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1977:
The number of Soviet technicians working in Afghanistan is approximately 1,300. (Digital National Security Archive, "Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response," http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CAF00789)
January 20, 1977:
Jimmy Carter is inaugurated as president of the United States.
February 1977:
The President’s Report to the Congress on U.S. International Broadcast Facilities notes that "International Broadcasting is a key element of United States foreign policy." It recommends acquiring, for Asia and Africa, 12 Voice of America (VOA) transmitters, spending about $27 million on "sixteen 250 kilowatt transmitters" for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and VOA, and that the government "must keep under constant review situations that might arise to impair our international broadcasting efforts." ( Report, U.S. White House, "President’s Report to the Congress on U.S. International Broadcast Facilities," c. February 1977)
February 22, 1977:
Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM/NSC) 11 is released, with President Carter ordering the National Security Council’s Special Coordination Committee (SCC) to "undertake a comprehensive review of major foreign intelligence activities and the organizational structure of the Intelligence Community." (Presidential Review Memorandum, National Security Council, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Walter Mondale et al., February 22, 1977)
February 28, 1977:
In a memo to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Council intelligence aide Samuel Hoskinson recommends abolishing the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and increasing the role of the Intelligence Oversight Board. (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Samuel M. Hoskinson to Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 28, 1977)
March 1977:
A Central Intelligence Agency report notes that "[d]uring the past several years, the Cuban government has provided only very limited and selective support for Latin America revolutionary groups," but makes clear that "Cuban support for national liberation movements in Africa is of a different genre," and "Cuban aid to Angola’s governing MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] is a special case." (Report summary/monthly analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, "Cuban Support for Nationalist Movements and Revolutionary Groups," c. March 1977)
March 1977:
In March 1977, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) decides to increase the power of their transmitters in Germany. This agitates German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who has been concerned about the radios since mid-July 1976. (Memorandum, Department of State, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Concern Expressed by Chancellor Schmidt over Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty," June 29, 1977)
March 9, 1977:
Stansfield Turner enters into service as director of central intelligence (DCI). (Report, Central Intelligence Agency, "Fact Book on Intelligence," September 1987, Digital National Security Archive (ProQuest), http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CIP00015, p.8)
May 10, 1977:
Regarding the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and their management by the Board of International Broadcasting (BIB), National Security Council staff intelligence aide Paul Henze notes that much of his "time was taken up working against the Pell amendment on BIB." He goes on to say that "[t]he Pell/McGovern initiative abolishes the RFE/RL Board and expands the BIB to become the operating and controlling element for the radios." (Memorandum, U.S. White House, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, May 10, 1977)
May 18, 1977:
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), in its first annual report, says that "[t]hus far, the executive branch has informed the committee of every covert action which has required a new Presidential Finding prior to its implementation." It goes on to provide an "Outline of Procedure for Covert Action Oversight," where it lists the steps the Central Intelligence Agency must take in regard to the notification of covert action. (Annual report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, May 18, 1977)
May 26, 1977:
A memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski briefly mentions the situation surrounding the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and notes that "[r]eaction to the abolishing of PFIAB has been minimal." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Evening Report," May 26, 1977)
June 3, 1977:
A National Security Council draft paper, regarding Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, examines the intricacies of covert action in detail. It states that covert action "constitutes an alternative to open conflict," however, it admits that "[t]here is no practical way to render a definitive value judgment on United States covert action." The future of covert operations is also discussed. Regarding this, the paper notes that "[u]nder law (the Hughes/Ryan amendment) the President is required to make a determination that each covert action is important to the [n]ational security of the United States. The future of United States covert action therefore resides with the President." It also suggests that "[a]nother major consideration in future covert action is the role of Congress in oversight; and its allocation of funds to that mission. Regarding oversight, it is clear that covert action on foreign policy issues must be based on a broad consensus within Congress. It also is apparent there exists a need to improve legislative procedures for such oversight, to insure secrecy of these operations and to minimize the problem of unauthorized disclosures." (Draft paper, National Security Council staff, "Covert Action by the United States," June 3, 1977)
June 4, 1977:
Executive secretary of the Department of State Peter Tarnoff, in a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, discusses the situation surrounding possible covert activity undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Micronesia. (Memorandum, Department of State, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 4, 1977)
June 16, 1977:
Defeat of the Pell Amendment, a congressional amendment that would have reoriented the U.S. international broadcasting program, caps months of uncertainty regarding the future of the Board for International Broadcasting and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 17, 1977)
June 22, 1977:
The National Intelligence Daily notes that "unrest is more serious in Poland than anywhere else in Eastern Europe." The document reflects the region’s status as a long-standing, high-interest target of the U.S. intelligence community. (Interagency intelligence memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, "Prospects for Poland and Hungary," June 22, 1977)
June 27, 1977:
In a memo to the secretary of state, the director of central intelligence, and the director of the United States Information Agency, Zbigniew Brzezinski discusses President Carter’s reactions to a report about Cubans in Angola that described perceptions of Cubans as "the new colonialists" and noted that the Angolans "frequently criticize the Cubans for being arrogant." The memo states that the president "asked whether we have any propaganda capability." At this juncture, decisions are made to organize and undertake a propaganda campaign against Cubans in Angola. (Memorandum, National Security Council, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Cyrus Vance et al., June 27, 1977)
July 6, 1977:
Zbigniew Brzezinski, in a memo regarding the ability of the U.S. to utilize propaganda against Cubans in Angola, states that "USIA has similarly stated there are ways in which this might be done through the Voice of America," though the State Department "suggested some limited possibilities but noted that U.S. involvement in spreading the message could be counterproductive." (Memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski to the Jimmy Carter, July 6, 1977)
July 17, 1977:
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) is created, one of several significant reforms growing out of revelations during the mid-1970s of intelligence community abuses. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 53)
July 28, 1977:
At a news conference, Jimmy Carter touches on intelligence charter legislation, noting that "I do think that we need to have a congressional charter evolved both for the FBI and also the CIA ... [and] I think it's accurate also to say that both my own administration, including the Attorney General and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Congress leaders are working on this project, and I would hope that this would be one of the accomplishments of my administration." (Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1977, bk. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 1374.)
August 4, 1977:
President Carter signs Presidential Directive (PD/NSC) 17, which lays out a reorganization of the intelligence community. The role of director of central intelligence is given significant attention. (Presidential Directive, PD/NSC 17, U.S. White House, "Reorganization of the Intelligence Community," August 4, 1977, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd17.pdf)
December 5, 1977:
Paul Henze, in a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, discusses Cubans in Angola propaganda activity, noting that Voice of America’s "performance is just what the President wanted." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 5, 1977) (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 5, 1977)
January 24, 1978:
President Carter issues Executive Order 12036 to regulate the intelligence community. Among other points, it mandates the dissolution of the PFIAB. (Denise Allard, ed., Encyclopedia of Government Advisory Organizations (Detroit, Mich.: Gale, 1987), p. 531; Executive Order 12036, U.S. White House, "United States Intelligence Activities," January 24, 1978, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12036.htm)
February 1, 1978:
Paul Henze, in a memo for Zbigniew Brzezinski, discusses a Central Intelligence Agency paper focused on the Horn of Africa, written by the CIA’s national intelligence officer for Africa. The paper argues that the Cubans have intervened abroad as a matter of Cuban "solidarity" with Third World socialist movements, but "not because the Soviets have told them they have to be there." Henze, who takes a more traditional Cold War line, points out that one of the main weaknesses of the paper is a "lack of a conceptual framework that fits Horn developments into a more comprehensive view of Soviet policy and aims." These differences of opinion within the administration had an impact on the formulation of U.S. policy toward issues such as the Cuban role in Africa. (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 1, 1978; memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski. to Paul B. Henze, January 31, 1978)
March 2, 1978:
In a memo to the director of central intelligence, Zbigniew Brzezinski, discussing an intelligence briefing on Cuban activities in Africa, notes that the president responded by saying "[m]aintain P.R. effort against Cubans in Africa, esp. radio to Cuba." (Memorandum, National Security Council, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Stansfield Turner, March 2, 1978)
March 16, 1978:
At a Special Coordination Committee meeting, the Horn of Africa is discussed, with specific focus on a trip to Somalia by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose. The main topics include "[t]he message [that] Moose would convey to President Siad Barre," and the possibility of "military and economic assistance for Somalia," among others. (Summary of conclusions, "Special Coordination Committee Meeting," March 16, 1978)
March 27, 1978:
Paul Henze discusses Assistant Secretary Moose’s mission to Somalia in a memo to Brzezinski. Henze emphasizes "[i]f this mission was based on the assumption that Siad needed bolstering and was eager to become a client of the United States, the assumption was over-simplified," and, further, that "[h]e insists he needs major arms to defend himself against Russian and Cuban attack." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, March 27, 1978)
April 7, 1978:
Discussing "[o]vert versus [c]overt media effort," Paul Henze, in a note to Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron, notes that "I am very much in favor of more coherent efforts to undertake overt programs, though I do not think they are a substitute for covert effort." He went on further to say that "CIA rightly points out that when a requirement is laid on it, it is ipso facto for covert effort, for that is CIA’s business." (Note, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to David Aaron, April 7, 1978)
