24/78)
August 30, 1978
The Pakistani reaction to France's recent cancellation of a reprocessing plant construction contract is regarded as mild. In fact, the government of Pakistan has not fully acknowledged the cancellation so far. A U.S. Embassy cable remarks that some pro-government newspapers have focused on "the sorrowful aspects of Pakistan's abandonment by her former great friend (the U.S.) rather than angry denunciations..." of the French actions. (Press and GOP Reactions to Reprocessing Deal Cancellation Surprisingly Mild, 8/30/78)
September 19, 1978
The State Department reports that Munir Khan, head of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, is visiting Italy to conduct, in Khan's words, a "shopping trip" for nuclear cooperation. (Pakistani Nuclear Chief Visit to Italy, 9/19/78)
September 28, 1978
A U.S. firm, Edlow International, applies to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a license to export 19,859 kilograms of enriched uranium to India. (CRS4, p. 13; Edlow International Company Application, Reference Number IN/DS/3, 9/28/78)
Mid-Late October 1978
It is revealed that the government of Pakistan has engaged in a secret effort to build a uranium enrichment plant capable of producing weapons-grade uranium. (Spector2, p. 41; PK [Pakistan] Nuclear Intentions, 10/23/78)
Late October 1978
The Mitre Corporation's study on breeder reactors, "Nuclear Power Issues and Choices," is reviewed by Soviet officials. Their reaction is that it is a "covert attempt to slow breeder development in other countries and thereby retain the U.S. monopolistic position...." (Soviet Views on Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, 10/3/78)
November 27, 1978
The Plenary Conference of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation begins in Vienna. (CRS3, p. 43)
Late 1978
Ahmed el Shahat, head of the Foreign Liaison Office of the Libyan People's Congress, states "unequivocally that Libya is seeking nuclear weapons." (Spector2, pp. 154)
January 1979
President Carter sends to Congress his report on U.S. government actions regarding non-proliferation as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. (Report of the President to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 1/79)
January 22, 1979
India and the Soviet Union sign an agreement for scientific and technical cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (CRS4, p. 13)
March 8, 1979
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher visits New Delhi. The United States is aware of India's concerns over fuel for the Tarapur reactor. (CRS4, p. 13)
March 13, 1979
After meeting in London in February 1979, the U.N. Anti-Apartheid Committee completes a report on nuclear collaboration with South Africa and sends it to the Security Council for action. The Committee urges the Security Council to adopt a mandatory decision under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter "to end all nuclear collaboration with South Africa, to require dismantling of nuclear plans [sic] and to warn the Pretoria regime that any efforts by it to continue its nuclear programe [sic] or to build a uranium enrichment plant would result in further international action, including effective collective sanctions." (U.N. Anti-Apartheid Committee to Send Report on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa to Security Council with Request for Action, 3/13/79)
March 23, 1979
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approves the export of 18.5 tons of slightly enriched uranium for the Indian reactor at Tarapur. (CRS3, p. 44; Tarapur Export License, 3/23/79)
April 1979
The core structures for the Osirak and Isis reactors in Iraq are destroyed. A French ecological group claims responsibility. However, others believe that the attack was actually carried out by Israeli agents. (Spector2, p. 176)
April 1, 1979
The Central Intelligence Agency prepares a report on the "International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." The report assesses the strategic implications of nuclear weapons capabilities and threats in a variety of troubled geographical areas. (International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 4/79)
April 4, 1979
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is executed, having been found guilty of conspiracy to murder of one of his political opponents. Also on this day, a State Department spokesman notes that the United States will be "winding down" U.S. aid to Pakistan in accordance with the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. (Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 14, April 11, 1979, 4/11/79)
April 6, 1979
A $40 million economic and military assistance aid package to Pakistan is cut after the Carter Administration concludes that Karachi is building an enrichment plant to produce weapons-grade uranium. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher meets with President Zia-ul-Haq, but fails to persuade him to cancel the facility. The cut-off is required under the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. (CRS3, p. 44; Spector2, p. 83)
April 19, 1979
The U.N. Security Council's South Africa Arms Embargo Committee agrees to delay any decision recommending a ban on nuclear cooperation with South Africa until an open meeting can be held to discuss the issue in further detail. The United States suggested that the meeting take place and that a State Department nuclear expert be invited and questioned regarding South Africa's nuclear program. (South African Arms Embargo Committee Meeting April 19, 4/21/79)
April 24, 1979
Edlow International applies to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for an export license for 19,858 kilograms of enriched uranium for India. (CRS4, p. 12)
May 1, 1979
At a Senate hearing, Carter Administration officials testify that in 1978 a California company sold Pakistan components which could be used in plants that produce weapons-grade plutonium. In response to a question by Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), Assistant Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering admits that "Pakistan could build a bomb in two to four years." Pakistan told officials of the California company that the parts would be used in the construction of a textile mill. Pakistan attempted to purchase similar components from Emerson Electric, U.K., six months ago but the sale was prevented by British officials who were suspicious of their intended use. Pickering reveals the Administration's perception of the Pakistani program when he testifies that it is not peaceful but related to an effort to develop a nuclear explosive capability. (NYT 5/2/79; Hearing, 5/1/79)
May 25, 1979
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) questions the Department of State regarding the implications of the proposed export of low enriched uranium to India. The NRC is concerned that Pakistan's "alleged clandestine enrichment activities" may be influencing India's nuclear development plans. NRC officials also ask the State Department to confirm Indian Prime Minister Desai's statement that "safeguards on Tarapur spent fuel would cease should the U.S. terminate supply of fuel." ([Possible Executive Branch Concerns over the Export of Low-Enriched Uranium to India], 5/25/79)
June 14, 1979
President Carter forwards a white paper on the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project to Congress. The paper illuminates the Administration's position that nuclear fuel cycles using plutonium or highly enriched uranium are threatening to non-proliferation efforts and global peace and security. (CRS3, p. 45)
June 21, 1979
The State Department confirms that Indian Prime Minister Desai "has said [excised] publicly [words excised] that India will be under no obligation to continue safeguards if we end supply, although he has left open the possibility of voluntarily maintaining safeguards as India has done on the Canadian supplied Rajasthan reactor." (The Next License for India's Tarapur Reactors, 6/21/79)
June 27, 1979
The U.N. Security Council's South Africa Arms Embargo Committee meets. The Committee asks the U.S. representative about the prospects of providing a State Department nuclear expert as promised in an earlier meeting. The U.S. representative has no information to offer. Committee members decide to invite Dr. Ronald Waters of Howard University as an expert and set July 6 as a tentative date for the next meeting. (Arms Embargo Committee Meeting June 27, 6/29/79)
July 1979
A secret Central Intelligence Agency document on Israel is prepared noting Israel's growing missile capability. It briefly describes the "Gabriel" missile, an indigenously produced and built naval surface-to-surface missile, and the "Shafir," an air-to-air missile. (National Basic Intelligence Factbook: Israel, 7/79)
July 15, 1979
Indian Prime Minister Desai resigns after his party becomes the minority in Parliament. (CRS4, p. 12)
August 3, 1979
The United States is reportedly delaying a decision on whether to export enriched uranium to India until the new Indian government announces its position on developing nuclear weapons. (CRS4, p. 12)
August 8, 1979
The government of Brazil ratifies the Treaty of Tlatelolco; however, the Treaty will only go into effect for Brazil if it waives Article 28 which requires all of the nations in the region to sign the treaty before it enters into force. (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 8/8/79)
August 11, 1979
A report in the Pakistani press alleges that Benazir Bhutto, daughter of executed former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, reportedly "struck a deal with America for support (in her father's campaign for clemency) in return for a pledge to scuttle Pakistan's drive for nuclear capability." Although the campaign was unsuccessful, it did "orchestrate western propaganda against Pakistan on the nuclear issuem [sic]." (Reported Deal with the U.S. to Save Bhutto and Stop Nuclear Program, 8/12/79)
August 15, 1979
New Indian Prime Minister Singh modifies earlier statements regarding India's non-nuclear weapon intentions. Singh threatens that if Pakistan continues to pursue its nuclear weapons program, then India may have to "reconsider the whole question." (Spector2, p. 42; CRS4, p. 12)
August 20, 1979
Pakistan Press International releases a copy of what it says is Benazir Bhutto's letter to her brother offering to trade Pakistan's nuclear program for U.S. support for clemency for her father. U.S. Ambassador Hummel comments that there is "no mention of the nuclear issue anywhere in the Benazir letter...." (Press Publishes Benazir Bhutto's "Nuclear Deal" Letter, 8/21/79)
August 27 1979
Edlow International files for an export license for 19,859 kilograms of enriched uranium for the Indian reactor at Tarapur. There are currently two license applications for India before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (CRS4, p. 12)
September 22, 1979
A U.S. Vela reconnaissance satellite detects a flash of unknown origin over the South Atlantic. Some observers believe it came from an unannounced nuclear test, perhaps by Israel or South Africa. Separate investigations by the United Nations and the United States conclude that the flash was probably not from a nuclear device. (CRS3, pp. 45, 47)
September 24, 1979
The State Department confers on two pending export licenses to supply fuel for Tarapur reactors in India. If approved, the deals will supply fuel to Tarapur through 1985. However, after March 10, 1980, the Symington Amendment does not allow U.S. aid to states which do not accept IAEA safeguards. The government of India has made no move toward accepting those safeguards. (Nuclear Fuel to India, 9/24/79)
October 3, 1979
The U.N. Security Council's South Africa Arms Embargo Committee meets to hear a statement on U.S. nuclear policy toward South Africa. Committee members criticize the United States for promising that a State Department nuclear expert would answer questions from the Committee and then "reneging" on the offer. The Committee (without support of the United States) presses the Security Council to call for a cut-off of all nuclear cooperation with South Africa. (South Africa Arms Embargo Committee Meeting October 3, 10/6/79)
October 19, 1979
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requests the State Department to inform them if State intends to use "the Presidential approval route" to decide whether to authorize the export of nuclear fuel to India. NRC officials wish to have the opportunity to decide on the export licenses themselves. ([Coordination of Action on the Sales of Nuclear Materials to India], 10/19/79)
October 24 1979
In formal discussions between U.S. and Pakistani officials, the United States "reaffirm[s] that in the event of Afghan aggression against Pakistan we would consider the 1959 bilateral agreement to be relevant...." This discussion foreshadows the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent change in U.S. policy toward aid to Pakistan. (U.S.-Pak. Talks: Regional Issues, 10/24/79)
October 28, 1979
Reports in the South African press respond to U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency claims that the September 22 unidentified flash over the South Atlantic was the result of a nuclear test conducted by South Africa. This claim differs from the view of a White House panel of scientists which stated that the signal observed by the Vela Satellite differed from other known nuclear test signals. The panel concluded that the event was "probably not from a nuclear explosion." The disagreement has not been settled. Press reports state that "the American Government has inflicted grave damage on South Africa's international relationships by suggesting that this country might have carried out a nuclear test explosion somewhere between Australia and Argentina." (Suspected Nuclear Event: South African Editorial, 10/29/79; Spector 2, pp. 299-300)
November 1979
Press reports state that Pakistan has received approximately 100 metric tons of uranium concentrate, also known as yellow cake, from Libya. Originally acquired from Niger, Libya reportedly transferred the material to Pakistan. According to the reports, Niger incorrectly assumed that the material was safeguarded as Libya was a NPT signatory. However, Libya had yet to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. (Spector2, pp. 85-87)
Late 1979
United States considers applying economic sanctions against Pakistan to further limit its ability to pursue a nuclear weapons program. The issue arises after President Zia-ul-Haq states that his country is easily adjusting to the loss of military and economic assistance formerly provided by the United States. Washington begins to take an uncooperative position regarding Pakistani debt rescheduling. (Spector2, pp. 83-84)
December 11, 1979
U.S. Ambassador to India Robert F. Goheen writes Assistant Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering arguing that the supply of nuclear fuel to India should be maintained. He says that ending U.S. assistance would adversely affect U.S. non-proliferation goals for the region, as IAEA safeguards on the Tarapur fuel would probably no longer apply. ([U.S. Nuclear Fuel Supplies to Tarapur Power Reactors Should Be Maintained], 12/11/79)
December 26, 1979
The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. Official Soviet statements claim that the government of Afghanistan asked the Soviet Union to intervene to help settle civil unrest. Among other effects, the invasion prompts the United States to adopt a program of expanded assistance to Pakistan. (See January 18, 1980, entry.) (Factbook1, p. 5; CRS3, p. 45)
December 27, 1979
The U.N. General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to "deplore the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan." In the months following the Soviet invasion, President Carter embargoes the export of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union, stops the sale of computers and high-tech equipment, boycotts the 1980 Olympics to be held in Moscow and withdraws the Salt II Treaty from the ratification process in the Senate. He also announces a new policy later dubbed the Carter Doctrine, which states that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault against the vital interests of the United States. (Bhasin, pp. 72, 137-138)
1980
The government of India claims that it has the right to extract plutonium from the spent fuel of the Tarapur reactor and reprocess it. The United States disagrees. The dispute continues to hamper U.S.-Indian relations as well as U.S. efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race in South Asia. (Spector2, pp. 47-48)
1980
Satish Dhawhan, head of India's space research organization, declares that "any country which can place a satellite in orbit can develop an IRBM" (Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile). This claim is significant in that it reveals India's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons delivery capability; the most likely target is China. (Spector2, p. 49)
January 1980
President Carter transmits to Congress his report on U.S. actions regarding non-proliferation. (Report of the President to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 1/1/80)
January 1980
Brazil agrees to sell Iraq large quantities of yellow cake. (Spector2, p. 171)
January 1, 1980
In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the National Security Council discusses the specifics of a plan to provide military and economic assistance to Pakistan. (NSC Discussion of Support for Pakistan, 1/1/80)
January 7, 1980
President Carter approves the State Department recommendation that favorable action be taken on the still-pending export licenses for nuclear fuel to India. (Instructions for Seeking Government of India Assurances in Connection with Shipments of Nuclear Fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, 1/10/80)
January 8, 1980
Iraq and Brazil sign an agreement for cooperation which provides for the transfer of nuclear technology to Iraq. This transfer is subject to the restriction detailed in Brazil's 1976 agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. (CRS5, p. 8)
January 9-12, 1980
Pakistani Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi visits New York and Washington to attend the U.N. Special Session on Afghanistan and to discuss with President Carter the impact of the Soviet invasion on U.S.-Pakistani relations. Shahi briefly describes Pakistan's impending balance of payments crisis and notes that debt rescheduling would ease the crisis. (Agha Shahi Visit to Washington, 1/8/80; U.S.-Pakistan Talks: Economic Assistance and Debt, 1/15/80)
January 14, 1980
Indira Gandhi becomes prime minister of India. (CRS4, pp. 4, 11)
January 17, 1980
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi comments on India's nuclear policy and on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. She states, "we do not believe in producing atom bombs. But, we should have the freedom in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." She further declares that "India does not support outside intervention in any country," but, she adds, "the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan Revolutionary Council." (Mrs. Gandhi on Nuclear Policy, Soviet Intervention, 1/17/80)
January 18, 1980
As part of a dramatic turnaround in U.S.-Pakistan relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter proposes giving $400 million in military and economic assistance to Islamabad as an emergency exemption to the Symington Amendment. However, President Zia-ul-Haq calls Carter's offer "peanuts" and presses instead for a security treaty with the United States. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher meet with Zia-ul-Haq and hold out only the promise of more aid, continuing to warn that a Pakistani nuclear test would end all U.S. efforts in this regard. (Spector2, p. 85; U.S. Assistance for Pakistan, 1/18/80; Zia-ul-Haq Criticizes U.S. Aid Offer in Interview with U.S. Press, 1/18/80; Zia's Remarks to U.S. Newsmen on U.S. Aid Offer, Bilateral Agreement, Nuclear Issue, 1/18/80)
January 23, 1980
Indian Foreign Minister P.V.N. Rao expresses "grave concern" over the decision by the United States to "rearm" Pakistan. (Indian Foreign Minister Expresses "Grave Concern" over U.S. Moves to Rearm Pakistan, 1/23/80)
January 29, 1980
Congressional and Executive Branch representatives agree that there should be a "full-scale review of U.S. non-proliferation policy..." due to the effect new nuclear weapons states might have on the ability of the United States to project its power "in the defense of threatened populations or vital resources." ([Review of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy: Threat Posed from Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Indian Reprocessing Issue], 1/29/80)
February 1980
President Carter writes to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stating that he will proceed with the two pending export licenses if he receives "certain assurances" reaffirming earlier statements that U.S.-supplied fuel would be used only at Tarapur. These assurances are also understood to rule out peaceful nuclear explosions. (Talking Points for Mr. Pickering to Use in Delhi, 2/25/80)
February 1980
The Central Intelligence Agency reports to a congressional committee that if a nuclear test indeed occurred on September 22, 1979, then "Israel is the leading candidate" among the states which might have conducted it. (Spector2, p. 133)
Early February 1980
The Department of State continues to plan different approaches toward increasing aid to Pakistan. President Carter prepares letters for key allies urging increased financial assistance in rescheduling the Pakistani debt, as well as other aid. (Strategy for Pakistan Assistance, 2/9/80; Economic and Military Assistance to Pakistan, 2/20/80)
February 2, 1980
Under Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski meet with Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq. Zia is primarily concerned with the degree of the U.S. commitment to Pakistan's security. (Talks with Pakistanis, 2/2/80)
February 4, 1980
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance cables the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan requesting an update on the consultations with President Zia-ul-Haq. In particular, the State Department needs to know whether Zia will accept the 1959 Agreement with Pakistan as the basis of U.S. security assurances. (Pakistan Consultations, 2/4/80)
February 7, 1980
The OPANAL Secretary General presents a memorandum to the United States requesting that it ratify Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Additional Protocol I applies denuclearization provisions to all territories for which Treaty signatories are responsible. With respect to the United States, a signatory of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty, these territories include areas where Washington operates military bases. (Call for U.S. Ratification of Protocol One of Treaty of Tlatelolco, 2/8/80)
February 10, 1980
Congressional leaders become concerned over India's plans to reprocess U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel at Tarapur. They request that the Administration block the shipment of the remaining 19 tons of uranium previously authorized for export. ([Arguments against Continued Shipment of Fuel to Tarapur], 2/10/80)
March 1980
Iraq purchases 138 tons of yellow cake from Portugal. Also, France notifies Iraq that it will only provide 24 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enough for only one nuclear device, instead of over 200 tons as originally agreed. (Spector2, pp. 169, 171)
March 1, 1980
The President of the South African Atomic Energy Board, Dr. De Villiers, dismisses the possibility that South Africa has diverted uranium produced at the Koeberg nuclear facility to military purposes, arguing that reprocessing would have to occur outside the country and that the IAEA conducts inspections of the plant. (South Africa Nuclear Policy, 3/1/80)
March 6, 1980
Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi declares to a closed session of locally-elected officials that the government of Pakistan "is not interested in the 400 million dollar aid package offered by Washington...." He states further that Pakistan must rely on its national unity and strength for its security. The basis for Shahi's attitude toward the U.S. offer is the view that it is evident that the 1959 U.S.-Pakistan bilateral agreement, which includes the "use of armed force in the event of a `Soviet-controlled' aggression," will not be upheld. The United States maintains that the agreement is not a treaty and therefore is primarily binding only on the administration which made the agreement. (Agha Shahi Publicly Rejects Proposed U.S. Assistance Package, 3/6/80)
March 9, 1980
President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq discusses with American scholar Selig Harrison why he decided to reject the U.S. aid package. Zia states that the effort to pair reaffirmation of the 1959 bilateral agreement with an aid package was viewed as an inadequate response to the Soviet invasion. He adds that the U.S. offer implied that the amount of aid was tied to the degree of assurances given. (U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Zia Expounds to American Scholar, 3/9/80)
March 10, 1980
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 takes effect. The Act is aimed at assuring that U.S. nuclear exports and weapons do not increase the prospects for the further spread of sensitive technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Among its provisions, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can no longer approve export licenses for nuclear components to countries that have not agreed to full-scope safeguards. (CRS4, p. 11)
March 12, 1980
The Indian Minister of Defense answers questions in Parliament regarding the status of India's nuclear program. He states: "[O]ur consistent nuclear policy, so far, has been that we would employ nuclear energy for peaceful and constructive purposes only." He goes on to state that "enriched uranium is to be supplied by the United States only for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station under the 1963 Agreement. India has enough uranium ore reserves for production of natural uranium required as fuel for all other nuclear power stations existing and planned." (Indian Nuclear Policy, 3/13/80)
March 14, 1980
The Carter Administration delays its decision on approving exports of nuclear fuel to India pending assurances from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the fuel will not be diverted for nuclear explosives. (CRS4, p. 11)
March 26, 1980
The Department of State contends that the full-scope safeguards requirement stipulated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 does not apply to India's two requests currently before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "because they [fall] within relevant deadlines in the law." (CRS4, p. 11; India's Tarapur Reactors, 3/26/80)
April 8, 1980
State Department officials outline potential policy options regarding authorizing nuclear fuel for export to India in light of the fact that the government of India has not been particularly forthcoming on the "assurances" sought by President Carter in his February 28 letter to Indira Gandhi. (Tarapur Fuel, 4/8/80; Tarapur Fuel Options Paper, 4/15/80; Tarapur, 4/23/80)
April 30, 1980
The State Department informs U.S. embassies that Argentina has recently obtained contracts from West Germany and Switzerland for new nuclear facilities without accepting any "NPT-type full-scope safeguards." (Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 18, April 30, 1980 [Argentina's Nuclear Program Gets Up Steam], 4/30/80)
May 7, 1980
The Executive Branch recommends that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorize the two pending export licenses for nuclear fuel to India and issues an Executive Order authorizing two others. ([Executive Branch Analysis of License Application for the Export of Low-Enriched Uranium to India with Enclosures Attached], 5/7/80; [Proposed Export of Nuclear Fuel to India Amid Concerns of the Development of Nuclear Explosives], 5/7/80; Fuel Supply for Tarapur, 5/8/80; Application of Sections 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act to Proposed Exports to India, 5/12/80)
May 16, 1980
The Executive Branch maps out its strategy for presenting the Executive Order authorizing shipments of nuclear fuel to India in order to minimize the anticipated "backlash" from the non-proliferation lobby in Congress. (The Congressional Agenda: Issues and Strategies, 5/16/80)
May 22, 1980
The State Department examines the implications that a cut-off of U.S. nuclear fuel will have on global non-proliferation efforts. ([Key Effects of a Cut-Off of U.S. Nuclear Cooperation on Global Non-Proliferation], 5/22/80)
June 18-19, 1980
President Carter waives the safeguards requirement for Indian nuclear facilities and permits two additional shipments of low enriched uranium for Tarapur amid mounting congressional opposition to aid to India. (Spector, p. 39; CRS3, p. 47)
June 30, 1980
Senators John Glenn (D-Ohio), Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minnesota), Abraham Ribicoff (D-Connecticut), William Cohen (R-Maine), Alan Cranston (D-California) and Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia) circulate an appeal to other members of Congress for support of a joint resolution to override President Carter's approval of nuclear fuel to India. (CRS3, p. 47)
August 1980
Several bombings occur at the offices of Iraq's key nuclear suppliers. Workers at the companies receive letters warning them to stop aiding the Iraqi nuclear program. The source of the letters is not known, but experts speculate that an Israeli group is behind them. (Spector2, pp. 176-177)
August 11-September 7, 1980
The Non-Proliferation Treaty Second Review Conference is held in Geneva. The Conference reports that between 1975 and 1980, 21 additional states have signed the NPT. By the end of the proceedings there is general agreement on the need for full-scope safeguards, but no amendments are proposed. A thorough and detailed examination of the implementation of all provisions of the treaty is produced. (CRS3, p. 47)
August 25, 1980
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie considers informing Congress of his "personal support" for the President's decision to authorize shipments of nuclear fuel for Tarapur. Congress has to disapprove the authorization by resolution in order to override the President's decision. (Nuclear Fuel to India: Letters to All Senators and to Chairman Zablocki, 8/25/80)
September 1980
U.S. efforts to stem Pakistan's imports of nuclear equipment, fuel and technology are hampered by lack of cooperation from certain European suppliers. Press reports claim that both France and Switzerland knowingly "permitted exports of sophisticated nuclear technology to Pakistan despite U.S. objections." Also during this time, Pakistan announces that it has completed a nuclear fuel fabrication plant which will supply the KANUPP reactor. This announcement is significant as it would become increasingly difficult for the IAEA to safeguard the facility if the fuel were indigenously produced. (Spector2, pp. 87-89)
September 15, 1980
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency sends a letter to every Senator in support of the President's decision to authorize the Tarapur exports. (Letter Supporting Tarapur Exports to All Senators, 9/15/80)
September 18, 1980