April 9, 1978:
A coup to overthrow Siad Barre in Somalia is defeated. (Correspondent report, Voice of America, April 9, 1978)
April 27, 1978:
A National Security Council memo from Paul Henze to National Security Council intelligence staffer Rick Inderfurth notes the "implementation problems" of covert action, and suggests that, if the Central Intelligence Agency is going to be able to launch useful covert operations, then "more efficient procedures for reviewing, approving and implementing must be developed." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul. B. Henze to Rick Inderfurth, April 27, 1978)
April 27, 1978:
A coup, known as the Saur Revolution, takes place in Afghanistan, bringing Communists to power. (Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 92-109)
May 3, 1978:
National Security Council staffer Tom Thornton, in a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski regarding a Special Coordination Committee Working Group meeting on Afghanistan earlier in the day, attaches an overview of the discussion. Thornton notes his "main concern is that CIA is so unwilling to consider covert action that we will not get a fair paper out of them on this subject." (Memorandum with attachment, National Security Council staff, Tom Thornton to Zbigniew Brzezinski, May 3, 1978)
May 15, 1978:
A Special Coordination Committee meeting convenes to discuss intelligence charters, and the "CIA’s proposed charter (Title IV) was endorsed in principle." (Summary of conclusions, "Special Coordination Committee Meeting", May 15, 1978)
May 15, 1978:
A Special Coordination Committee meeting takes place, where the Horn of Africa is the subject. Regarding Somalia, "[t]here was agreement that we should move cautiously in establishing a military supply relationship with Siad." Regarding Ethiopia and Eritrea, it was noted that "there is no evidence to date of Cuban participation in combat activities in Eritrea, although they are doing some planning." (Summary of conclusions, "Special Coordination Committee Meeting," May 15, 1978)
May 23, 1978:
Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM/NSC) 36 is issued to initiate an investigation of the Cuban and Soviet presence in Africa. (Presidential Review Memorandum, PRM/NSC 36, U.S. White House, "Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa," May 23, 1978, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/prm/prm36.pdf)
May 23, 1978:
A State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) report touches on Nicaragua, and notes that Anastasio Somoza, when speaking with Ambassador Mauricio Solaun, "continued to insist that the U.S. more actively support the Nicaraguan government," and that he "repeated that U.S. criticism was responsible for the violence in Nicaragua." (Report, Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Current Reports," May 23, 1978)
June 2, 1978:
In a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Rick Inderfurth highlights the issue of Cuba assisting Katangan forces in the Congo. Listing a number of Fidel Castro’s claims denying any Cuban involvement, Inderfurth notes that "we have been able...to refute all of Castro’s assertions but one." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Rick Inderfurth to Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 2, 1978)
June 26, 1978:
At a news conference, a reporter asks President Carter: " [...] we just sent a diplomat over to Angola to . . . talk to them. But a few weeks earlier, the CIA Director had been up on Capitol Hill trying to get approval from the Senate for a plan to back-door weapons to the rebels in Angola. What is the consistency in these two positions, and would you have approved that plan?" Carter responds by noting that "[t]here was never any plan put forward to send back-door weapons to the rebels, because that would have been in violation of the American law." (Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978, bk. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 1184-1185)
July 16, 1978:
A New York Times article by Seymour Hersh, entitled "Kissinger-Colby Briefings on C.I.A. Called Misleading by Senate Panel," suggests that Henry Kissinger and William Colby misled the Senate regarding the CIA’s involvement in the Angolan civil war in 1975. (New York Times, 7/16/78)
July 27, 1978:
A National Security Council memo regarding the Horn of Africa notes that "[t]he Cubans and Soviets have drawn careful lines to preclude direct involvement in Eritrean fighting," and goes on to highlight that "[t]he Ogaden remains in an unsettled state and Cuban involvement there still appears necessary for the Ethiopians." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, July 27, 1978)
September 11, 1978:
Tom Thornton, discussing the Afghanistan situation in a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, notes there "is a serious possibility of Soviet intervention in case things unravel too badly." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Tom Thornton to Zbigniew Brzezinski, September 11, 1978)
December 21, 1978:
A National Security Council memo summarizing the year-end report of the Special Coordination Committee Nationalities Working Group records that "CIA’s intelligence collection arms are revising priorities and directives to focus more attention on nationalities," and that "RFE/RL has stepped up efforts to recruit new nationalities talent and do more research supportive of broadcasts." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 21, 1978)
Early January 1979:
Serious disagreements between Board for International Broadcasting and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty occur in regard to the management of the radios. The issues are "resolved with the election of Leonard Marks by Corporate Board as ‘Secretary’ through whom all requests from BIB to radio management must pass." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, January 19, 1979)
March - April, 1979:
The United States begins considering aid to Afghan rebels, and the possibility of covert operations is mulled over. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 469)
March 22, 1979:
A highly important Special Coordination Committee meeting takes place, which focuses on issues with respect to intelligence charter legislation. In particular, it discusses two major aspects - provisions for covert action and the SCC’s future agenda on charters. Sam Hoskinson, in a short cover memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, emphasizes that "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that our capability in the future to plan and carry out meaningful covert action programs is at stake." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Sam Hoskinson to Zbigniew Brzezinski, March 22, 1979; memorandum, National Security Council staff, Samuel M. Hoskinson et al. to Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., March 22, 1979)
July 17, 1979:
Long-time U.S. ally Anastasio Somoza flees Nicaragua two days before Sandinista National Liberation Front forces take control of Managua. (New York Times, 7/18/79; Washington Post, 7/20/79)
July 19, 1979:
Central Intelligence Agency officials ask Congress to approve covert operations in Afghanistan. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 470)
Late 1979:
The Central Intelligence Agency is given authority by Jimmy Carter to stop any Cuban activities in Latin America. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 463)
September 14, 1979:
A memo from Stansfield Turner to the National Security Council notes that "Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the Taraki regime and protect their sizable stake in Afghanistan." (Memorandum, Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner to National Security Council, September 14, 1979)
September 17, 1979:
National Security Council staffer Marshall Brement, in a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, discusses broadcasting issues as well as Afghanistan. Regarding broadcasting, he suggests steps to "increase our broadcasting effectiveness to Afghanistan, Iran, and to the Central Asian areas of the Soviet Union," and to ensure that "VOA Russian language service is making its very important Soviet listenership understand the reasons for our concern at the Soviet military buildup and Soviet/Cuban behavior in Africa and elsewhere." Regarding Afghanistan, he suggests "inter-agency task forces to examine whether more can productively be done to enhance the capacities of resistance forces in Afghanistan." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Marshall Brement to Zbigniew Brzezinski, September 17, 1979)
November 4, 1979:
The Iranian hostage crisis begins when the U.S. Embassy in Tehran is taken over, which will induce the United States to undertake the failed covert operation known as "Eagle Claw" to rescue the hostages. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 21-27)
December 3, 1979:
The National Intelligence Council is created, replacing a more loosely coordinated system of national intelligence officers. (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 313)
December 11, 1979:
At a Special Coordination Committee meeting the topic of broadcasting is discussed in depth, with a focus on Muslim audiences. This meeting caps several months of planning regarding broadcasting to Soviet Muslim audiences, providing a variety of concrete proposals to move forward. (Summary of conclusions, National Security Council, "Broadcasting and Related Issues," December 11, 1979)
December 12, 1979:
In a memo to the president, Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that there are steps being taken to increase, immediately and substantially, Radio Liberty broadcasts, which will include the expansion of RL "broadcasts in seven languages to Soviet Muslims." (Memorandum, National Security Council, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, December 12, 1979)
December 19, 1979:
A Central Intelligence Agency alert memorandum notes that "Soviet leaders have crossed a significant threshold in their growing military involvement in Afghanistan." (Alert memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, Stansfield Turner to National Security Council, December 19, 1979)
December 25, 1979:
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan begins.
December 27, 1979:
President Jimmy Carter signs a Presidential Finding that allows the Central Intelligence Agency to provide weapons assistance to Afghan rebels to resist the Soviets. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 472)
December 28, 1979:
A Special Coordination Committee meeting considers options for Afghanistan and debates whether to cut off bilateral relations. Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner "wonder[s] if the Afghan situation could be used in any way to help with the hostage situation." Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron notes "that we are now going to be assisting rebel forces." (Draft summary, "Special Coordination Committee Meeting," December 28, 1979)
December 28, 1979:
A National Security Council meeting discusses Afghanistan. Participants want to enlist U.S. allies as well as other countries. The group deliberates on the eventual U.S. goal. In this regard, Brzezinski, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown say "it [is] to make it as costly as possible for the Soviets." The "President conclude[s] that our maximum goal, however, [i]s to get the Soviets out." (Minutes, National Security Council, "National Security Council Meeting," December 28, 1979)
January 2, 1980:
There are a variety of issues before a National Security Council meeting, though the focus remains Afghanistan. Much time is given to deciding how to move forward at the U.N. level against the Soviet intervention. A possible boycott of the Olympic games in Moscow is suggested, an embargo on grain is debated, and the question of proceeding with nuclear arms control (SALT II) is considered. (Minutes, "National Security Council Meeting," January 2, 1980)
January 3, 1980:
At a Special Coordination Committee meeting Afghanistan is briefly touched on. Two issues discussed in relation to Afghanistan are SALT II and steps to take in relation to a grain embargo. (Summary of conclusions, "Special Coordination Committee Meeting," January 3, 1980)
January 4, 1980:
A Special Coordination Committee meeting convenes with a focus on how to assist Pakistan. (Summary of conclusions, "Special Coordination Committee Meeting," January 4, 1980)
January 10, 1980:
Presidential Directive (PD/NSC) 55 creates an intelligence special access program known as the Apex Program, which is designed to "control the nature, attributable collected information, and operational details of the most sensitive intelligence sources and methods, as determined by the Director of Central Intelligence." (Presidential Directive, PD/NSC 55, U.S. White House, "Intelligence Special Access Programs: Establishment of the Apex Program," Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd55.pdf)