The House passes four resolutions disapproving President Carter's decision to approve the export of nuclear fuel to India. However, the Senate fails to do the same and Congress] does not override the Administration's action. (CRS3, p. 48; [Congratulations on Prevailing in the Battle of Supplying Nuclear Fuel to the Tarapur Reactors], 9/25/80; [Authorization to Export Fuel to Tarapur; Letters between Senator Frank Church and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie Attached], 9/26/80)
September 30, 1980
Eight days after Iraq attacks Iran to start the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian Phantom jets attack the Osirak nuclear reactor. The raid causes only minor damage to the reactor dome, which is still under construction. (Spector2, p. 177)
October 1980
Iraq attempts to purchase depleted uranium pins from a West German supplier (NUKEM), ostensibly to be used in a training reactor yet to be constructed. Depleted uranium can be irradiated to produce plutonium. NUKEM attempts to subcontract portions of the job to Canadian and American firms and does not indicate the ultimate destination for the material. Upon discovery of the deal by American and Canadian regulatory officials, the contract is stopped. (Spector2, pp. 172-173)
Early October 1980
Soon after the Iranian attack on Osirak, all but seven French technicians working there return home. The remaining workers continue to verify the 12.5 kilograms of French-supplied, highly enriched uranium but they are not able to maintain constant surveillance for the duration of the war. (Spector2, p. 177)
December 7, 1980
The Canadian government reveals that three men have been arrested in Canada on charges of illegally exporting goods to Pakistan. The three men, Salam Elmenyawi, Mohammed Ahmad and Abdul Aziz Khan, attempted to export safeguarded electronics equipment identified as condensers and resistors which were purchased in the United States. (WP 12/7/80)
1981
Egypt ratifies the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States signs an agreement for nuclear cooperation with Egypt and agrees to sell two nuclear power plants with certain restrictions. (Spector2, p. 129)
Early 1981
The government of India (GOI) notifies the U.S. government of its intention to terminate the 1963 Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation. The GOI claims that the termination is the result of delays in fuel shipments for the Tarapur reactor. However, by July 1982, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi agrees to a modus vivendi with the government of France which allows France to supply the fuel and as a result to maintain the 1963 agreement with the United States in all other terms. (Spector2, p. 40)
January 1981
Libya establishes a Ministry for Atomic Energy. (CRS5, p. 10)
January 1981
President Carter sends his report of the governments non-proliferation activities during 1980 to Congress. (Report of the President to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 1/81)
January 20, 1981
Ronald W. Reagan is inaugurated as the 40th President of the United States. (WP 1/21/81)
February 5, 1981
Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) writes a letter to President Reagan regarding India's plan to end its Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation with the United States and discussing India's "attitude" toward reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear fuel. ([Second Shipment of Fuel to Tarapur], 2/5/81)
March 1, 1981
The Department of State discusses the Glenn Amendment to the Symington Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act. Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) proposes that the Presidential waiver language of the Symington Amendment be modified to require consideration as to whether a cut-off of foreign assistance "would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security." (Talking Points on Pakistan, 3/1/81)
March 13, 1981
Secretary of Energy James B. Edwards appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic and Nuclear Forces, and testifies strongly in favor of developing plutonium reprocessing and breeder reactor technologies. The Reagan Administration's position is exactly opposite that of the Carter Administration. (See June 14, 1979, entry.) (CRS3, p. 49)
March 13, 1981
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. briefs President Reagan on a meeting with President-Designate of Argentina Roberto Viola. President Reagan is expected to discuss Argentina's nuclear supplier capability and encourage a quick ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (Your Meeting with Roberto Viola President-Designate of Argentina, 3/13/81)
March 17, 1981
Senator Alan Cranston (D-California) addresses the Senate on the proliferation activities of Pakistan, Libya and Iraq. He warns that Pakistan may be able to produce nuclear weapons by 1982 and that Iraq is proceeding on a "Manhattan Project program." He calls on the Reagan Administration to pressure U.S. allies to cease nuclear trade with these countries. He also proposes that Congress undertake an investigation of the Pakistani and Iraqi nuclear programs and the nature of assistance these nations are receiving from West European countries. (CRS3, p. 50)
March 31, 1981
In a discussion with Canadian officials, the Reagan Administration answers concerns regarding the new U.S. policy toward Pakistan and India. State Department representatives assure the Canadians that the new Administration has examined U.S. policy in light of the deterioration of regional security due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the turmoil in Iran and the Iran-Iraq conflict.
"The conclusion reached was that a stronger, more self-confident Pakistan capable of resisting Soviet pressures through Afghanistan was essential for the enhanced deterrence to Soviet expansionism which we seek....Pakistan could play a key role in enhancing the security of the southwest Asia region." (U.S. Policy towards Pakistan and India, 3/31/81; U.S. Policy towards Pakistan, 4/1/81)
April 1-3, 1981
The International Seminar on the Implementation and Reinforcement of the Arms Embargo Against South Africa meets in London and urges the United States to desist from reversing its ban on the export of nuclear fuel to South Africa. (Special Committee against Apartheid: Letter on Nuclear Fuel Supply to South Africa, 5/11/81)
May 1981
Iraq purchases 100 tons of yellow cake from Niger. (Spector2, p. 172)
May 14, 1981
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials discuss the possibility of terminating enrichment contracts with South Africa and Austria. (A Proposal for Gracefully Terminating Enrichment Contracts with S[outh] Africa and Austria, 5/14/81)
June 1981
It is revealed that Turkish companies have successfully circumvented both U.S. and European export control laws by transhipping millions of dollars worth of nuclear components to Pakistan. (Spector2, pp. 89-90)
June 2, 1981
The Israeli mission to the U.N. General Assembly addresses the situation in the Middle East and discusses an Israeli proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone there. (The Situation in the Middle East: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East, 6/2/81)
June 7, 1981
The Israeli Air Force attacks the 40-megawatt research reactor at Osirak near Baghdad, Iraq. The government of Israel claims that the reactor is intended to produce material for nuclear weapons that would be used against Israel. (CRS3, p. 52; Spector2, p. 178)
June 9, 1981
State Department spokesman Dean Fischer states: "We have no evidence that Iraq has violated its commitments under the [Non-Proliferation] Treaty." But the United States is concerned that the Iraqi nuclear program could "pose a threat at some point in the future." (Spector2, p. 181)
June 15, 1981
The United States and Pakistan announce an aid package to Pakistan totalling $3.2 billion. The commitment, which includes 40 F-16 aircraft, comes in response to intense concern over the security of Pakistan following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. (Spector2, pp. 44, 90-91; CRS3, p. 52)
June 16, 1981
President Reagan holds a press conference during which he reacts to the Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor. He states: "We're opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and do everything in our power to prevent it. I don't believe, however, that that should carry over into the development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes." (CRS3, p. 53; The President's News Conference, 6/16/81))
June 19, 1981
The U.N. Security Council adopts resolution 487 which calls on Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and states that Iraq is entitled to reparations for the destruction of its reactor. (CRS3, p. 54)
June 24, 1981
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein calls upon "all peace loving nations to `assist the Arabs in one way or another to obtain a nuclear bomb in order to confront Israel's existing bombs.'" (Spector2, p. 178)
June 28, 1981
A report in The New York Times describes a pattern of nuclear contacts among Israel, Taiwan and South Africa and discusses the U.S. government debate over whether the three nations are assisting each others nuclear weapons development. (3 Nations Widening Nuclear Contacts, 6/28/81)
Late June 1981
France announces that it has terminated nuclear assistance to Iraq. However, within one month, Saudi Arabia announces that it will finance the rebuilding of the Osirak reactor. France then announces that it will rebuild the reactor itself, although with stricter controls. (Spector2, p. 183)
July 16, 1981
President Reagan makes a statement on U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy. He declares that the success of the policy depends on the ability of the United States to improve "regional and global stability." (Statement on United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 7/16/81; United States Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Policy, 7/16/81)
July 17, 1981
The Department of Energy investigates the existing regulatory barrier to commercial reprocessing of nuclear fuel and will submit the results of its findings to Vice President Bush's regulatory task force in August. (CRS3, p. 56)
August 19, 1981
In response to the shooting down of two Libyan warplanes by the U.S. Navy, Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi states:
"We are warning the peoples of Sicily, Crete, Turkey and all the states of the Mediterranean that if America again attacks the Gulf of Sidra, then we will intentionally attack the nuclear depots in their countries and cause an international catastrophe." (Spector2, p. 156)
September 9, 1981
In a news interview, a Taiwanese politician states that Taiwan is developing nuclear weapons. (Kyodo Reports Local Politician Claim Taiwan Developing Nuclear Weapons, 9/9/81)
September 16, 1981
In hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Under Secretary of State James Buckley says that the Pakistani leadership "totally understood, without a doubt" that "detonating a nuclear explosive device could jeopardize the recently agreed-upon $3.2 billion aid package." Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq has given the United States assurances that his country will not develop nuclear weapons. (CRS3, p. 57)
September 26, 1981
In a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the nominations of U.S. ambassadors to India and Pakistan, Ronald Spiers, director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, reveals that Pakistan has acquired the capability to produce its own reactor fuel and is currently using it in a reactor near Karachi (the KANUPP reactor). Senator Alan Cranston (D-California) supports the claim with evidence from private discussions with outside sources. Domestically produced reactor fuel would not be covered by the IAEA safeguards system. Therefore, diversion of the spent fuel to a plutonium reprocessing plant would not be monitored by the IAEA as safeguarded spent fuel is. (NYT 9/26/81)
October 1981
IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund calls on Pakistan to upgrade its safeguards agreement. The Agency can no longer certify that diversions of spent nuclear fuel from the KANUPP reactor have not taken place. (Spector2, pp. 93-94)
October 8, 1981
President Reagan announces the lifting of the 1977 ban on spent fuel reprocessing. The Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project will proceed. (CRS3, p. 58)
October 21, 1981
Senator John Glenn's (D-Ohio) amendment to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (S. 1196) is approved. Originally an amendment to the Symington Amendment, S. 1196 requires that the President submit a classified report on Pakistan's nuclear program and activities each year. In addition, the bill limits the ability of the President to waive the prohibition of assistance to Pakistan to six years. Finally, all assistance to India and Pakistan will be terminated if either nation detonates a nuclear explosive device. (CRS3, p. 59; Spector2, p. 93)
November 13, 1981
The Senate ratifies Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by a vote of 79-0. (Ratification of Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco, 11/13/81)
January 1982
A Congressional Research Service briefing document prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee makes several statements assessing Iraq's potential for producing nuclear weapons. The report notes that Iraq does not possess substantial quantities of natural uranium as a raw material. Iraq also "has no established industry to produce, refine and use uranium, to manufacture nuclear reactors, to enrich uranium, or to recover plutonium from spent fuel." Furthermore, Iraq does not possess the chemical, metallurgical and electronic manufacturing infrastructure necessary to establish an indigenous nuclear industry. (CRS5, p. 9)
January 1982
President Reagan sends his report of the governments non-proliferation activities during 1981 to Congress. (Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 1/1/82)
March 1982
The Department of Energy completes its report of the history of the Energy Research and Development Administration. (A History of the Energy Research and Development Administration, 3/82)
March 8, 1982
News reports in the American press discuss nuclear proliferation in Latin America. Neither Brazil nor Argentina has agreed to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nor have they signed the regional Treaty of Tlatelolco. There have also been rumors about an illegal diversion of nuclear fuel from an Argentine reactor, and Brazil has already built an unsafeguarded pilot reprocessing plant. (Press Guidance on WP Non-Proliferation Editorial, 3/12/82)
April 5, 1982
The Department of State circulates for approval changes in Executive Branch procedures under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The changes are minor and eliminate some overlap in responsibilities between the Executive Branch and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (Executive Branch Procedures under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 4/5/82)
May 20, 1982
News reports discuss the United States new policy of "flexibility" on exports to South Africa. One article cites a letter by Commerce Department Secretary Malcolm Baldrige to Senator Charles Percy (R-Illinois) noting that "the Reagan Administration will be more flexible than its predecessor with regard to permits for the delivery of nuclear-related goods which can also be used for other purposes." (Press Report on New U.S. Flexibility on Nuclear Policy toward South Africa, 5/20/82)
July 6, 1982
The State Department discusses the possibility of resolving the longstanding issue of the U.S. agreement to supply nuclear fuel to Tarapur. The government of India has shown some interest in a U.S. proposal of December 1981 which allows another supplier, the French, to "step into our shoes." This option will be pursued with careful consultation with the U.S. Congress prior to Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Washington at the end of the month. (U.S.-India Nuclear Supply Relationship, 7/6/82)
July 23, 1982
The State Department consults with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and representatives of the Indian government. The United States reiterates its understanding that France will become the principal supplier of nuclear fuel to Tarapur on the condition "that all existing safeguards and controls on the Tarapur fuel and equipment...as set out in the [1963] Agreement for Cooperation will remain intact and, among other things, no steps will be made to reprocess spent fuel produced at Tarapur without U.S. agreement." (Your Meeting with Indian Foreign Secretary M.K. Rasgotra, 10:30 a.m., July 23 [Talking Points Discussing the Tarapur Settlement Proposal--Cover Note Attached], 7/22/82)
July 29, 1982
The United States and India sign an agreement permitting India to receive nuclear fuel from France to power the Tarapur nuclear power plant. (Washington Post Article on India, U.S. Agreement on A-Fuel Pact, 7/29/82)
September 8, 1982
The Reagan Administration tells Congress that it plans to publish a new list of 63 countries that will need specific approval to obtain any technology from U.S. firms for their nuclear power programs. (Washington Post Report on Nuclear Export Control Revision, 9/9/82)
September 24, 1982
At the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), members vote to deny Israel its credentials to attend. This action is in response to Israel's June 7, 1981, attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor. The United States and 14 other members walk out of the conference in protest. The United States decides to return to the IAEA Conference in February 1983. (CRS3, pp. 64, 67)
November 1982
India begins operations at the reprocessing facility at Tarapur using spent fuel from the Rajasthan I reactor. This fuel is subject to safeguards requirements imposed by the Soviet Union, since it was acquired from Moscow. (Spector2, p. 48)
November 26, 1982
France and India conclude an agreement that will replace the United States with France as the primary supplier of enriched uranium for Tarapur. (CRS3, p. 65)
December 1982
The Reagan Administration resumes a series of high-level, ad hoc proliferation consultations originally initiated under the Carter Administration. Former NRC Chairman Richard T. Kennedy serves as the U.S. ambassador for non-proliferation. The sessions take place every six months, with delegations alternately meeting in Washington and Moscow. (Jones, pp. 9-10)
December 7, 1982
Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq assures President Reagan that Pakistan is only interested in seeking nuclear technology for "peaceful purposes." (CRS3, p. 65)
Late December 1982
Allegations that China has aided Pakistan's nuclear weapons program cause the United States to postpone negotiation with China of an agreement for cooperation in nuclear energy and research. Eventually, the reports are sufficiently muted so that within two years the agreement between the United States and China is completed. (Spector2, pp. 101-102)
January 1983
President Reagan sends his report of the governments non-proliferation activities for 1982 to Congress. (Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 1/83)
January 18, 1983
President Reagan approves National Security Decision Directive 76 authorizing the United States to seek "peaceful nuclear cooperation with China on the basis of adequate non-proliferation assurances and other conditions." (Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with China, 1/18/83)
January 22, 1983
The State Department notifies all U.S. embassies in Africa of a revision in the U.S. commodity control list on exports to South Africa. The Department wishes to clarify that the revisions have been made only on the non-munitions list and not on the munitions list "through which [the] U.S. implements the United Nations arms embargo." The statement is meant to calm any concerns that the United States is relaxing its policy toward South Africa. (Revision in U.S. Commodity List Controls on Exports to the South African Police and Military, 1/22/83; 98th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 1028: To Prohibit the Export or Other Transfer to the Republic of South Africa of Nuclear Material, Equipment, and Technology, 1/27/83)
February 3, 1983
A joint resolution is signed by Congress requesting that, at the earliest possible date, President Reagan submit for Senate ratification the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties which were signed in 1974 and 1976 respectively. The resolution also requests that President Reagan "resume trilateral negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty" as soon as possible. (98th Congress, 1st Session, S.J. Res. 29: Joint Resolution to Prevent Nuclear Testing, 2/3/83)
March 1983
Demonstrating France's disagreement with the U.S. aim of persuading other nations not to sell nuclear technology, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson declares that France is prepared to sell Pakistan a large nuclear power reactor. (Spector2, p. 97)
March 1983
The United States prohibits Libyan students from studying nuclear science at American University in Washington, D.C. (Spector2, p. 159)
March 14, 1983
The State Department completes a report on the Pakistani nuclear program. The report is part of the evaluation process for foreign assistance and must be submitted for all countries for which the waiver portions of Sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act are in effect. Pakistan is the only country in this category. The report describes several facilities which "could be significant for the development of nuclear explosives," including a uranium enrichment plant, a reprocessing plant, a nuclear fuel complex and a fuel fabrication plant. None of the facilities is under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA has been unable to confirm that no diversion of spent fuel occurred at the KANUPP facility because since 1980 Pakistan has been able to produce the fuel for KANUPP in an unsafeguarded plant. However, the director general of the IAEA has reported that negotiations have resolved many of the Agency's concerns and that substantial progress has been made. The State Department argues that the assistance program for Pakistan "is our most effective weapon in dissuading that nation from continuing its nuclear explosives program." ([Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981: Pakistan's Nuclear Program], 3/14/83; Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program, 5/7/83)
March 21, 1983
A report in an Indian newspaper notes that the government of India is having difficulty in obtaining spare parts for the Tarapur facility despite the recent agreement with the United States. The article claims that the U.S. government made an implicit promise to supply the spare parts as part of the Indo-U.S.-French nuclear supply agreement and is now trying to extract reprocessing assurances as a condition of supply. (Indian Paper Raises Issue of Spares for Tarapur, 3/21/83; Issue of Spares for Tarapur, 3/23/83)
May 1983
Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-Kuo tells Der Spiegel that Taiwan has the scientific and technological capability to build nuclear weapons, but does not intend to do so. (Spector2, p. 21)
June 10, 1983
The Department of State issues a listing of the Administration's "non-proliferation accomplishments" since entering office. (Non-Proliferation Accomplishments of the Administration to Date, 6/10/83)
June 14-16, 1983
The United States and the Soviet Union conduct bilateral discussions on non-proliferation. (U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Consultations on Non-Proliferation 14-15 June, 5/24/83; U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Consultations on Non-Proliferation, June 14-16, 1983, 5/26/83)
June 15, 1983
The State Department issues guidance to U.S. embassies on the question of whether the United States and India have an agreement for a third country to supply the spare parts for Tarapur. The Department maintains that there is no agreement as such, although it has been considered. (Contingency Press Guidance on Third Party Supply of Parts for Tarapur, 6/15/83)
June 21, 1983
A press release by the Nuclear Control Institute of Washington, D.C., states that the Reagan Administration has decided to authorize the export of spare parts for Tarapur after failing to persuade a Japanese firm to supply what was needed. The State Department responds to the press release the following day, noting that no foreign firms have refused to supply the parts and that the government of India has indeed been in contact with some of them. (Reagan Administration to Approve Nuclear Exports to India Despite Ban on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 6/21/83; Press Guidance on June 21, 1983 Press Release by Nuclear Control Institute, 6/22/83)
June 22, 1983
Congress allocates no additional money beyond the current fiscal year for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project. This is a setback for the Reagan Administration's efforts to pursue this technology despite the implications for nuclear proliferation. (CRS3, p. 71)
June 23, 1983
The State Department prepares another briefing on the Pakistan nuclear program, clearly stating that "China has provided assistance to Pakikistans [sic] program to develop a nuclear weapons capability....We now believe cooperation has taken place in the area of fissile material production and possibly also nuclear device design." (The Pakistani Nuclear Program, 6/23/83)
June 30, 1983
Secretary of State George Shultz promises that the United States will export needed spares for the Tarapur facility as long as no other suppliers can be found. Members of Congress object and continue to press for denying the requested export licenses. By early 1984, legislation is passed preventing nuclear component exports to all non-nuclear weapons countries which do not accept full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities. (Spector2, p. 53; CRS3, p. 72)
July 1983
The Department of Energy completes a report on the history of the Atomic Energy Commission. (A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, 7/83)
Late July 1983
India's fifth power reactor, Madras I, begins operations. The facility will provide India with an indigenous capability to process plutonium from spent fuel, which will come from the Tarapur reactor. The facility is not subject to IAEA safeguards. (Spector2, pp. 10, 56-57)
August 1983
Dr. Raja Ramanna is appointed to succeed the late Dr. Homi Bhabha as chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. (Spector2, p. 50)
August 4, 1983
The House introduces a concurrent resolution that the spare parts needed for the Tarapur reactor should not be exported to India "unless the government of India provides stronger nonproliferation guarantees." (98th Congress, 1st Session: H. Con. Res. 156 [Export of Nuclear Reactor Components to Tarapur Reactor], 8/4/83)
October 11, 1983
At the 27th session of the General Conference of the IAEA, the Board of Governors approve the membership of the People's Republic of China to the IAEA. The membership will become effective when China completes the ratification of the IAEA Statute providing safeguards on all of China's nuclear facilities. China submits its ratification and becomes a member of the IAEA on January 1, 1984. (CRS3, pp. 74, 76)
October 26, 1983
A report on a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of U.S. nuclear export laws appears in the American press. The report notes that the GAO has found that "there are growing concerns that the export of dual-use, nuclear-related equipment and component parts...have facilities [sic] the efforts of other countries to acquire nuclear weapons." ([Press Guidance on Washington Post Article by Milton R. Benjamin Entitled "GAO Cites Loophole in Nuclear Export Law"], 10/30/83)
November 1983
The government of Argentina announces that it has been building a plant to produce uranium for the past five years. It hopes to complete the facility, which is not covered by IAEA safeguards, in 1985. There are disagreements about how the uranium will be used. Some observers believe that it will be weapons-grade and used for nuclear weapons while the Argentine government contends that it will be devoted to peaceful purposes. (Spector2, p. 11; CRS3, p. 74)
1984
Iraq attempts to purchase 34 kilograms of plutonium from an Italian black market smuggling ring. The attempt fails. However, Iraq still has 12.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium originally supplied by France for the now destroyed Osirak reactor. (Spector2, pp. 12-13)
January 1984
Secretary of State George Shultz receives a background paper for his upcoming meeting in Stockholm with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The meeting will be the third in a series of bilateral non-proliferation consultations with the Soviets. The positive results of the previous meetings suggest that enhanced U.S.-Soviet cooperation on non-proliferation is an area of mutual interest. (Non-Proliferation, 1/4/84)
January 31, 1984
The chairman of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation makes a public announcement stating that IAEA safeguards will be applied to the country's new semi-commercial enrichment facility and that South Africa will abide by the nuclear suppliers guidelines on its nuclear exports. The State Department reacts favorably to this announcement, indicating that it is an important step by the South African government and is consistent with efforts by the United States and other governments to develop a common nuclear supply policy in the interests of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. (South African Public Announcement of January 31, 1984 regarding Nuclear Export Policy and International Safeguards, 1/31/84)
February 1984
Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, head of Pakistan's uranium enrichment program, announces that Pakistan has mastered the uranium enrichment process. He also states that an explosion is not necessary to gain a nuclear capability. This is further support for the belief that Pakistan possesses the knowledge and ability to produce a nuclear weapon at this time. (Spector2, pp. 9, 98-99)
February 6, 1984
The United States and Brazil conclude an agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel. (CRS3, p. 76)
February 16-18, 1984
The United States conducts a three-day series of consultations with the Soviets on general nuclear non-proliferation matters at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna. The talks build on two previous meetings in the areas of strengthening the overall non-proliferation regime, improving the IAEA safeguards system and furthering such export control developments as upgrading the Zangger Committee lists of circumstances which trigger safeguards on exports. (U.S.-USSR Bilateral Discussions February 16-18, 1984, 2/84)
March 17, 1984
President Ronald Reagan submits a report to Congress on Pakistan's nuclear program. There is a statutory requirement that this report be submitted as part of the presentation materials for the 1984 foreign assistance program for Pakistan. (Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program, 3/17/84)
April 1984
Senate Foreign Relations Committee advises Congress to terminate the $3.2 billion military and economic aid package to Pakistan unless a Presidential Finding confirms that Pakistan is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program. (Spector2, p. 10)
May 1984