January 10, 1980:
Pakistan receives its first shipment of Central Intelligence Agency arms authorized since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 472)
January 11, 1980:
A Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center memorandum discussing Nicaragua states that "[t]he Sandinistas have trained, advised, and probably armed revolutionaries in El Salvador." (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, "Nicaragua: Export of the Revolution - The First Six Months," January 11, 1980)
January 24, 1980:
The Special Coordination Committee meets to discuss a number of topics, including, briefly, Afghanistan. The committee points out that "[q]uestions have arisen about the duration of our sanctions on the USSR," and that "The SCC agreed that we should not lock ourselves into a specific deadline or a set of specific conditions upon which we would revise our present posture on grain sales, technology transfer or other policies relating to the USSR." (Summary of conclusions, "Special Coordination Committee Meeting," January 24, 1980)
January, 29, 1980:
With Canadian assistance, six Americans escape from Tehran in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Project Argo. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 464)
February 1, 1980:
At a mini-Special Coordination Committee meeting the focus is on Afghanistan and United States allies. The meeting discusses ways to get the allies to take more serious action. Some conclusions are that "Britain’s part in the Allied response would be principally composed of increased economic and security assistance to Pakistan," and "France should sell and partially finance advanced aircraft to Pakistan." (Summary of conclusions, "Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting," February 1, 1980)
February 15, 1980:
The Washington Post reports that Afghan rebels are receiving weapons from the U.S. (Washington Post, 2/15/80)
March 18, 1980:
A National Security Council meeting takes place. At the time of the meeting, "it was the President’s judgment the Soviets are going to stay in that country for at least a year," and "he thought they were making progress against the resistance." Moreover, Carter notes that "it was important to develop a definition ... of a neutralist Afghanistan and try to build world support for it along with a concomitant condemnation of the Soviet military occupation." (Minutes, "National Security Council Meeting," March 18, 1980)
March 24, 1980:
In a memo to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), James Dick discusses "Covert Action Review & Approval Procedures." He notes, "NSC staffers were unable to locate any record of either the adoption of the OAG [Operations Advisory Group-a Ford-era interagency covert operations unit] Guidelines by the SCC, or of a decision by the SCC to adopt new procedures," and says that "Paul Henze ... stated that the current procedure "has evolved" from the OAG system." Dick concludes "... many of the problems previously identified have not been permanently corrected. I recommend that the Board continue to monitor ... the covert action review and approval system." (Memorandum, James V. Dick to President’s Intelligence Oversight Board, March 24, 1980)
April 17, 1980:
A memo focused on Eastern Europe notes that "[o]ur most valuable instruments for communication with Eastern Europe and the USSR are the big radios," and emphasizes that "[n]ew investment for programming improvement is urgently needed. This has been strikingly demonstrated as we have taken up the question of broadcasting in Muslim languages, where Radio Liberty’s current level of performance is only a fraction of its potential." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, April 17, 1980)
April 21, 1980:
A National Security Council Policy Review Committee meeting discusses Pakistan. Stansfield Turner notes that "the critical question would be the extent of Soviet success in the coming months in sealing the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan." (Minutes, "Policy Review Committee Meeting," April 21, 1980)
April 24, 1980:
U.S. Delta forces initiate Operation "Eagle Claw", an attempt to free American hostages being held in Tehran. The mission fails after a helicopter collides with a refueling plane on the ground, killing eight U.S. servicemen. In the aftermath, Secretary of State Vance, who had opposed the mission, resigns. (Report of the Special Operations Review Group (the Holloway Report), August 23, 1980, pp. 9-10; New York Times, 1/13/02)
May 15, 1980:
A Special Coordination Committee meeting considers Afghanistan and Iran. Regarding Afghanistan, it "focused on ways to increase media attention on Soviet activities." One point, specifically, was that "VOA [Voice of America] will be instructed by State to increase their interviews with journalists who have been inside Afghanistan." (Summary of conclusions, "Special Coordination Committee Meeting," May 15, 1980)
July 17, 1980:
A Policy Review Committee meeting takes place regarding Pakistan. The focus is on Soviet moves inside Afghanistan and on Pakistan’s aid to Afghan insurgents. A move toward a more overt plan of assistance to Afghan insurgents is debated. (Minutes, "Policy Review Committee Meeting," July 17, 1980)
August 1, 1980:
An interagency meeting to discuss Poland takes place against the backdrop of growing strikes and political unrest in that country that are mainly the result of government price hikes on basic goods. In a summary, Peter Tarnoff particularly notes the need "[t]o ensure continued responsible broadcasting policy by RFE [Radio Free Europe], RL [Radio Liberty] and VOA [Voice of America] in order to avoid broadcasts which would inflame the situation inside Poland." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff Steve Larrabee to Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 8, 1980; memorandum, Department of State, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 7, 1980)
August 13, 1980:
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act is proposed, prohibiting "the unauthorized disclosure of information identifying certain United States intelligence officers, agents and sources of information and operational assistance." (Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Intelligence Identities Protection Act," August 13, 1980)
August 14, 1980:
A summary of the second annual report of the Nationalities Working Group is sent to Zbigniew Brzezinski. It highlights the work that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) do in regard to "nationalities," or non-Russian regions of the Soviet Union, and notes that VOA "has made modest increases in broadcasting in Uzbek and is soon inaugurating an Azerbaijani service," and that "RFE/RL have been able to make only extremely modest increases in broadcast time in non-Russian languages." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 14, 1980)
September 17, 1980:
The Intelligence Oversight Board continues to note defects in covert action review and approval procedures. (Memorandum, U.S. White House, James V. Dick to Intelligence Oversight Board, September 17, 1980)
Fall 1980:
President Carter approves a Central Intelligence Agency program that aims to send nearly $1 million to Nicaraguan groups that have anti-Sandinista stances. (Los Angeles Times, 3/3/85)
October 3, 1980:
President Carter meets with Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’s president. While discussing Soviet actions in Afghanistan, President Carter asks Zia, "What is your assessment of the effectiveness of resistance?" Zia responds: "Excellent. And they could do more." Zia also noted that "[i]t is in the interest of both Pakistan and the U.S. to support the freedom fighters." The remainder of the conversation centers on military aid and debt assistance to Pakistan. (Memorandum of conversation, U.S. White House, October 3, 1980)
October 29, 1980:
A Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center memorandum focusing on Cuban presence overseas explains that the "Cuban profile in Angola today is somewhat lower than it was in 1976," but, within "the past 15 months, the size of the Cuban presence in Latin America has risen dramatically. Virtually all of this increase, however, came in a single country - Nicaragua." (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, October 29, 1980)
November 15, 1980:
David Aaron, in a memo to the president, discusses Nicaragua’s new Sandinista leadership. In particular, Aaron cites Secretary of State Edmund Muskie in connection with a possible coup. Muskie’s "bottom line is that the coup plot is not in our interest and should be opposed." However, Aaron notes "this judgment and others in the memo are not shared by the Secretary of Defense or Dr. Brzezinski." (Memorandum, National Security Council, David Aaron to Jimmy Carter, November 15, 1980)
December 7, 1980:
Poland is the focus of a National Security Council meeting, where the possibility of a Soviet invasion is discussed at length. Four days earlier, President Carter sent a hotline message to Kremlin leader Leonid Brezhnev warning of negative consequences to U.S.-Soviet relations if Soviet forces invade Poland. At the time the CIA is receiving intelligence from Col. Ryszard Kuklinski inside the Polish General Staff that indicates an invasion might be imminent. (Summary of conclusions, "National Security Council Meeting," December 7, 1980; Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), p. xxxiv)
January 20, 1981:
Ronald Reagan is inaugurated as president of the United States.
January 21, 1981:
The first National Security Council meeting of the Reagan presidency takes place, with Libya and Iran being the center of the discussion. (Washington Post, 2/20/87)
January 28, 1981:
William J. Casey assumes the role of director of central intelligence (DCI). (Report, Central Intelligence Agency, "Fact Book on Intelligence," September 1987, Digital National Security Archive (ProQuest), http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CIP00015, p.8)
March 1981:
Through a Presidential Finding, Ronald Reagan authorizes continued covert action against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the continued support of Afghan Mujahedeen. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 475)
Mid February - March 1981:
The Reagan administration decides to officially end most U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua. (Christopher Dickey, With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), p. 106; John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 512)
March 1981:
In a proposal to Ronald Reagan regarding Afghanistan, Director of Central Intelligence Casey suggests that the Central Intelligence Agency could improve the clandestine assistance pipeline. (Miami Herald, 6/5/83)
March 1981:
The Central Intelligence Agency initiates plans to boost covert activities against the Soviet bloc in connection with the Polish crisis, though actual increases reportedly do not occur until after the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981. (Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), p. xxxvii)
Early March, 1981:
Mozambique expels four American diplomats, with Cuba allegedly being involved. Reagan’s National Security Council staff explore ways to retaliate. (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Roger Fontaine to Richard V. Allen, March 6, 1981; memorandum, National Security Council staff, Fred Wettering to Janet Colson et al., March 1981)
March 9, 1981:
President Reagan signs a Presidential Finding aimed at preventing Nicaragua from sending arms to guerrillas in El Salvador. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 508)
Summer 1981:
There are approximately 45,000 Mujahedeen rebel fighters in Afghanistan. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 476)
May 18, 1981:
A National Security Council memo notes that Soviet military equipment, including tanks and artillery, has arrived in Nicaragua from Cuba. It suggests that although "not of the same order as the Cuban missiles [in the 1962 crisis], the opportunity is present to make a public case for the kind of threat for which SecState is taking so much flack." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Robert Schweitzer et al. to Richard V. Allen, May 18, 1981)
May 20, 1981:
National Security Adviser Richard Allen, in a memo to White House Counsel Edwin Meese regarding an upcoming National Security Council meeting on May 22, asks for approval to discuss a variety of topics, including the development of a policy toward Libya. The memo notes that "Libya has become a strategic threat to the U.S. interests both in the Middle East and Africa. A policy is needed which will bring about a basic reorientation of these Libyan policies and attitudes which are harmful to the United States interests." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Richard V. Allen to Ed Meese, May 20, 1981)
August 4, 1981:
President Reagan is asked to approve intensified "pressure on Soviets in Afghanistan." (Memorandum, National Security Council, Richard V. Allen to the Ronald Reagan, August 4, 1981)
August 19, 1981:
A State Department cable notes that Samora Machel, the president of Mozambique, has become openly critical of the United States. (Cable, U.S. Embassy, Mozambique to Department of State, August 19, 1981)
Early - Mid October 1981:
The State Department comments on a proposed meeting with Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi. (Cable, State Department to U.S. Consulate General, Cape Town, October 2, 1981; cable, U.S. Consulate General, Cape Town to Department of State, October 15, 1981)
November - December, 1981:
Duane Clarridge, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Latin American operations division, develops a plan for assisting the Nicaraguan rebels. The arrangement, which was to have the agency - with the help of Argentine trainers - recruit and train 500 rebels, is taken to the National Security Council. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 511)
November 10, 1981:
A highly important National Security Council meeting discusses measures with regard to Central America and Cuba. Nicaragua, in particular, is debated. United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick is emphatic that the Central American situation is deteriorating, and states that the U.S. should "focus on El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala in that order," suggesting that "we can use covert action. We can employ proxy forces." A little later, Director of Central Intelligence Casey "reiterated the principal target is Nicaragua." The discussion continues to focus on actions against Nicaragua. Eventually, the president, citing expected problems from the press, Congress, and public opinion in regards to action against Nicaragua, asks, "Are there other things we can do? Can covert actions be traced back to us?" Edwin Meese, a little farther on, notes that "As for Nicaragua, we can do political, military, propaganda/covert actions that do not require U.S. forces." Immediately after Meese, Vice President George Bush asks "if we could mine Nicaraguan east coast ports." Richard Allen responds, "yes, but other shipping [is] involved." After a few other statements, the president "asks to hear more (at the next meeting) about various alternatives including mining," and would come to ask "what other covert actions could be taken that would be truly disabling." (Minutes, National Security Council, "Strategy toward Cuba and Central America," November 10, 1981)
November 23, 1981:
President Reagan approves, in principle, what will become National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 17. This directive permits the Central Intelligence Agency to develop an expansive program to oppose the Nicaraguan government. Other secret aspects of the plan are covered by a Presidential Finding. (Washington Post, 5/8/83; John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 511)
December 1, 1981:
Ronald Reagan meets with Mobutu Sese Seko, the president of Zaire. Mobutu asks for the United States’ assistance "in training security experts and obtaining equipment to monitor the activities of these communist diplomats" from East Germany and Cuba. (Memorandum of conversation, National Security Council staff, "Summary of President’s Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire," December 1, 1981)
December 4, 1981:
President Reagan issues Executive Order 12333 to govern the intelligence community in place of a charter. In some respects, this order expands the definition of covert action, which it terms "special activities," and it specifically provides that, except in time of war or by presidential direction, the CIA has full responsibility for "special activities." (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 496; U.S. White House, "Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981: United States Intelligence Activities," December 4, 1981, Digital National Security Archive, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CIC00042)
December 8, 1981:
A National Security Council meeting convenes to discuss Libya. Actions are considered, including a démarche and a withdrawal of American citizens from the country. (Minutes, "National Security Council Meeting," December 8, 1981)
December 9, 1981:
Senators and congressmen send letters to President Reagan strongly urging him to meet with Jonas Savimbi. (Letter, Senator Roger W. Jepsen et al. to Ronald Reagan, December 9, 1981; Letter, Newt Gingrich et al. to Ronald Reagan, c. December 9, 1981)
December 10, 1981:
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 16 creates a Libya Task Force to "coordinate and implement decisions on Libyan policy." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Donald R. Fortier et al. to Robert C. McFarlane, "The Qadhafi Problem," February 15, 1985)
Mid-December 1981:
The Central Intelligence Agency starts to operate a unit in Honduras which provides training and arms to conduct raids into Nicaragua. (Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), p.23)
December 29, 1981:
President Reagan signs an appropriations bill providing $19 million for the Nicaraguan rebel force that will become known as the Contras. (Nina Serafino, Contra Aid: Summary and Chronology of Major Congressional Action, 1981-1989 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 11, 1989), p. 5)
Early 1982:
The first Central Intelligence Agency arms shipments are sent to the Contras. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 513)
January 4, 1982:
President Reagan issues National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 17. Noting that it is the policy of the United States to ensure that Nicaragua and Cuba do not interfere in Central America by sending arms or troops, the order specifically provides that to implement this policy the U.S. will "support democratic forces in Nicaragua" and "provide military training for indigenous units and leaders both in and out of the country." (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 17, U.S. White House, "National Security Decision Directive on Cuba and Central America," January 4, 1982)
January 21, 1982:
A National Security Council meeting updates steps President Reagan ordered towards Libya on December 8. Other measures are also considered, and the group discusses an Executive Order drafted by the Treasury Department "to implement an embargo of imports and/or exports." The subject of Qaddafi’s hit squads is discussed. Toward the end of the meeting, the President notes "that he now lean[s] toward sterner measures to address the Libyan threat." (Minutes, "National Security Council Meeting," January 21, 1982)
February 10, 1982:
The National Security Council deliberates an overarching policy for the Caribbean Basin. The national security adviser, Judge William P. Clark, "opened the meeting by observing that after a year’s work, we have reached a plateau where we can consider a comprehensive political, economic, and security policy for the region." (Minutes, National Security Council, "The Caribbean Basin," February 10, 1982)
February 18, 1982:
During a news conference in the White House, President Reagan offers no comment when asked "do you approve or reject -- or do you care to state what your policy is as far as having American covert operations to destabilize any existing government without specific reference to Nicaragua?" (Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, 1982, bk. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 182)
March 1982:
The covert operation in Nicaragua is brought out into the open as it begins to receive coverage in major newspapers in the U.S. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 515)
April 9, 1982:
The U.S. proposes an eight-point peace plan to Nicaragua. The plan makes explicit that Nicaragua must become "democratic" as a condition for normalization of relations. Ambassador Anthony Quainton notes that "the first free elections in the country would be essential elements of the political context of future relations." (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs: Chronology, 1978-1989 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1990), p. 149; Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy: The Making of U.S. Policy in Nicaragua, 1981-1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), p. 95)
April 22, 1982:
A State Department cable summarizes a meeting between South African Prime Minister Botha and American Ambassador Herman Nickel. It notes that "In his first 45-minute meeting with . . . Nickel, Prime Minister Botha expressed his strong interest in persuading Jonas Savimbi to allow reopening the Benguela Railroad in return for Cuban withdrawal to Northern Angola." (Cable, U.S. Consulate General, Cape Town to Department of State, April 22, 1982)
May 28, 1982:
National Security Decision Directives 37 and 37A are approved. These contain guidelines for Cuba and Central America. NSDD 37 affirms that NSDD 17 is "to be fully and consistently implemented," with substantial "FMS [Foreign Military Sales] cash sales to Guatemala . . . authorized." (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 37A, U.S. White House, May 28, 1982; National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 37, U.S. White House, May 28, 1982)
June 23, 1982:
Ronald Reagan signs the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 into law. The act, debated in Congress since 1980, makes it illegal to reveal the identity of Central Intelligence Agency covert operatives. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 145-146)
July 15, 1982:
President Reagan approves National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 45 on international broadcasting, reiterating that the radios are a vital tool for United States’ national security policy. It mandates that Radio Free Europe begin a lengthy initiative to expand and modernize Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) and lays groundwork for an anti-Cuban broadcast operation, Radio Martí. (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 45, U.S. White House, "U.S. International Broadcasting," http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-045.htm)
August 20, 1982:
Central Intelligence Agency deputy director John McMahon circulates an assessment of the situation in Namibia, noting that "The pace of the Namibian talks has quickened recently." However, "Pretoria’s demand that a settlement be linked to withdrawal of Cubans from Angola poses a formidable obstacle." The analysis emphasizes that the "critical issue is whether the Angolan regime is willing or able to send a sufficient number of Cubans home and in a manner that satisfies Pretoria’s demand that Cuban forces be withdrawn." The report observes that a "Namibian settlement that included the withdrawal of substantial numbers of Cuban troops would be widely viewed as a major success for [U.S.] policy toward southern Africa." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, John N. McMahon to William P. Clark, August 20, 1982)
September 9, 1982:
State Department executive secretary Paul Bremer, in a memo to William P. Clark, notes that U.S. policy toward Mozambique is being reassessed because the country appears to be opening up more to the West. (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, L. Paul Bremer to William P. Clark, September 9, 1982)
November 3, 1982:
Duane Clarridge, Central Intelligence Agency task force chief for the Contra operation, briefs the National Security Council on Central America. (Minutes, National Security Council, November 3, 1982)
December 13, 1982:
An opening round of discussions takes place between Mozambique’s president Samora Machel and American negotiators in Maputo. (Cable, Department of State to White House Situation Room, December 14, 1982; U.S. Embassy, Mozambique to Department of State, December 14, 1982)
December 21, 1982:
The first Boland Amendment passes Congress, banning the Central Intelligence Agency from activities designed to destabilize the Nicaraguan government. (Washington Post, 5/8/83)
January 14, 1983:
President Reagan issues National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77, stipulating the creation of an "International Broadcasting Committee" that will be in charge of the "planning and coordination of international broadcasting activities sponsored by the U.S. Government." (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 77, U.S. White House, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-077.htm)
February 19, 1983:
A State Department cable notes the issue of "South Africa downgrad[ing] talks with Angolans and terminat[ing] dialogue with Mozambique." (Cable, Department of State to White House Situation Room and U.S. Consulate General, Cape Town, February 19, 1983)
February 24, 1983:
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 82 is approved. This provides for measures in El Salvador and briefly touches on Nicaragua. It mandates the creation of a Central America Working Group. (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 82, U.S. White House, "U.S. Policy Initiatives to Improve Prospects for Victory in El Salvador," February 24, 1983)
March 10, 1983:
The U.S. estimates there are between 1,500 and 2,000 Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua. (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, "Cuban Presence in Nicaragua," March 10, 1983)
March 24, 1983:
A State Department update from Paul Bremer to William P. Clark notes that a meeting with "Angolan Interior Minister Rodrigues Kito in Paris last week may have moved us a step closer to an understanding on Cuban troop withdrawal." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, L. Paul Bremer to William P. Clark, March 24, 1983)
April 1983:
A covert attempt by Libya to send arms to Nicaragua is stopped. The Central Intelligence Agency later notes this fact without explaining what role the agency may have had in the failed shipment. (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, "Libyan Troublemaking-1979-1984," September 5, 1984)
April 5, 1983:
A Department of State cable notes that the U.S. country team in Nicaragua sees the country as becomingly increasingly anti-American. It "recommends that urgent consideration be given to a substantial modification in our economic relationship." (Cable, U.S. Embassy, Nicaragua to Department of State, April 5, 1983)
April 8, 1983:
At a National Security Planning Group meeting, U.S. policy toward Poland is discussed. (Minutes, "National Security Planning Group Meeting," April 8, 1983)
April 14, 1983:
President Reagan publicly acknowledges American clandestine assistance to the Contras. (Washington Post, 4/15/83)
April 27, 1983:
Bill H.R. 2760 is introduced in the House of Representatives. Its goal is to "amend the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1983 to prohibit United States support for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and to authorize assistance, to be openly provided to governments of countries in Central America, to interdict the supply of military equipment from Nicaragua and Cuba to individuals, groups, organizations, or movements seeking to overthrow governments of countries in Central America." (H.R. 2760, "Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY83," 98th Cong. (1983))
April 30, 1983:
A House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report notes that "covert assistance to interrupt the clandestine flow of arms and other support between countries of the region is essential [...] to give the President additional leverage in bringing about negotiations between Nicaragua and its neighbors." (Report, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Title VIII - Special Oversight of Intelligence Activities in Central America," April 30, 1983)
May 4, 1983:
Support for the Afghan Mujahedeen is increased by the Reagan administration. (New York Times, 5/4/83)
May 19, 1983:
Hearing that a new Presidential Finding for Nicaragua may be under development, Ambassador John Negroponte recommends that support for the Contras be continued. (John D. Negroponte to William J. Casey et al., "Project in Nicaragua," May 19, 1983)
Summer 1983:
The Central Intelligence Agency leases a vessel to be utilized as a mother ship in harbor mining operations against Nicaragua. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 527)
June 6, 1983:
George Shultz, updating the president on South Africa negotiations, states that "[t]he pace of our southern African negotiation is increasing and I anticipate important developments in the weeks ahead." He notes that "[w]e understand the debate within Angola’s leadership has been sharp but the Angolans appear to have decided to cooperate with us and as a result they have begun talks with the Soviets and Cubans." (Memorandum, Department of State, George P. Schultz to Ronald Reagan, June 6, 1983)
June 25, 1983:
Central Intelligence Agency director William Casey, in a letter to President Reagan emphasizes that "We are losing Central America." Casey suggests that the United States has only "four assets to work with," those being the United States’ efforts to "improve El Salvador’s ability to defeat ... insurgency," ensure that the Contras are "relieved of the fear that we will pull the rug out from under them," understand that Honduras is a "fulcrum," and "keep additional Cuban military and security forces out of Nicaragua." (Letter, William J. Casey to Ronald Reagan, June 25, 1983)
July 28, 1983:
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 100 specifies that "U.S. support must also be provided to the democratic resistance forces within Nicaragua in an effort to ensure that [it] ceases to be a Soviet/Cuban base." (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 100, U.S. White House, "Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance for the Central American Region," July 28, 1983)
Fall 1983:
Central Intelligence Agency-coordinated attacks against Nicaraguan targets begin, including the mining of Nicaraguan ports. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 528)
September 14, 1983:
A Central Intelligence Agency memorandum notes that "President Zia ul-Haq is coping successfully with the current disturbances in Pakistan - the most serious threat to his rule so far." (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for President Zia," September 14, 1983)
October 10, 1983:
The Nicaraguan port city of Corinto, located on the Pacific Coast, is attacked by Central Intelligence Agency-led raiders. This is the first utilization of the mother ship (see Summer 1983 entry). (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 528)
October 17, 1983:
William P. Clark leaves his position as assistant to the president for national security affairs, with Robert McFarlane taking his place. (U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition; and House. Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair. Appendix: Chronology of Events, November 1987. 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1988, p. 4)
November 1983:
A Central Intelligence Agency report on Central America notes that "Sandinista concern over a possible invasion has reached a near panic level in the aftermath of [U.S.] actions in Grenada." (Report, Central Intelligence Agency, "Central American Monthly Report #4," November 1983)
December 2, 1983:
The National Security Council considers export controls directed at Libya. William Casey, taking a hard line, suggests "the time ha[s] come for a complete Libyan embargo." (Minutes, National Security Council, "Libya and Oil and Gas Export Control Issues," December 2, 1983)
December 27, 1983:
Marking the fourth anniversary of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, President Reagan issues a statement declaring, "Islamic fighters in a faraway land have given new meaning to the words ‘courage,’ ‘determination,’ and ‘strength.’ They have set the standard for those who value freedom and independence everywhere in the world." Reagan further explains that "Afghanistan's freedom fighters-the resistance or mujahidin-represent an indigenous movement that has swept through their mountainous land and challenged a foreign military power threatening their religion and their very way of life." (Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1983, bk. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 1750)
January 6, 1984:
A National Security Planning Group meeting authorizes intensifying pressure on Nicaragua. (U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition; and House. Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, November 1987. 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 36)
January 8, 1984:
At Montelimar, Nicaragua, utilizing both helicopters and assault craft from the mother ship, the Central Intelligence Agency strikes the Sandinistas. The strike unit comprises agency "unilaterally controlled Latino assets." The Sandinistas defend only with local forces. The attack causes significant damage at the port. (Wall Street Journal, 3/5/1985)
January 23, 1984:
The Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, which exempts "certain CIA operational files from being searched in response to requests received by CIA under the Freedom of Information Act," is made law. Operational files include files from the CIA’s Directorate for Science and Technology, Directorate of Operations, and the Office of Personnel Security. (Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: The U.S. Experience," October 1994, p. 22; The CIA Information Act of 1984,50 U.S.C. Title VII (1984), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20030505/cia.htm; and http://www.foia.cia.gov/CIAinfoact1984.asp)
January 31, 1984:
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) holds a hearing to discuss the Central American Finding. The Central Intelligence Agency’s deputy director for operations, John Stein, and its Latin America division chief, Duane Clarridge, attend. Clarridge notes that "our instructions are to maintain pressure on the Nicaraguan regime." (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, "House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) Hearing on the Central American Finding," January 31, 1984)
February 19, 1984:
William Casey and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia meet after the king sees President Reagan and Robert McFarlane. Casey reportedly asks the king to help finance the Angolan and Nicaraguan rebels. (San Francisco Examiner, 10/20/86)
Late February 1984:
Eight mines are distributed in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto and four are laid at the port of El Bluff, both actions by Central Intelligence Agency-controlled assets. (Wall Street Journal, 3/6/85)
April 6, 1984:
The Wall Street Journal reports that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in the Nicaraguan port minings. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 291; Wall Street Journal, 4/6/84)
April 9, 1984:
In an effort to end the United States’ support for the Contras and find a way to end the mining, Nicaragua looks to the International Court of Justice, filing suit against the United States. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 534; memorandum, Department of State, Charles Hill to Robert C. McFarlane, April 12, 1984)
June, 1984:
Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi threatens "to "export terrorism" to the U.S. in retaliation for alleged Central Intelligence Agency support for an attack on his headquarters by Libyan dissidents a month earlier. (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, "Libyan Troublemaking-1979-1984," September 5, 1984)
June 25, 1984:
The National Security Planning Group meets to discuss Central America. William Casey notes, in regard to Nicaragua, "[i]f we notify the oversight committees, we can provide direct assistance to help the FDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Force] get the money they need from third countries. There will be some criticism, but senior members of the oversight committees recognize that we need to do this." During the meeting, President Reagan says "Contra funding is like the MX spending. It is what will keep the pressure on Nicaragua." Secretary of State George Shultz notes that soliciting third-country aid might an impeachable offense. (Minutes, "National Security Planning Group Meeting," June 25, 1984)
July 20, 1984:
A Central Intelligence Agency memorandum notes that "Pakistan in the next year faces potentially serious threats to its security from the Soviets in Afghanistan and India. Islamabad’s support for the Afghan resistance has increased the risk of a tougher Soviet policy toward Pakistan." (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Challenges in the Next Year," July 20, 1984)
August 1984:
The Costa Rican government permits the U.S. to build a radio station to transmit anti-Sandinista broadcasts into Nicaragua and Costa Rica. (Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), p. 130)
Early September, 1984:
A helicopter crashes in Nicaragua, killing two Americans who were part of the Civilian Military Assistance (CMA) group. The situation is examined by the Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency to discern whether there is U.S. government involvement. (Memorandum and attachment, Department of State, Charles Hill to Robert C. McFarlane, September 6, 1984; Memorandum, National Security Council, "FDN Air Attack of 1 September," September 2, 1984, Digital National Security Archive, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CIC00557)
September 17, 1984:
National Security Council staff deputy Bob Kimmitt forwards a paper by staffer Fred Wettering to senior officials. Wettering’s paper, "An Assessment of Administration Strategies in Africa, 1981-84" concludes that "Over the past 3 ½ years we have developed a coherent, six-part strategy to Africa, have made a sincere effort to implement it, and have seen it bear positive results. The strategy remains valid, but needs to be more tightly and more comprehensively applied, and daily vigilance is required to counter regular efforts at backsliding from various agencies." (Note, National Security Council staff, Bob Kimmitt to William P. Clark and Jeane Kirkpatrick, September 17, 1984; paper, National Security Council staff, "An Assessment of Administration Strategies in Africa, 1981-84," c. September 1984)
September 23, 1984:
President Reagan meets with Zaire’s President Mobutu in New York. Mobutu covers various economic and political issues, and Reagan "respond[s] by stating that Ambassador Kirkpatrick had kept him well informed on Zaire’s strong support in the Security Council and General Assembly." Reagan also notes "that he has raised our bilateral assistance this year over last and had asked Congress for an increase for next year." (Memorandum of conversation, National Security Council staff, "Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire," September 23, 1984)
October 12, 1984:
The Boland II Amendment becomes law. It bans the Central Intelligence Agency from using its funds to assist the Contras. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 292)
Late 1984:
The Senate passes a sense-of-the-Senate resolution that urges the administration to give the Mujahedeen better equipment. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 484)
December 6, 1984:
National Security Council staff aides Oliver North, Raymond Burghardt, and Donald Fortier, in a memo to John Poindexter, attach a draft of their "strategy paper on Central America." The strategy contains three phases, which would bring about a favorable outcome for the U.S. in Nicaragua. The paper notes that "Intelligence, both tactical and strategic, will continue to improve. (The FDN will receive U.S. intelligence support.)." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Oliver L. North et al. to John M. Poindexter, December 6, 1984)
At an National Security Planning Group meeting, the feasibility of creating Radio Martí to broadcast to Cuba is discussed. (Minutes, National Security Council, "National Security Planning Group Meeting," December 14, 1984)
Spring 1985:
Director of Central Intelligence Casey, who has been disputing "the notification process for covert action" with the congressional intelligence oversight committees, eventually "propose[s] to both committees new procedures to govern the notification process." (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 62)
January 18, 1985:
President Reagan approves National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)159, revising "procedures for the planning, approval, and coordination of covert action." ( National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 159, U.S. White House, "Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination Procedures," January 18, 1985, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-159.pdf)
February 15, 1985:
A National Security Council memo to Robert McFarlane provides an overview of how the U.S. has reacted to Muammar Qaddafi. The paper suggests "[i]mmediate steps should be taken to enhance political and military intelligence collection on Libya." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Donald R. Fortier et al. to Robert C. McFarlane, "The Qadhafi Problem," February 15, 1985)
February 16, 1985:
President Reagan, in a radio address, explains that the "true heroes of the Nicaraguan struggle-non-Communist, democracy-loving revolutionaries-saw their revolution betrayed and took up arms against the betrayer. These men and women are today the democratic resistance fighters some call the contras. We should call them freedom fighters." Reagan goes on to assert that "[t]here are over 15,000 freedom fighters struggling for liberty and democracy in Nicaragua and helping to stem subversion in El Salvador." (Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1985, bk. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 173)
March 1, 1985:
Ronald Reagan, referring to the Contras in a speech, maintains they are "the moral equal of our founding fathers and the brave men and women of the French resistance." (New York Times, 3/2/85)
March 27, 1985:
National Security Decision Directive(NSDD) 166 focuses on Afghanistan. Two points, among others, are to "[i]mprove the intelligence support to our covert action program," and "[i]mprove the military effectiveness of the Afghan resistance." Under this authority the Central Intelligence Agency provides sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles to the resistance. (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 166, U.S. White House, "U.S. Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan," March 27, 1985)
April 4, 1985:
President Reagan meets with Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz Sr., and Alfonso Robelo, who are key Contra leaders. (Memorandum, National Security Council, Robert C. McFarlane, "Meeting with the Nicaraguan Resistance Leaders," April 4, 1985)
April 16, 1985:
Stansfield Turner, while providing testimony to a House subcommittee, emphasizes that Contra actions could be considered "as terrorism, as state-supported terrorism." (Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), p. 40)
May 1, 1985:
The United States institutes a complete trade embargo against Nicaragua. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 545; Washington Post, 5/2/85)
May 1985:
A Central Intelligence Agency assessment notes that "[m]ore than five years after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they are bogged down in a guerrilla war of increasing intensity. The Soviets have had little success in reducing the insurgency or winning acceptance by the Afghan people." (Intelligence assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After," May 1985)
July 26, 1985:
A National Security Council meeting considers South Africa. Current issues in the region as a whole are discussed. President Reagan ends the meeting by emphasizing that "we must continue to seek the end of apartheid, but through gradualism in the political process." (Minutes, "National Security Council Meeting," July 26, 1985)
Late August 1985:
Towards the end of August, in his first direct participation in the covert U.S. initiative on Iran, Oliver North is tasked to create "contingency plans for extracting hostages ... from Lebanon." He is given a passport under an alias on August 30, so that he can travel to Europe to work on the initiative. (United States. President’s Special Review Board. Report of the President’s Special Review Board [Tower Commission Report] (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 26, 1987), p. B-25; U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition; and House. Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, November 1987. 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 168)
August 29, 1985:
The Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) is created by Executive Order 12530. It becomes a vehicle for ferrying lethal aid to the Contras under Oliver North. (Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), pp. 198-199)
September 16, 1985:
A bill is signed into law that will give the Contras "$27 million in humanitarian aid." (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 292)
October 28, 1985:
With Executive Order 12537, Ronald Reagan re-establishes the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. (Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, 1985, bk. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 1302-1303)
December 6, 1985:
Oliver North tells Israeli officials that, in order to assist the Contras, he is going to divert money made from selling weapons to Iran. (U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition; and House. Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, November 1987. 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 270)
December 27, 1985:
Terrorist attacks are carried out against El Al Airlines ticket counters at both the Rome and Vienna airports. (Cable, U.S. Embassy, Austria to Department of State, December 27, 1985; Cable, U.S. Embassy, Italy to Department of State, December 27, 1985)
December 28, 1985:
Regarding the recent terrorist attacks, National Security Council staff aide Donald Fortier notes in a memo to the president that while "hard evidence is lacking, there is a strong consensus in the intelligence community that these acts were conducted by Abu Nidal terrorists or by an appendage of the Abu Nidal group. There is also clear evidence that Abu Nidal receives financial and operational support from Libya." (Memorandum, National Security Council staff, Donald Fortier to Ronald Reagan, December 28, 1985)
1986:
The Central Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism Center is established. (Baltimore Sun, 3/12/89)
January 3, 1986:
The Crisis Pre-planning Group (CPPG) meets to discuss Libya. Leaks regarding possible military action against Libya are discussed, as well as how to engage European allies in responding to the evolving situation. (Minutes, National Security Council Crisis Pre-planning Group, "Meeting on Libya," January 3, 1986)
January 8, 1986:
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 205 sets out how the United States will react to Libyan terrorism. President Reagan states "I have determined that the policies and actions in support of international terrorism by the Government of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States." The directive calls for a trade embargo. The annex orders an additional carrier group sent to the Mediterranean. (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 205, "Acting against Libyan Support of International Terrorism," January 8, 1986; National Security Decision Directive annex, "Acting against Libyan Support of International Terrorism," January 8, 1986)
February 27, 1986:
Secretary of State Shultz, in a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, notes that "the United States must support the Nicaraguan resistance, so as to sustain pressure on the Sandinistas to accept meaningful negotiations toward a workable Contadora agreement. Why would the Sandinistas negotiate if there were no armed resistance?" (Report, Department of State, "Nicaragua: Will Democracy Prevail?," February 27, 1986)
March, 1986:
UNITA and Jonas Savimbi start to receive military assistance from the Reagan administration. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 503)
March 14, 1986:
A National Security Planning Group meeting reviews upcoming Freedom of Navigation exercises to be conducted off the Libyan coast as cover for an aerial retaliation. (Memorandum, "Meeting with The National Security Planning Group," March 14, 1986)
March 20, 1986:
Ronald Reagan, in a letter to Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte, explains that "Sandinista repression and external subversion, can only be [ended] if the Nicaraguan resistance is able to apply pressure on the Sandinistas." (Letter, U.S. White House, Ronald Reagan to Jose Napoleon Duarte, March 20, 1986)
March 24, 1986:
Freedom of Navigation exercises begin off the Libyan coast. (Chronology, National Security Council staff, "Libyan Strike Timetable," April 17, 1986)
April 14, 1986:
Ronald Reagan addresses the country in regard to air strikes launched against Libya earlier in the day. Describing the action as taken in retaliation for terrorist acts by Muammar Qaddafi, the president reveals U.S.-launched attacks "against the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Mu'ammar Qadhafi's subversive activities." (Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1986, bk. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 468-469)
May 16, 1986:
Central America is the subject of a National Security Planning Group meeting. The main issues are money for the Contras, plus the Contadora negotiations. (Minutes, "National Security Planning Group Meeting," May 16, 1986)
May 20, 1986:
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 225 reaffirms United States policy toward Nicaragua. (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 225, "Central America: U.S. Policy on the Search for a Negotiated Solution," May 20, 1986)
June 27, 1986:
Nicaragua wins its case against the United States in the International Court of Justice. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 534)
July 1986:
The first Mujahedeen trained by Pakistani intelligence to use Stinger missiles take the field. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 488)
August 14, 1986:
The National Security Planning Group discusses the actions taken against Libya thus far. There is consensus that those have worked well. How to move forward is then considered. National Security Advisor John Poindexter concludes by summarizing, "we will be ready to respond with military action if we determine that Libya is behind a terrorist attack against U.S. interests. At the same time we will pursue a multi-faceted strategy designed to intensify the pressures on Qadhafi." (Memorandum of conversation, "NSPG on Libya," August 14, 1986)