United States announces a ban on all nuclear exports to Iran and asks other nuclear supplier countries to follow suit. (Spector2, p. 114)
May 1984
Belgium and Libya announce that they will conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement that will enable Belgium to sell Libya a uranium tetrafluoride plant, which will have the capability to produce uranium metal. This uranium could then be used to fuel a reactor that could ultimately produce plutonium. The United States presses Belgium to stop the sale. (Spector2, pp. 159-161)
May 15, 1984
In a letter to Al Swift (D-Washington), chairman of the Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the General Accounting Office indicates that China had the largest number of dual-use technology export licenses approved of any country between 1981 and 1983. (Exports of Dual-Use, Nuclear-Related Equipment to the People's Republic of China, 5/15/84)
June 1984
Reports in the American press state that the People's Republic of China is providing information pertaining to nuclear weapons design to Pakistan. (Spector2, p. 10)
June 19, 1984
In an interview with the Pakistan Times, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan describes reports that China has provided Pakistan with nuclear expertise as totally without merit. The issue has become particularly significant in light of an agreement reached in April between the United States and China for exchanges of nuclear-related materials. (U.S.-China Nuclear Agreement--Pakistan Reaction, 6/19/84)
June 21, 1984
Gary Milhollin of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission produces a comprehensive history of the Tarapur nuclear facilities in India. This paper eventually plays a significant role in formulating U.S. policy toward India. (Tarapur: A Brief for the United States, 6/21/84)
July 1984
A senior Reagan Administration official is quoted by the press as stating that Pakistan has produced weapons-grade uranium at the Kahuta facility, which is not under IAEA safeguards. (Spector2, pp. 9-10)
July 16, 1984
A federal grand jury in Houston indicts three Pakistani nationals, Nazir Ahmed Vaid, Salim Ahmed Mohammedy and Ilyas Ahmed Mohamedy, on charges of trying to ship 50 high-speed switches (called krytrons) to Pakistan. The switches can be used in the triggers for nuclear weapons. (WP 7/17/84)
September 1984
Senator Alan Cranston (D-California) introduces an amendment calling for the prohibition of security assistance to Pakistan if Pakistan engages in a program of developing a nuclear explosive or in acquiring or producing the equipment and material for such a device. The amendment also calls for a report to be filed describing Pakistan's nuclear program and estimating the impact of the halt of security assistance to Islamabad on U.S. interests. It also calls for assessing the impact upon "international norms against proliferation" of continuing U.S. security assistance despite the existence of a nuclear explosives program in Pakistan. (Your Meeting with Pakistan Foreign Minister Yaqub--Additional Talking Points, 9/27/84)
October 1984
A special, personal letter is sent from President Ronald Reagan to President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan. The letter expresses satisfaction over current U.S.-Pakistan relations as well as Reagan's concern over the violation of Pakistani air space by Afghan aircraft. Finally, President Reagan calls attention to his anxiety over Pakistan's atomic program. He states that if Pakistan produces an atomic bomb, its relations with the United States will receive a shock. (Press Reports of Reagan-Zia Letter, 10/8/84)
October 10, 1984
The Republic of Korea's defense minister, Yoon Sung-Min, reaffirms his country's commitment to the NPT, which it signed in 1968. He states that Korea will continue efforts to maintain and expand security cooperation with the United States. He adds that he does not believe that North Korea will make the mistake of developing a nuclear weapons capability nor will South Korea spur efforts to acquire nuclear armaments in order to secure military superiority over North Korea. (Defense Minister Reaffirms ROKG [Republic of Korea Governments] Nuclear Non-Proliferations Stance, 10/15/84)
October 11, 1984
The Pakistani Urdu Daily Nawai Waqt claims that the United States has offered a nuclear umbrella to Pakistan in return for Pakistan's abandonment of its nuclear weapons program. This claim is not confirmed by the U.S. government. (Press Reports of U.S. Offer of Nuclear Protection to Pakistan, 10/11/84)
November 1, 1984
Belgium seeks assurances from other countries that they will not participate in aiding the Libyan nuclear program if Belgium refrains from doing so. (Nucleonics, 11/1/84)
1985
North Korea signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (WT 11/7/91)
January 1985
Reports that Pakistan has conducted tests of U.S.-made nuclear triggers receive international attention. The U.S. news media reports that Pakistan may be on the verge of developing a nuclear bomb, while Soviet media accounts claim that Pakistani efforts have received support from the United States. These reports, attributed to U.S. intelligence sources, are neither confirmed nor denied by the U.S. government. The government of Pakistan repeats its assertion that it has no intention of building an atomic bomb and Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs states that the Pakistani nuclear program is entirely peaceful in nature. (Special Media Reaction Report Number 45--Pakistan's Testing of Nuclear Triggers, 7/16/85)
January 4, 1985
The State Department provides guidance to the U.S. Embassy in South Africa relating to the problem of American citizens working at the South African nuclear reactor at Koeberg. A change in U.S. law, enacted in February 1983, tightened regulations (contained in the Atomic Energy Act) that implement legal controls over unclassified nuclear information. These changes stipulate that the transfer of nuclear information and services which has previously been generally authorized now requires specific authorization. (U.S. Citizens Employed at Koeberg, 1/4/85)
January 23, 1985
The House of Representatives conducts the first in a series of four briefings about American citizens working at the South African nuclear plant at Koeberg. It is never implied that the South African government encouraged U.S. citizens knowingly to evade U.S. law. (U.S. Citizens at Koeberg: Briefings on the Hill, 1/25/85)
February 1985
An article in Nuclear Engineering International states that the fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam, India, will attain criticality in early 1985. The article claims that spent fuel was reprocessed at Tarapur to obtain the plutonium to fuel the breeder. (Indian Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam, 2/26/85)
February 25, 1985
Top-level employees of Westinghouse's energy and advanced technology group arrange a meeting with Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige to register a complaint that in the absence of a signed agreement with China for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Chinese nuclear power officials have been instructed not to do business with American architects and engineers. Westinghouse cites a recent poll which indicates that a majority of members of Congress would favor such an agreement if it complied with U.S. law. (Meeting with Westinghouse Group, March 7, at 2:45 p.m., 3/4/85)
February 25, 1985
A New York Times article claims that Pakistani agents have been operating in the United States for nine months in an attempt to obtain timing devices for a nuclear weapons trigger. A spokesman for the Pakistani government denied any connection between Nazir Ahmed Vaid, who was arrested in July 1984 in Houston for trying to smuggle out 50 krytrons, and the government. (NYT 2/25/85)
March 1985
Returning from a visit to Paris, the Israeli Energy Minister states that an essential step has been taken toward obtaining favorable financing from France for the nuclear reactor project planned at Dimona. The project is expected to cost between two and three billion dollars. (Le Monde Article on French Nuclear Reactor Sale to Israel, 3/26/85)
April 9, 1985
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission officials in India indicate that an article in the February 1985 issue of Nuclear Engineering International is inaccurate. The IAEA can account for all spent fuel at the Rajasthan atomic power station indicating that none has been secretly diverted. (See February 1985 entry.) (Indian Fast Breeder at Kalpakkam, 4/9/85)
May 16, 1985
Federal prosecutors indict an export broker for illegally selling Israel 810 krytrons (high-speed electronic switches) between 1980 and 1983. Israel agrees to return the krytrons following a U.S. government request and provides assurances that any units they retained would not be used for nuclear purposes. (NYT 5/17/85)
June 25, 1985
In a briefing memorandum about the U.S. governments relationship with Israel as it pertains to nuclear issues, the Reagan Administration reiterates its call for Israel to sign the NPT and to place all of its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. The Administration stresses that because Israel is not a party to the NPT, the United States is unwilling to negotiate an agreement for nuclear commerce. (Responses to Senator Mitchell's Questions; The U.S. Nuclear Relationship with Israel, 6/25/85)
July 10, 1985
After recent discussions held in Beijing between the United States and the People's Republic of China, the State Department resumes preparation of the paperwork needed to forward to President Reagan the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. (U.S.-PRC Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 7/10/85)
August 27-September 21, 1985
The Non-Proliferation Treaty Third Review Conference takes place in Vienna. Fourteen new states have signed the Treaty since 1980. The United States is severely criticized for its refusal to enter into test ban negotiations, which is taken as an indicator of a lack of superpower initiative in achieving disarmament. The non-aligned states argue for a comprehensive test ban, as stipulated in the NPT. Conference participants do agree on a Final Declaration which urges that all non-weapons states party to the treaty make a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons and that all states commit to safeguards as a prerequisite to the transfer of materials, technology and equipment. The non-weapons states articulate their resolve to press the weapons states to adhere to the treaty more strictly. (SIPRI3, pp. 470-477)
September 1985
Former Assistant Director General of the IAEA David A.V. Fischer publicly states that South Africa has the capability to build two atomic bombs per year from domestically produced uranium. Fischer claims that the absence of IAEA inspections of some South African nuclear facilities has allowed Pretoria to develop this capability. (South Africa's Nuclear Capability Cited by Former Senior IAEA Employee, 9/17/85)
October 18, 1985
The United States and the USSR begin the sixth round of bilateral negotiations on non-proliferation in Washington D.C. (U.S.-USSR Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, Washington D.C., October 18-23, 1985, 10/18/85)
November 4, 1985
Forty-six members of Congress send a letter to President Reagan expressing concern over reports that China has provided assistance to Pakistan in designing a nuclear weapon. The representatives ask the President to withdraw from congressional consideration the proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with China until the allegations can be investigated. ([Concerns That China May Be Helping Other Countries Acquire Nuclear Weapons Which Abrogates the Proposed Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with China], 11/4/85)
November 27, 1985
At the request of Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), the General Accounting Office conducts a review of the proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. The GAO report dated November 27, 1985, finds nothing in the agreement which should preclude congressional approval, but does find some ambiguous language that could lead to misinterpretation. (Nuclear Agreement: Cooperation between the United States and the People's Republic of China, 11/85)
December 16, 1985
Congress passes a Joint Resolution consenting to the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. (Nuclear Cooperation between the U.S. and the Republic of China, 12/16/85)
July 15-22, 1986
Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo of Pakistan arrives in the United States for an official visit. A scope paper prepared in advance of the visit indicates that Secretary of State George Shultz will address the serious concerns the United States has about the content and direction of Pakistan's nuclear program and stresses the relationship of Pakistani actions in this area to the continuation of U.S. assistance. (Scope Paper: Official Visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo--15-22 July 1986, 7/1/86)
September 1986
In reaction to the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, an international agreement on the early notification of nuclear accidents and emergency response is endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors. Fifty-one nations immediately sign the agreement and form the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group. (Scheinman, p. 105)
September 19, 1986
A seismic disturbance in Pakistan is recorded. Some in the international community claim that the disturbance was caused by a Pakistani test of a nuclear device. The government of Pakistan claims that the disturbance was caused by an earthquake. (Pakistan's High Explosive Test--The View from Delhi, 11/5/86)
October 1986
State Department produces a briefing paper addressing recent allegations made by former Israeli scientist Mordechai Vanunu that Israel has a successful clandestine nuclear weapons development program. The briefing paper states the U.S. government's concern that Israel has yet to sign the NPT and reiterates Israel's claim that it will not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. (Israeli Nuclear Program; Alleged Theft of Nuclear Technology, 10/86)
October 5, 1986
The London Sunday Times prints a story describing an Israeli subterranean factory engaged in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The article claims that the facility hidden beneath the Negev Desert has been producing atomic warheads for the last 20 years. Information about the facility was obtained from Israeli technician Mordechai Vanunu who provides photographic evidence along with his personal account. (Sunday Times Reveals Scale of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, 10/5/86)
November 1986
Mordechai Vanunu disappears while in London. Vanunu is the Israeli technician whose claims about a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Israel were published in a London newspaper. The British government claims that there is no evidence that any crime has been committed but places Vanunu on the missing persons list. It is later revealed that he was abducted by Israeli intelligence. (HMG Response to Speculation on Whereabouts of Mordechai Vanunu, 11/6/86; Cockburn, p. 96)
December 13, 1986
Press guidance is prepared for President Reagan's announcement that he plans to sign a waiver of the Solarz and Symington Amendments which could cut off U.S. assistance to Pakistan. The basis of the waiver is that imposition of the sanctions "would be seriously prejudicial to U.S. non-proliferation objectives and the common defense...." Application of the Amendments will be waived until April 30, 1990. (Waiver of Symington and Solarz Amendments for Pakistan, 12/13/86; [Presidential Waivers of Symington and Solarz Amendments], 1/15/87)
December 15-18, 1986