September 26, 1986:
Stinger missiles fired by Central Intelligence Agency-backed Afghan partisans shoot down a first Soviet aircraft (Reader’s Digest, 12/88)
October 3, 1986:
At a National Security Council meeting, the main topic is South Asia. The discussion touches briefly on Afghanistan, and William Casey notes that "the war in Afghanistan [is] going well." Casey proceeds to say the "air war ha[s] escalated and the Stingers ha[ve] given the Resistance a capability against Soviet aircraft." (Minutes, "National Security Council Meeting," October 3, 1986)
October 5, 1986:
While flying an arms shipment to the Contras, a Southern Air Transport-connected plane is shot down in Nicaragua. The only survivor, American ex-Marine Eugene Hasenfus, is alleged to be carrying out operations for the Central Intelligence Agency. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 294)
November 3, 1986:
Lebanese news magazine Al Shiraa reports that the United States is selling weapons to Iran with the goal of securing the release of U.S. hostages. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 64)
November 12, 1986:
John Poindexter and William Casey provide testimony to the congressional intelligence committees regarding U.S arms sales to Iran. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 64)
November 21, 1986:
Department of Justice investigators discover one of Oliver North’s memos endorsing diversion of Iranian arms sale funds to the Contras. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 558)
November 26, 1986:
Director Casey instructs the Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General to probe the agency’s participation in the Iran-Contra affair. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 64)
December 1, 1986:
President Reagan creates the Tower Commission to investigate National Security Council staff involvement in the Iran-Contra affair. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 64)
Early 1987:
The Central Intelligence Agency begins a relationship with Julio Roberto Alpírez, a Guatemalan military officer and chief of a presidentially-controlled intelligence unit. The CIA hopes to obtain inside information on Guatemalan strategy and operations. (Report of investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "Guatemala Volume III: CIA Relationship with Julio Roberto Alpírez," July 15, 1995)
February 20, 1987:
The National Security Planning Group considers Central America, primarily the situation in Nicaragua. Officials compare the Vietnam conflict with the situation in Nicaragua. Towards the end of the meeting President Reagan declares that "[t]here is a difference between Vietnam and Central America. In Vietnam, we did not intend to win. We intend to win this one." (Minutes, "National Security Planning Group Meeting," February 20, 1987)
February 27, 1987:
In National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 264 President Reagan orders further action taken against Nicaragua, in particular significant support for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 264, U.S. White House, "Central America," February 27, 1987)
April 1987:
Central Intelligence Agency-backed Afghans launch attacks into Soviet-controlled territory. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 489)
May 5, 1987:
Congress begins several weeks of nationally televised hearings on the Iran-Contra affair. (Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993), p. 408)
May 7, 1987:
Two National Security Decision Directives are approved the same day. NSDD 272 concerns Southern Africa. It mandates the "reduction and elimination (to the greatest possible extent) of Soviet and Cuban military presence, access, and influence in Angola and elsewhere in the southern African region." NSDD 274 concentrates on U.S. policy in Angola. (National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 274, U.S. White House, "United States Policy toward Angola," May 7, 1987; National Security Decision Directive, NSDD 272, U.S. White House, "United States Objectives in Southern Africa," May 7, 1987)
May 26, 1987:
William Webster assumes the role of director of central intelligence (DCI). (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 313)
August 12, 1987:
While addressing the nation on the Iran-Contra affair, President Reagan declares he is "adopting new, tighter procedures on consulting with and notifying the Congress on future covert action findings. We will still pursue covert operations when appropriate, but each operation must be legal, and it must meet a specific policy objective." (Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1987, bk. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989, p. 942-945)
September 20, 1987:
A Central Intelligence Agency report on the Soviets in Afghanistan concludes that "Moscow is clearly probing for a way to establish a stable government in Kabul and to bring Soviets troops home." (Intelligence report, Central Intelligence Agency, "Moscow’s Afghan Quagmire: No End in Sight After Eight Years," September 20, 1987)
November 1987:
A Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence research paper argues that "Western broadcasting has had and will continue to have a profound long-range impact on the attitudes of the Soviet population." (Research paper, Central Intelligence Agency, "Gorbachev and the Problem of Western Radiobroadcasting into the USSR," November 1987)
March 1988:
A Central Intelligence Agency Special National Intelligence Estimate emphasizes that the Soviet Union will ends its occupation of Afghanistan. (Special National Intelligence Estimate, Central Intelligence Agency, "USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan," March 1988)
March 1988:
The Contras turn back a Sandinista offensive in the last major battle of the Nicaraguan covert operation. Congressional rejection of the latest Central Intelligence Agency budget request leads to termination of the project. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 571)
April 14, 1988:
Negotiations in Geneva are completed, and an accord reached there paves the way for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The accords set out four basic points: Afghanistan and Pakistan will not intervene or interfere, all Afghan refugees in Pakistan can return home, the Soviet Union and the U.S. will halt their activities, and the Soviet Union will complete the withdrawal of its troops. (New York Times, 4/15/88)
January 20, 1989:
George H.W. Bush is inaugurated as president of the United States.
February 1989:
President Bush issues National Security Directive (NSD) 1, creating a Policy Coordination Committee for Intelligence. (Washington Post, 2/3/89)
February 15, 1989:
The last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan. (New York Times, 2/16/89)
February 28, 1989:
Richard Kerr, during nomination hearings for deputy director of central intelligence, says "I believe that establishment of Intelligence Committees to oversee the activities of CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community has been a necessary and a positive development," and he comments that in "my experience with and perspective on covert action, I am convinced there is one key ingredient for the success of any covert action program and that is bipartisan support in Congress. To obtain such support, it is necessary to keep Intelligence Committees fully and currently informed on such activities." (Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Nomination of Richard J. Kerr," February 28, 1989, p. 45-46)
May 2, 1989:
While speaking to the Council of the Americas, the president notes that "Nicaragua's effort to export violent revolution must stop. We cannot tolerate Sandinista support -- which continues today -- for the insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala, and terrorism in Honduras as well. Peace in the region cannot coexist with attempts to undermine democracy." (Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush, 1989, bk. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 505)
August 4, 1989:
A Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro branch located in Atlanta is raided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation which is investigating allegations of unauthorized loans to Iraq. This eventually leads to a Senate investigation of the intelligence community’s, and, in particular, the Central Intelligence Agency’s, involvement in the case. (Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "The Intelligence Community’s Involvement in the Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro (BNL) Affair," February 1993)
September 22, 1989:
National Security Directive (NSD) 25 strongly emphasizes that there will be absolutely no covert assistance to any group within Nicaragua in relation to the 1990 Nicaraguan election. (National Security Directive, NSD 25, U.S. White House, "U.S. Policy toward the February 1990 Nicaragua Election," September 22, 1989, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd25.pdf)
November 17, 1989:
President Bush, when asked in an interview, "Have you, indeed, approved a covert plan that allows the Central Intelligence Agency to recruit people to overthrow Manuel Noriega in Panama?" responds by emphasizing that "Of course I'd love to see Noriega out there, but you know I never discuss intelligence. I was head of the intelligence community for [one] year, a little over a year -- about a year -- and one thing that I know you don't do is discuss covert action or rumors about covert action, or confirm or deny covert action. And I wish other people would conduct themselves in that same manner, and then maybe some of the efforts of an intelligence community could be more effective." (Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush, 1989, bk. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 1543)
Mid 1989 - Early 1990:
The intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1990 recasts the Central Intelligence Agency inspector general (IG) position to become an independent position, not appointed by the Central Intelligence Agency’s director but by the president, and reporting to both the White House and Congress. (Report, The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: The U.S. Experience, October 1994, p. 24)
March 1990:
Though 15,000 troops are claimed by Contra spokespersons, there are only approximately 6,000 Contra rebels left in Nicaragua. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 581)
June 9, 1990:
In Guatemala, Michael Devine, a citizen of the United States, is murdered, with Central Intelligence Agency asset Julio Roberto Alpírez thought to be significantly involved. ( Report of investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "Guatemala Volume III: CIA Relationship With Julio Roberto Alpírez," July 15, 1995)
September 25, 1990:
Frederick Hitz’s nomination for Central Intelligence Agency inspector general is approved by the Senate. (Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Nomination of Frederick P. Hitz," September 25, 1990)
October 17, 1990:
National Security Directive (NSD) 51 focuses on international broadcasting. It provides that "budgetary support for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty should eventually be phased out as their mission is completed." (National Security Directive, NSD 51, U.S. White House, "United States Government International Broadcasting," October 17, 1990, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd51.pdf)
June 24, 1991:
Robert Gates is nominated for the position of director of central intelligence (DCI). (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 210)
Mid-September to Mid-October 1991:
Lengthy nomination hearings for Robert Gates take place as the appointment proves controversial for both his role in the Iran-Contra scandal and his alleged politicization of intelligence. (Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 342-343)
November 6, 1991:
Robert Gates begins his tenure as director of central intelligence (DCI). (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 313)
March 10, 1992:
Admiral William Studeman is appointed deputy director of central intelligence (DDCI). (Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Nomination of Vice Admiral William O. Studeman to Be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence," March 10, 1992, p. 38)
March 12, 1992:
Efraín Bámaca Velásquez, a Guatemalan guerrilla, vanishes after a shoot-out with Guatemalan army soldiers. Suspicions are that he was captured alive, and evidence eventually shows that he likely died in Guatemalan custody. Central Intelligence Agency asset Julio Roberto Alpírez is thought to have inside knowledge of what transpired. (Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Hearing on Guatemala," April 5, 1995)
January 20, 1993:
Bill Clinton is inaugurated president of the United States.