The United States and the Soviet Union complete bilateral consultations on nuclear non-proliferation issues. These consultations, held in Washington, D.C., are the eighth in a series of on-going meetings which began in 1982. Both the United States and the USSR express a desire to prevent proliferation while helping other countries capitalize on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (Press Statement for Release Following the Eighth Round of U.S.-USSR Consultations on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, c. 11/18/86)
December 15, 1986
Several U.S. Senators send a letter to President Ronald Reagan to express their concern that the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 not be interpreted in such a way as to prevent private U.S. companies from purchasing South African uranium. The Senators maintain that as long as the enriched uranium is then sold to and consumed by foreign countries other than South Africa, the intent of the legislation will be met. ([Request to the President for Support of Legislation Which Would Allow South African Uranium Oxide to Enter U.S. for Conversion], 12/15/86)
December 31, 1986
Section 309 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 prohibiting the importation of South African uranium ore and oxide into the United States goes into effect. A Treasury Department policy determination states that only ore and oxide imports for domestic consumption are covered by the ban. Uranium imported for processing and then subsequently sold to third parties is not affected. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission complicates the issue by interpreting the legislation as requiring specific licensing for uranium mined in South Africa as well as for all products generated from that uranium, in whatever form, and regardless of intervening substantial transformation in a third country. This is a change in NRC policy which had previously granted a general license for any uranium imports. (Import Ban on South African Uranium Ore and Oxide, 12/31/86)
January 1, 1987
President Reagan completes his report to Congress on the Administration's non-proliferation activities for the year 1986. (Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 for the Year Ending December 31, 1986, 1/87)
January 6, 1987
President Reagan certifies to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device. The certification is necessary in order to continue military assistance to Pakistan. Reagan also asserts that continuing assistance will reduce the risk that Pakistan will feel the need to possess a nuclear device. (Congressional Record, 1/6/87, p. H96)
January 8, 1987
Several American nuclear experts state that they find Mordechai Vanunu's claims about Israel's nuclear weapons program to be credible and consistent with other information independently received. These statements raise difficult questions for the United States which has a policy of discouraging nuclear proliferation and of denying aid to nations that continue to pursue a weapons capability. State Department officials react by repeating Israel's often cited statement that it would not be the first to "introduce" nuclear weapons into the region. (Experts Accept Claim about Israel's Nuclear Capability, 1/8/87)
January 13, 1987
The United States and Israel hold bilateral discussions regarding U.S. proliferation concerns. Not a great deal is known about the meetings. The U.S. government repeats its request that Israel join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (U.S.-Israel Bilaterals, January 13, 1987--U.S. Proliferation Concerns, 1/7/87)
February 3, 1987
The Department of State prepares a briefing to address questions on the status of U.S.-Israeli nuclear cooperation. (U.S./Israel Nuclear Cooperation, 2/3/87)
February 4-5, 1987
Officials from Canada and the United States meet to discuss improvements and expansion in their nuclear safety programs. (U.S./Canada Nuclear Consultations, February 4-5, 1987: Review of Special Program and Expanded Nuclear Safety Program, 1/29/87)
February 16, 1987
Deane Hinton, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, warns officials in Islamabad about nuclear activities which would appear inconsistent with a purely peaceful program. Hinton also cautions Pakistan about the possibility that President Reagan will not certify to Congress the peaceful nature of Pakistan's program if he concludes that it possesses all the components for a nuclear device, even if they are currently unassembled. (CRS6, p. 3)
February 29, 1987
The Department of Energy estimates that it could lose up to 30 percent of its enrichment business due to the ban on importing uranium from South Africa imposed by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. ([Impact of South African Uranium Ban on the Department of Energy], 2/29/87)
March 5, 1987
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert A. Peck testifies before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs regarding bilateral relations with Pakistan. The Administration's position is that U.S. relations with Pakistan are to be understood only in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan. The amount of pressure that can be placed on Pakistan to slow down its nuclear program has to be measured against the potential of alienating a valuable regional ally. (Statement of Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs..., 3/5/87)
March 9, 1987
In the wake of Robert Peck's statement to Congress of March 5, the State Department hurries to assure the media that the Administration has not entirely abandoned its policy of preventing Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons. State again makes the connection that aid to Pakistan is needed to support its ability to resist pressure from the Soviet Union and that, therefore, it helps the Afghan resistance as well. (Pakistan Nuclear Issue, 3/9/87)
March 10, 1987
The Treasury Department issues its guidelines for implementing the ban on imports of South African uranium stipulated by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. The guidelines indicate that the U.S. government may temporarily import uranium until July 1987. This will allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to process some pending license applications which propose to reexport the uranium to third countries. (Treasury Regulations Temporarily Allow Import of South African Uranium for Reexport, 3/16/87; [Department of Treasury's Response to Senator Edward M. Kennedy's Request for Information regarding the Treatment of Uranium Imports under Section 309 of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986], 3/17/87)
March 25, 1987
A news article in India repeats a Pakistani newspaper interview of Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, director of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission. The article quotes Dr. Khan as claiming that Pakistan possesses a nuclear bomb. Dr. Khan later declares that the report was "false and concocted." The editor of the Pakistani newspaper is ultimately forced to resign after repeatedly stating that Khan's claims were truthfully obtained. (Article on the Pak Nuclear Program, 3/25/87; Spector3, pp. 133-134)
March 30, 1987
In an interview with Time Magazine, Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq, states: "What's the difficulty about building a bomb? We have never said we are incapable of doing this. We have said we have neither the intention nor the desire." He also states, contrary to U.S. intelligence information, that "Pakistan has not enriched its uranium above the normal grade level required for peaceful purposes." (Knocking at the Nuclear Door and an Interview with Zia, 3/30/87; Spector3, pp. 134-135)
April 1987
A U.S. defense contractor, the Institute for Defense Analyses, completes a report evaluating the technical facilities in Israel and other NATO Nations for accommodating Strategic Defense Initiative research. The report notes that the Israeli "SOREQ and Dimona/Beer Sheva facilities are the equivalent of Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Oak Ridge National Laboratories." It further notes: "[T]he capability of SOREQ to support SDIO and nuclear technologies is almost an exact parallel of the capability currently existing at our National Laboratories." (Critical Technology Assessment in Israel and NATO Nations, 4/87)
April 10, 1987
An American press account reports that Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland has asked Israel to submit to inspection the heavy water Norway supplied. Norwegian government sources state that Norway would consider a refusal by Israel to do so as a breach of contract and might attempt to recall the material in question. (WT 4/10/87)
April 16, 1987
Israel rejects Norway's request that the heavy water it supplied to Israel in 1959 and 1970 be inspected by IAEA officials. Israel argues that the IAEA would not conduct an impartial inspection even though the IAEA has already inspected heavy water supplied to Israel from the United States. (WSJ 5/26/87)
April 16, 1987
A new non-proliferation regime to control the transfer of unmanned nuclear delivery equipment (i.e., missiles) and technology is announced. The agreement is the result of secret meetings among Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany, which began in 1982. The regime is based on parallel controls adopted by the seven states. The regime becomes known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). (See also Missile Technology Control Regime in the Legal Glossary.) (Spector3, p. 34)
April 23, 1987
Thomas P. Rona, assistant director for government programs in the Office of Science and Technology Policy, advises the deputy assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, Philip Hughes, concerning the recent missile control regime announcement. He argues that the United States should oppose the sale of certain components for India's Polar Space Launch Vehicle as it could "communicate an undesired message to other participants in the new regime" and undermine efforts to persuade Pakistan to forgo any further nuclear weapons developments. (Munitions Case Number 329433, 4/23/87)
May 1987
In response to inquiries regarding the implementation of the ban on importing uranium from South Africa as stipulated by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the Executive Branch concludes that the ban applies only to uranium to be used for domestic consumption. This implies that imports for processing and re-export are allowed under the Act. This finding differs directly with that of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's general counsel who has concluded that "all imports of South African ore and oxide are barred by Section 309" of the Act. (Existing Licenses Authorizing Import of Uranium of South African Origin, 5/7/87)
May 7, 1987
In Islamabad, French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond announces a two-part proposal for cooperating with Pakistan in constructing a nuclear power plant. The proposed facility represents part of the damages awarded to Pakistan after France unilaterally canceled a 1974 contract to supply a reprocessing plant. (France Offers Pakistan Nuclear Plant in Reprocessing Dispute Talks, 5/14/87)
May 20, 1987
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requests a briefing by the Executive Branch to clarify its views on uranium imports from South Africa. ([NRC Request for a Brief by the Executive Branch concerning Uranium Import Ban Provision (Section 309) of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986], 5/20/87; Nuclear Implications of South Africa Sanctions Legislation, 6/12/87)
July 1987
The Defense Intelligence Agency completes a report on the nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Israel and India. The report notes that Argentina has the most advanced nuclear program in Latin America and that many of its facilities are not covered by comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Brazil, regarded as less threatening, is still relying on 1960s technology and all reactors are operated under safeguards. (Nuclear Proliferation Watch [Background Information on Nuclear Programs in Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Israel and India], 7/87)
July 2, 1987
It is reported that a senior Norwegian official will be sent to Israel to renew Norway's request for an IAEA inspection of the heavy water sale in 1959. The right to inspect was a condition of the original sale. (Nucleonics, 7/2/87)
July 14, 1987
The State Department prepares its position on Technical Assistance, Nuclear Safety, and Committee on Assurances of Supply funding proposals for the upcoming IAEA budget. (IAEA Technical Assistance Funding; The Role of the IAEA in Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Safety; Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), 7/14/87)
July 16, 1987
The State Department prepares the government's position regarding the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ). The SPNFZ entered into force in December 1986 when three Protocols to the Treaty were opened for signature. Protocol 1 calls on outside powers with territories in the zone to agree not to "manufacture, station or test nuclear weapons" in the zone. Protocol 2 requires that the five nuclear nations agree that they will not threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty. Protocol 3 requires the declared nuclear states to agree not to carry out nuclear tests in the zone. The United States declines to sign any of the Protocols as they do not fall within the nation's "global security interests and responsibilities." (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 7/16/87)
July 19, 1987
While preparing for the upcoming U.S-Soviet non-proliferation bilaterals, State Department officials note the U.S. position regarding the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials of October 26, 1979. Parties to the Convention, which entered into force only in February 1987, are already attempting to include questions of armed attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. The United States is "vigorously opposed" to such proposals "on the grounds that such questions lie outside the statutory mandate of the IAEA; if they are to be discussed at all, it should be in the Conference on Disarmament." (U.S./USSR Nuclear Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, July 28-30, 1987--Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 7/19/87)
July 28, 1987
A news report quotes U.S. intelligence officials as saying that Iran is close to producing a nuclear bomb small enough to be hidden in a briefcase. The officials are also cited as saying that Iran has benefitted from collaboration with several states, including Argentina, Israel and South Africa. (Nuclear News from South Africa, 7/29/87)
July 28-30, 1987
The United States and the Soviet Union conduct bilateral talks on non-proliferation in Moscow. The United States is concerned with making progress on nuclear test negotiations and in this regard wishes to "improve verification provisions of the TTBT [Threshold Test Ban Treaty] and PNET [Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty]." Some of the discussions focus on the meetings of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and the Committee on Assurances of Supply held during May in Vienna. The United States thanks the Soviet Union for their support at these conferences. Also discussed is the status of those states considered to be close to attaining a nuclear weapons capability. States mentioned include Israel, Libya, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. (Nuclear Testing, 7/87; U.S.-USSR Nuclear Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, July 28-30, 1987--Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), 7/14/87; U.S.-Soviet Bilaterals--Outcome of PUNE Conference, 7/14/87; U.S.-USSR Non-Proliferation Bilaterals--Regional Aspects of Non-Proliferation, 7/20/87)
August 14, 1987
State Department officials note that the government of France currently has not implemented a ban on importing uranium from South Africa and therefore would "take advantage of the business opportunities provided by the U.S. sanctions law." The U.S. government view is that France is essentially "cashing in" on the U.S. import law. (GOF Import Policy on South African Uranium, 8/14/87)
October 19-20, 1987
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits Washington, D.C. A variety of issues are discussed in meetings with the president, vice president, secretary of defense and secretary of state. At the top of the agenda are U.S. relations with and aid to Pakistan, as well as recent arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. (Your Call on Prime Minister Gandhi, Monday, October 19, 5:20 p.m., 10/10/87; Suggested Statement for the President's Use Following His Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on Tuesday, October 20, 1987, 10/10/87; Fact Sheets for Gandhi Visit, 10/13/87)
October 22, 1987
State Department officials discuss the need for a round of formal talks on U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation. Presumably, these discussions will also include the Tarapur facilities. (Nuclear Cooperation with India, 10/22/87)
October 22, 1987
Ambassador-at-Large Richard T. Kennedy testifies before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Administrations position regarding continued military and economic assistance to Pakistan. He discusses Steven Solarz's (D-New York) proposal that the assistance remain tied to Pakistan's promise not to enrich uranium above the five percent level. Ambassador Kennedy says that the Administration would oppose such a proposal on the grounds that such an ultimatum might actually "increase Pakistani motivations to acquire nuclear weapons." (Kennedy Testimony before HFAC Subcommittee on Pakistan Nuclear Issue, 10/31/87)
October 27-28, 1987
The United States and Canada hold bilateral discussions on non-proliferation in Ottawa, Canada. At issue is the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement under which the United States imports over one half of Canada's uranium supplies. (U.S./Canada Non-Proliferation Bilaterals, October 27-28, 1987--Uranium Trade Issues, 10/20/87)
December 7-10, 1987
The United States and the Soviet Union hold a summit in Washington, D.C. President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. This accord is historic, the first of its kind to eliminate entire classes of weapons (both intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles will be destroyed), and to provide for on-site inspection of the process by both sides. (Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement, 12/7/87; Cannon, p. 775)
December 17, 1987
President Reagan sends Congress a certification stating that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device. Under Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, this certification is necessary in order to qualify Pakistan for continued military and economic assistance. ([Annual Certification to Congress Regarding Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program Enclosed], 12/17/87)
January 9, 1988
A Department of State press release states that the 10th round of U.S.-USSR Consultations on non-proliferation matters will take place on January 12-14, 1988. The meeting will cover a wide range of issues, including support for the NPT, strengthening of IAEA nuclear safeguards and measures to improve nuclear export controls. ([Tenth Round of U.S.-USSR Consultations on Non-Proliferation Held in Washington, January 12-14, 1988], 1/9/88)
January 15, 1988
President Reagan signs and sends to Congress waivers to the Symington and the Solarz Amendments that would require a cut-off in aid to Pakistan because of Pakistan's activities in nuclear weapons development. Reagan claims that ending U.S. assistance to Pakistan would be counterproductive to U.S. strategic interests by destabilizing the region and would likely not achieve the non-proliferation objectives of the legislation. (President Signs Symington, Solarz Waivers, 1/16/88)
February 1988
The government of India tests its first domestically built surface-to-surface missile with a range of 150 miles. The "Prithvi" missile has been produced for use by the Indian Army. (Test Launch of India's First Indigenous Surface to Surface Missile, 2/22/88)
March 24, 1988
India launches its first augmented space launch vehicle. This is the fifth launch that India has undertaken and the first since 1983. The rocket, equipped with two strap-on boosters, fails and the satellite that was to be deployed in space is lost. (Freeworld China: 1987 Space Summary, 1/6/88)
March 27, 1988
Mordechai Vanunu, the Israeli nuclear technician who provided information about Israel's nuclear weapons program to the London Times in 1986, is sentenced in Israel to 18 years in prison for treason and espionage. (Israel and Nuclear Weapons, 8/8/88)
August 8, 1988
Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Raphel and other U.S. and Pakistani military officials are killed when the transport plane they are travelling in mysteriously explodes in mid-air. (WP 8/18/88)
September 1988
The 32nd IAEA General Conference meets to debate the Israeli nuclear capability and threat. (Israel and Nuclear Weapons, 8/8/88)
September 18, 1988
Israel conducts a satellite launch. U.S. intelligence estimates suggest that with minor modifications that are within Israeli capabilities, the rocket could be used to carry a nuclear warhead. (Israeli Missile Capabilities: A Few Numbers to Think About, 10/7/88)
January 1, 1989
India and Pakistan reach an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. A verbal agreement had been reached in 1985 between Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq and India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. According to the terms of the new accord, the two countries "will refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating indirectly or directly in any action aimed at causing the destruction or damage to any such [nuclear] installations or facilities in the other country." The agreement also states that India and Pakistan will notify each other annually on January 1 of the locations of all nuclear facilities. (WP 1/1/89)
January 5, 1989
Harald Mueller, the project leader for European non-proliferation policy at the Hessian Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, calls West German export controls the weakest in the world. Mueller's statement comes in the wake of recent revelations of illegal exports of nuclear technology by two Hessian firms. Mueller describes the sales as the latest in a long series of illegal transfers of items that can only be used in nuclear weapons, not energy, programs. (Nuclear Proliferation Expert Harald Mueller on Illegal FRG Exports of Nuclear Technology, 1/18/89)
January 28, 1989
In reaction to an article on Pakistan's nuclear program in The Washington Post, the Pakistani Embassy in Washington issues a statement declaring that it does not possess any nuclear weapons. The Embassy reiterates Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's statement that its program is designed strictly for peaceful purposes. (WP 1/29/89)
February 6, 1989
General Mirza Aslam, chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, announces that Pakistan has successfully fired and tested indigenously manufactured surface-to-surface missiles. (Pakistan Enters Missile Age, 2/6/89)
February 15, 1989
Soviet troops complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan according to the terms of the treaty signed in April 1988. (NYT 2/16/89)
February 20, 1989
An article in Der Spiegel claims that Pakistan has the ability to build a nuclear bomb, having acquired the technology from West German scientists and firms. The article describes a heavily fortified, secret laboratory at the foot of the Kashmir mountain range. (Spiegel Article on Nuclear Exports, 2/22/89)
March 22, 1989
The magazine Stern prints an article alleging that the Frankfurt branch of the Pakistan National Bank and the West German firm New Technologies Company illegally supplied Pakistan with equipment for the building of atomic bombs. An investigation of the bank's records by members of the Hessian State Investigative Office produces a list of over 70 companies that have supplied merchandise for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. The article claims that repeated warnings by the CIA, the British Secret Service and even the KGB about illegal transfers of technology by West German firms to Pakistan have been ignored by the German Federal Economics Ministry. (Stern Article on FRG Assistance to Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program, 3/23/89)
April 5, 1989
Western officials dismiss a report in an American newspaper that Iraq is on the verge of producing nuclear warheads for its growing stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles. The officials, based in Baghdad, state that Iraq has not reactivated the reactor at Osirak which Israel destroyed in 1981 and has only a low-level nuclear energy research program. (FT 4/5/89; WP 3/31/89)
June 4, 1989
An article in an American newspaper discusses the various claims about the extent and nature of Iraq's nuclear program. Israeli intelligence analysts say that Iraq is mounting a crash program to build an atomic bomb within two years. Defense Department sources believe that Iraq has begun a weapons program and has "dispersed, hardened and hidden" its facilities in the event of another Israeli strike. (WP 6/4/89)
December 5, 1989
Iraq tests a rocket said to be capable of launching a satellite (and therefore a nuclear warhead as well). Later it is learned that only the first of the rockets three stages was actually successfully tested. (ACT, 10/90, p. 35)
February 12-28, 1990
The 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meet in Ottawa, Canada, to begin discussions on an Open Skies proposal similar to that proposed during the Eisenhower Administration. (ACT, 10/90, p. 22)
April 1990
Der Spiegel reports that Iraq might be constructing a centrifuge enrichment plant for manufacturing weapons-grade plutonium with the use of illegal exports from a West German company. The article claims that it is unlikely that Iraq will be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium before the turn of the century. (Iraq and Nuclear Weapons, 12/21/90)
May 4, 1990
In a press report, Iraq's ambassador to the United States claims that many lies have been told about Iraq's plans to build atomic bombs and other weapons such as a "super gun" and that his country has no intention to produce these weapons. (NYT 5/4/90)
May 8, 1990
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein claims that Baghdad has obtained an American electronic capacitor which could be used to detonate a nuclear bomb and that Iraqi scientists are now capable of producing the devices indigenously. This announcement is made only days after British authorities seized a shipment of the same devices destined for Iraq. Hussein boasts that some of the devices still made their way to Baghdad. (NYT 5/9/90)
June 22, 1990
President Bush signs National Security Directive 15 calling for the establishment of an Open Skies regime. (ACT, 10/90, p. 21)
July 2, 1990
The Pakistan Embassy denies a report by the U.S. news media that it is contributing to an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. (Iraq and Nuclear Weapons, 12/21/90)
August 2, 1990
Iraq invades Kuwait, claiming that Kuwait has been illegally siphoning oil from Iraqi lines. (ACT, 10/90, p. 26)
August 20-September 14, 1990
The Non-Proliferation Treaty Fourth Review Conference is held. For the first time, France sends an official observer, even though it is not a party to the Treaty. The soon-to-be-unified German states issue a joint declaration renouncing the production, possession and control of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. They also announce their support for extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty past 1995. The Conference ends without issuing a Final Declaration, which would require unanimous consent by the Treaty signatories. The primary disagreement among participants revolves around the comprehensive test ban issue, which has been used by some members as an indicator of progress on disarmament as specified by the Treaty. (Kotter, p. 13; ACT, 7-8/90, p. 27)
September 1990
At the opening of the IAEA's 34th General Conference in Vienna, Director General Hans Blix states that the embargo approved by U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 has made it impractical for the IAEA to extend aid to Iraq. (Iraq and Nuclear Weapons, 12/21/90)
September 24, 1990
At the United Nations, Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello calls on the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to ban all nuclear explosives, including those intended for peaceful use. (ACT, 12/90, p. 13)
November 1990
A Special National Intelligence Estimate concerning Iraq's nuclear program is circulated by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. The Committee is an interagency group charged with following nuclear proliferation events throughout the world. The document remains highly classified. (NYT 11/30/90)
November 17, 1990
The North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement to the United Nations declaring that full support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty is dependent on the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone on the Korean Peninsula and the withdrawal of U.S. forces. (ACT, 3/91, p. 10)
November 27, 1990
The IAEA announces that after routine safeguards inspections of Iraqi facilities earlier in the month, it has been concluded that no change in the status of safeguarded materials has taken place. (Iraq and Nuclear Weapons, 12/21/90)
November 28, 1990
Brazilian President Collor de Mello and Argentine President Menem meet at Foz do Iguacu on the Argentine-Brazilian border to discuss nuclear-related issues. The two leaders publicly renounce nuclear weapons, agreeing to apply bilateral and international inspections to all of their nuclear facilities and also to implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (ACT, 12/90, p. 13)
November 29, 1990
The U.N. Security Council authorizes the use of force after January 15, 1991, to compel the Iraqi military to withdraw from Kuwait. (ACT, 12/90, p. 23)
December 11, 1990
The Senate ratifies the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 by a vote of 98 to 0. (PPNN, Winter 90-91, p. 7)
December 21, 1990
In a Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, Warren H. Donnelly suggests that even under the best possible circumstances it would take Iraq five to 10 years to produce even a crude atomic bomb. (Iraq and Nuclear Weapons, 12/21/90)
January 7-18, 1991
The parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 meet at the United Nations for a conference to amend the Treaty. They consider whether to include underground testing, thereby transforming the LTBT into the equivalent of a comprehensive test ban treaty. However, due to opposition from the United States and the United Kingdom, no agreement is reached. (ACT, 3/91, p. 14)
January 20, 1991
George Bush is inaugurated as the 41st President of the United States. (WP 1/21/91)
January 27, 1991
India and Pakistan sign an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations. (PPNN, Spring 1991, p. 2)
February 7, 1991
In testimony before Congress, Secretary of State James Baker reaffirms the United States support for the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. However, he states that such a regime must be negotiated by the Middle East nations themselves and cannot be imposed from outside the region. (ACT, 3/91, p. 18)
March 5-7, 1991
Members of the London Suppliers Club meet at The Hague to set up a working group to reinforce export controls on dual-use nuclear-related equipment, materials and technology. (PPNN, Spring 1991, p. 2)
March 28, 1991
U.S. government officials are still uncertain of the whereabouts of the enriched uranium taken from Iraq's nuclear reactors and facilities, which were attacked in January 1991 by U.S. and allied forces. There is approximately 47.6 pounds unaccounted for, enough for one atom bomb. (NYT 3/29/91)
April 3, 1991
The United Nations and Iraq agree to a permanent cease-fire agreement. Part of the agreement, Resolution 687, requires that Iraq provide a complete inventory of all weapons it possesses, as well as the amounts and locations of each type. (NYT 4/20/91)
April 3, 1991
The U.N. Security Council adopts resolution 687 ending the Persian Gulf War. The resolution gives the United Nations and the IAEA authority to inspect all of Iraq's nuclear facilities for possible Non-Proliferation Treaty violations. (PPNN, Summer 1991, p. 2)
April 19, 1991
Iraq informs the United Nations that it does not have any nuclear arms or nuclear-weapons-grade material. The United States doe not believe Iraq's claim and notes that many items are missing from the inventory list Iraq has provided as part of the U.N. cease-fire agreement. (NYT 4/20/91)
April 30, 1991
In a letter to the IAEA, Iraq states that at least some of its enriched uranium stockpile was moved from the Tuwaitha facility prior to the U.S. and allied bombings in January to avoid "the possibility of a nuclear accident and any risks including radiation contamination." (NYT 5/1/91)
May 15-21, 1991
Investigations by the first two IAEA inspection teams on Iraqi nuclear capabilities find that after the Gulf War many buildings where nuclear weapons research activities had taken place have been thoroughly destroyed. In almost every case, records have disappeared. (Consolidated Report on the First Two IAEA Inspections under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) of Iraqi Nuclear Capabilities, 7/15/91)
May 17, 1991
Iraq agrees to a "rigorous system of inspections of its military and scientific installations..." finally acceding to all demands made by the international commission responsible for implementing U.N. Resolution 687. The resolution requires that all of Iraq's weapons be located and destroyed. (NYT 5/18/91)
June 3, 1991
France announces its intention to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (PPNN, Summer 1991, p. 1)
June 6, 1991
Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif calls for a multilateral meeting on non-proliferation in South East Asia with the goal of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone. (PPNN, Summer 1991, p. 2)
June 23, 1991
U.N. officials are blocked from entering a suspected nuclear site during a snap inspection. Nevertheless, large amounts of material are seen being carted away from the site by trucks, cranes and forklifts. Information received from an Iraqi nuclear scientist (who defected earlier this month to U.S. forces) and corroborated by intelligence findings, contributed to the selection of the site by the United Nations. The nuclear scientist also disclosed that Iraq possessed approximately 90 pounds of enriched uranium--enough for two bombs. Previous estimates put Iraq's enriched uranium holdings at approximately 47 pounds. (WP 6/27/91; NYT 7/9/91)
June 27, 1991
South Africa announces that it will accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that it is in favor of declaring a nuclear weapon free zone. (PPNN, Summer 1991, p. 3)
June 28, 1991
Defense Department officials disclose in a news report that the Administration is preparing certain military options to eliminate the remainder of Iraq's nuclear weapons research program. An interagency committee, known as the Deputies Committee, thought to be composed of "second-echelon" officials from the Departments of Defense and State, will provide a recommendation to the President when they have reached a consensus. (WP 6/28/91)
June 28, 1991
Iraqi soldiers fire over the heads of U.N. inspectors as they attempt to enter a military facility to inspect some trucks in the compound. The inspection team is denied entry as Iraqi soldiers race to the trucks and drive off through a back entrance, but the inspectors take photographs and film of the incident. Later, they state that they believe the vehicles were carrying calutrons, which are used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level. (NYT 6/29/91)
July 1991
Brazil and Argentina agree to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and to establish a joint nuclear agency that will control their nuclear materials. (WP 12/14/91)
July 7-18, 1991
Investigations by the third IAEA inspection team on Iraqi nuclear capabilities suggest that the Iraqis have yet to disclose the full extent of their centrifuge enrichment program and that sensitive equipment and material continue to be held at undeclared locations. The Iraqi government confirms earlier inspectors suspicions that the Tarmiya facility was the main production site for the enrichment of uranium. (Report on the Third IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 7/25/91)
July 8, 1991
In a statement issued in Baghdad and in Vienna, Iraq discloses previously unknown details of its nuclear program, which included three different operations for enriching uranium. (NYT 7/9/91)
July 13, 1991
The U.N. nuclear inspection team asks Iraqi officials for a complete list of its nuclear enrichment facilities. The request is part of a program of stepped-up political pressure on Iraq from the United Nations and the United States to fully reveal its nuclear program. The Bush Administration has implied to Iraq that it may destroy the facilities if Iraq refuses to comply with the inspection teams requests. (WP 7/14/91)
July 15, 1991
Hans Blix, director of the IAEA, announces that given the evidence compiled by the U.N. inspection team so far, Iraq could have achieved the large-scale enrichment ability necessary to build a nuclear weapon within two years. (WP 7/16/91)
July 18, 1991
The IAEA formally condemns Iraq for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is the first time a state has been found to be in direct violation of the Treaty. It prompts questions regarding the ability of international safeguards to check adequately against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (WP 7/19/91)
July 19, 1991
Based on the information received since Iraq began cooperating with the U.N. Secretariat on July 15, along with evidence gathered during on-site inspections, the U.N. inspection team claims that Iraq had never produced weapons-grade uranium indigenously. The U.N. Secretariat later differs vociferously with this assertion, arguing that the inspection team did not have all the information necessary to arrive at such a sweeping conclusion. (NYT 7/18/91 & 7/20/91)
July 27-August 10, 1991
The fourth IAEA on-site inspection team in Iraq is given only limited information about the magnitude of the Iraqi centrifuge enrichment program. The determination is made that the centrifuge program was on an industrial scale which would have resulted in significant production of weapons-grade material. A total of 22 sites are inspected, 14 for the first time. The inspection team encounters no access problems during their time in Iraq. (Report on the Fourth IAEA Inspections under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 9/11/91)
July 31, 1991
President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Treaty eliminates approximately 50 percent of all nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles. A framework for future reductions is also established. (Bulletin, 11/91, p. 18; NYT 8/1/91)
August 5, 1991
Iraq discloses that it was able to extract a small amount of weapons-grade plutonium from the spent fuel of a domestic nuclear reactor. They were able to do this despite the fact that the facility was subject to international safeguards. (NYT 8/6/91)
August 10, 1991
China's Prime Minister Li Peng announces that his country is prepared "in principle" to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (NYT 8/11/91)
September 14-20, 1991
The fifth IAEA inspection team in Iraq carries out routine follow-up activities to previous inspections. The team checks the seals on previously identified materials and equipment and prepares plutonium for removal from Iraq. (Report on the Fifth IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 10/4/91)
September 22-30, 1991
The sixth IAEA inspection team sent to Iraq obtains conclusive evidence that the government of Iraq had a program for developing an implosion-type nuclear weapon. Documents show that the nuclear weapons program was supported by broad-based international procurement efforts and that the program was linked to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission's surface-to-surface missile project. (First Report on the Sixth IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 10/8/91)
September 27, 1991
President Bush proposes to remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea, thereby meeting a North Korean condition for signing an inspection agreement with the IAEA. He also proposes to withdraw all sea-launched cruise missiles from service. These missiles were not affected by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed in July. (WT 11/7/91; Bulletin, 11/91, p. 27)
Late September 1991
A senior Iranian official, Ayatollah Mohajerai, says that "because the enemy has nuclear facilities, the Muslim states too should be equipped with the same capacity." The enemy in this case is Israel. (WP 10/30/91)
October 17, 1991
Waldo Stumpf, chief executive of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, says that his country has abandoned its nuclear weapons program and is instead seeking to become a competitor in the world's nuclear energy market. (WP 10/18/91)
October 30, 1991
In a press report, U.S. intelligence sources reveal that China has provided Iran with equipment capable of producing fissile materials. (WP 10/30/91)
November 1991
Chinese leaders tell Secretary of State James Baker that they are willing to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which limits the sale of missile technology and equipment to other nations, if the United States will lift trade sanctions against two Chinese weapons companies and review exports of computers and satellites to China. (WP 12/30/91)
November 15, 1991
A newspaper report indicates that India is negotiating the sale of a nuclear research reactor to Iran. If true, this would be the first nuclear export India has ever made. The reactor would be subject to IAEA safeguards because Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all nuclear imports are covered. U.S. officials are reportedly trying to persuade India to stop the sale. (WP 11/15/91)
November 21, 1991
It is reported that U.S. troop reductions in South Korea are being postponed as Washington evaluates how close North Korea is to developing nuclear weapons. (WP 11/21/91)
November 25, 1991
The Foreign Ministry of North Korea announces that it will sign an agreement permitting foreign inspection of its nuclear facilities when the United States begins to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea. (WP 11/27/91)
December 6, 1991
The former Soviet republics of Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia sign a document founding the "Commonwealth of Independent States." The Commonwealth is designed to replace the Soviet central government at year's end. (WP 12/18/91)
December 11, 1991
The Republic of Korea announces that all U.S. nuclear missiles and warheads have been removed from the country. The South Korean government then offers to open U.S. military installations there for inspection by North Korea as long as North Korea allows "simultaneous inspection of its nuclear complexes." (WP 12/12/91)
December 11, 1991
The United Nations identifies 13 firms which have assisted Iraq's covert nuclear weapons program. However, the IAEA does not claim that any of the firms "knowingly assisted" Iraq's efforts. (WP 12/12/91)
December 13, 1991
North and South Korea sign an accord pledging "non-aggression and greater exchanges of people and communications...." Although the state of war that has existed since 1953 is still not formally ended, the accord commits the two nations eventually to sign a peace treaty. (WP 12/13/91)
December 13, 1991
Brazil and Argentina sign an agreement in Vienna to open their nuclear facilities to mutual inspection. Although neither state has yet signed the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, both have agreed to take steps to put the Treaty of Tlatelolco into effect. (WP 12/14/91)
December 15, 1991
A news article reports that following the declaration of independence by the Soviet republics a major concern of U.S. officials is who will ultimately control the extensive Soviet nuclear arsenal. In addition, officials fear that the technology and materials used in the Soviet nuclear weapons program may be sold on the international market as the economies of the former republics deteriorate. (WP 12/15/91)
December 17, 1991
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev meets with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and agrees that "all Soviet agencies will be dissolved or transferred by Jan. 1 `so we can start to live a qualitatively new way without the former Soviet Union.'" (WP 12/18/91)
December 17, 1991
Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan, announces that his republic will "remain a nuclear power as long as Russia has atomic weapons." (WP 12/18/91)
December 18, 1991
Leonid Kravchuk, president of the Ukraine, pledges to destroy rapidly the nuclear weapons placed by Soviet authorities on Ukrainian territory. President Kravchuk also declares that the Ukraine will support all arms control accords negotiated by the former Soviet Union. (WP 12/19/91)
December 18, 1991
During a series of informal discussions with representatives of U.S. nuclear laboratories, Soviet nuclear officials suggest that the United States "might retain a key on any facilities it helps construct for long-term storage of radioactive Soviet weapons components." The Soviets have identified the shortage of such storage facilities as a major roadblock to the dismantling of thousands of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. (WP 12/19/91)
December 18, 1991
President of South Korea Roh Tae Woo declares again that there are "now no U.S. nuclear weapons in his country..." and that North Korea should immediately abandon its nuclear weapons development program. (WP 12/19/91)
December 29, 1991
Legislators of China's only parliamentary body vote to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Premier Li Peng notes that China had agreed in principle to sign the Treaty as of last August; however, it was not decided when the signing would take place. (WP 12/30/91)
December 31, 1991
North and South Korea reach agreement on an accord which bans nuclear weapons from the peninsula. The agreement is the culmination of months of intensive negotiations during which the United States removed all nuclear weapons from South Korea. On January 6, 1992, North Korea tells the IAEA that it will sign the NPT safeguards agreement. Although North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, it had refused to sign the inspection portion of the Treaty. (WP 1/1/92 & 1/7/92)
December 31, 1991
China announces that it will export a 300-megawatt nuclear power plant to Pakistan. The United States has attempted to persuade China to stop its nuclear and missile exports to nations believed to be close to developing nuclear weapons. (WP 1/1/92)