February 1993:
The Senate intelligence committee releases its report on the Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro affair. The SSCI finds no significant Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the financial crisis and little the U.S. could have done to avert it. (Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "The Intelligence Community’s Involvement in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) Affair," February 1993)
February 5, 1993:
James Woolsey takes over the position of director of central intelligence (DCI). (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 313)
February 26, 1993:
A bomb detonates under the World Trade Center in New York. Several perpetrators are later tried and found guilty, including Ramzi Yousef, whose uncle, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, would mastermind the September 11, 2001, destruction of the twin towers. (Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press), pp. 249-251, 272-274; New York Times, 2/27/93)
Late 1993 - Early 1994:
A U.S. official residing in Croatia, most likely Ambassador Peter Galbraith, suggests using covert action to support Bosnian Muslims. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 608-609)
February 21, 1994:
A Central Intelligence Agency employee, Aldrich Ames, is arrested for being a Russian spy. (David Wise, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million. New York: Harper Collins, 1995; Britt L. Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), p. 322)
Late April, 1994:
A "Green Light" decision is made, wherein "the U.S. authorized Iran to use Croatia as its forward staging area and depot in the arms supply line into Bosnia." (Report, House Committee on International Relations, "Final Report of the Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia ("The Iranian Green Light Subcommittee")," October 10, 1996, p. 164)
December 8, 1994:
President Clinton, through a Memorandum of Justification and a Presidential Determination, authorizes the Airbridge Denial Program, which is a project for Central Intelligence Agency assistance to Peruvian aerial interdiction of drug-trafficking flights. (Report, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "[redacted] Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001 [redacted], August 28, 2008)
March 23, 1995:
A New York Times article alleges the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the death of Michael DeVine in 1990 (see June 9, 1990 entry), because of the agency’s relationship with Julio Roberto Alpírez, a Guatemalan army colonel. This article leads the CIA to undertake a number of inquiries focused on Guatemala. (Report of investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "Guatemala Volume II: Alleged Removal of Guatemala Documents," June 14, 1995)
March 30, 1995:
President Clinton instructs the Intelligence Oversight Board to examine the Guatemalan affair. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 612)
April 18, 1995:
At a news conference, President Clinton is asked what he knew about the concealment of Central Intelligence Agency documents related to Guatemala and Julio Roberto Alpírez. (Report of investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "Guatemala Volume II: Alleged Removal of Guatemala Documents," June 14, 1995)
May 10, 1995:
John Deutch takes over the position of director of central intelligence (DCI). (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 313)
May 16, 1995:
The Central Intelligence Agency’s Airbridge Denial Program shoots down its first plane. (Report of investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "[redacted] Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001 [redacted], August 28, 2008)
June 14, 1995:
A Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General investigation finds no evidence of wrongdoing in the possible removal of documents related to Guatemala. (Report of investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "Guatemala Volume II: Alleged Removal of Guatemala Documents," June 14, 1995)
April 5, 1996:
The United States’ involvement in Bosnian arms shipments is highlighted in the first of a series of Los Angeles Times articles focused on "the Lake-Galbraith maneuvers with their "no instruction" subterfuge," alleged to have given the ambassador the green light to avoid bringing up the subject with local authorities. (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 617)
July 17, 1996:
John Deutch testifies before a Senate intelligence committee hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency’s utilization of clergy and journalists for intelligence purposes. Deutch explains, "the Central Intelligence Agency policy is not to use journalists accredited to American news organizations, their parent organizations, American clergy or the Peace Corps for intelligence purposes. This includes any use of such organizations for cover. The policy that I have just stated ... has been in place for 20 years." (Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "CIA’s Use of Journalists and Clergy in Intelligence Operations," July 17, 1996, p. 6)
September 1996:
In Afghanistan, the Taliban takes over Kabul. The group will eventually harbor Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, and will significantly influence future developments in the U.S. "War on Terror." (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 580)
October 10, 1996:
A House committee report investigating the U.S. role in arm shipments from Iran to Bosnia and Croatia finds that the Central Intelligence Agency played no role. It notes that the Central Intelligence Agency "exercised sound judgment in its refusal to participate in activities that might have otherwise led to an inadvertent and illegal covert action," and that it "did not participate in the development of the green light policy." It further emphasizes this point, adding "CIA officers acted appropriately in monitoring and reporting to their superiors what were, to them, apparently rogue activities by senior [U.S.] State Department officials," and the "CIA was put in this awkward situation solely because of the unnecessary and unjustifiable secrecy within the Administration concerning its green light policy." (Report, House Committee on International Relations, "Final Report of the Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia ("The Iranian Green Light Subcommittee")," October 10, 1996, p. 207)
February 1997:
Standard operating procedures are promulgated for the Airbridge Denial Program. These, however, do "not specify visual signals as one of the required intercept procedures." Inadequate protocols for warning aircraft being intercepted under the Central Intelligence Agency-Peruvian air force joint interdiction program would figure in mistaken shootdowns. (Report of investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "[redacted] Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001 [redacted], August 28, 2008)
March 11-13, 1997:
A nomination hearing for Anthony Lake to become director of central intelligence (DCI) takes place. Lake later withdraws from consideration as it becomes clear his nomination is too controversial. (Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Nomination of Anthony Lake to Be Director of Central Intelligence," c. May 13, 1997)
July 11, 1997:
George Tenet ascends to the position of director of central intelligence (DCI). (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 313)
January 28, 1998:
In a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, George Tenet comments on the threat of terrorism, saying "there has been a trend toward increasing lethality of attacks, especially against civilian targets." He notes that "a confluence of recent developments increases the risk that individuals or groups will attack [U.S.] interests." Tenet seeks a budget increase and reprogramming for Central Intelligence Agency covert operations. ( Speech, Central Intelligence Agency, "Speeches and Testimony: DCI before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," January 28, 1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1998/dci_speech_012898.html)
May 5, 1998:
L. Britt Snider is nominated as Central Intelligence Agency inspector general. (Press Release, Central Intelligence Agency, "Press Releases and Statements: President Clinton Names New Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General," May 5, 1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1998/snider.html)
July 15, 1998:
George Tenet releases a statement on Central Intelligence Agency efforts to declassify records. He says, "the goal of our declassification program is to identify and release as much of the information as we can, as soon as we can." (Statement, Central Intelligence Agency, "Press Releases and Statements: DCI Statement on Declassification," July 15, 1998, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1998/ps071598.html)
February 2, 1999:
George Tenet notes that "there is not the slightest doubt that Usama Bin Ladin, his worldwide allies, and his sympathizers are planning further attacks against us." (Statement, Central Intelligence Agency, "Speeches and Testimony: DCI Statement: Current and Projected National Security Threats," February 2, 1999, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/ps020299.html)
April 27, 2000:
The Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, John Gannon, writes that in "the world of 2015 as a whole, no country, no ideology, and no movement will emerge to threaten [U.S.] interests on a global scale." However, "the threat of terrorism directed against [U.S.] interests -both at home and abroad - will increase." (Central Intelligence Agency, "Speeches and Testimony: NIC Chairman: Intelligence Challenges through 2015," April 27, 2000, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/gannon_speech_05022000.html)
January 20, 2001:
George W. Bush is inaugurated as president of the United States.
April 20, 2001:
A plane downed in Peru with the assistance of the Airbridge Denial Program proves to contain a family of innocent American missionaries. (Report of investigation, Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, "[redacted] Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001 [redacted], August 28, 2008)
September 11, 2001:
The terrorist group Al-Qaeda launches a coordinated attack on targets in the United States, destroying the World Trade Center towers in New York and damaging the Pentagon. A third airliner crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers stormed the cockpit to prevent the plane from reaching its destination (hitherto unknown).
September 20, 2001:
George W. Bush, in a speech before a joint session of Congress, declares that, given the 9/11 terrorist attacks, "Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success." (Public Papers of the Presidents: George W. Bush, 2001, bk. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003, p. 1142)
October 6, 2001:
Bill Harlow, the director of public affairs for the Central Intelligence Agency, gives an interview to CNN, in which he says that, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, "Our Counterterrorism Center, in fact, was set up in the mid-1980’s. In the last four years, the size of it has doubled, and in the last four weeks, it’s doubled again." (Interview transcript excerpt, Central Intelligence Agency, "CNN Interview with Director of Public Affairs Bill Harlow," October 9, 2001)
November 1, 2001:
The Central Intelligence Agency begins studying what become known as Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. (American Civil Liberties Union, "Torture Tapes," http://www.aclu.org/timelines/torture-tapes)
February 2, 2002:
A Department of State memo emphasizes, with regard to constitutional protections against arbitrary incarceration and unreasonable search and seizure, that "CIA lawyers believe that, to the extent that the protections do not apply as a matter of law but those protections are applied as a matter of policy, it is desirable to circumscribe that policy so as to limit its application to the CIA." (Report, Senate Armed Services Committee, Nov 30, 2008, p. 3).
March 28, 2002:
A leading al-Qaeda figure, Abu Zubaydah, is captured in Pakistan. (New York Times, April 14, 2002)
April 13, 2002:
The Central Intelligence Agency begins videotaping interrogations of detained alleged terrorists. (American Civil Liberties Union, "Torture Tapes," http://www.aclu.org/timelines/torture-tapes)
April 17-April 25, 2002:
John Helgerson is nominated for Central Intelligence Agency inspector general. (Hearings, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Nomination of John L. Helgerson to Be Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency," 2002)
April 27, 2002:
A Central Intelligence Agency email discussing the Abu Zubaydah interrogation notes a need to create "official record copies" of the interrogation tapes, as "CIA has not had such a responsibility for a long time, so we want to make sure we know how to keep ‘in bounds.’" (Email message, Central Intelligence Agency, "AZ Interrogations," April 27, 2002)
May 2002:
It is the Central Intelligence Agency’s opinion that Abu Zubaydah is holding back information. This impression becomes the basis for the employment of strong-arm interrogation methods against the detainee. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Release of Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel’s Opinions on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program [Rockefeller Report],"Apr. 22, 2009, p. 2-3, intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/olcopinion.pdf)
July 24, 2002:
The Central Intelligence Agency monitor Abu Zubaydah and other detainees for their responses to interrogation. In a draft psychological assessment of Abu Zubaydah, an agency official states that "he showed strong signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal (possibly fear) when he experienced the initial ‘confrontational’ dislocation of expectation during an interrogation session. Due to his incredibly strong resolve, expertise in civilian warfare, resistance to interrogation techniques ... this experience was one of the few that led to him providing significant actionable intelligence. As has been observed throughout his recent detention, he was able to quickly bounce back from these most disconcerting moments and regain an air of calm confidence, and strong resolve in not parting with other threat information." The document shows, apart from its direct content, that strong-arm interrogation methods were already being employed before this date. (Fax, Central Intelligence Agency to John Yoo, July 24, 2002)
October 9 and October 16, 2002:
Scott Muller is nominated as Central Intelligence Agency General Counsel. (Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Nomination of Scott W. Muller to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency," 2003)
October 25, 2002:
In a cable, the Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Operations (DDO) asks for authorization to destroy the interrogation tapes of Abu Zubaydah. As its reason it notes the "danger to all Americans should the tapes be compromised," and "there also exists a clear danger that the officers pictured on the tapes could be subject to retribution from Al-QA’IDA elements." Therefore, "the best alternative to eliminate those security and additional risks is to destroy these tapes." (Cable, Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Operations, "Eyes Only - Disposition of Videotapes," October 25, 2002)
December 2002:
The Central Intelligence Agency Counterterrorism Center gets a new chief, as Jose Rodriguez moves into Cofer Black’s position.
January 1, 2003:
The Central Intelligence Agency’s inspector general begins to examine the Detention and Interrogation Program (American Civil Liberties Union, "Torture Tapes," http://www.aclu.org/timelines/torture-tapes).
January 28, 2003:
Director Tenet issues two DCI Directives, consisting of guidelines for interrogation practices and for conditions in which detainees should be held. (Directive, Director of Central Intelligence, "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the [redacted]," January 28, 2003; Directive, Director of Central Intelligence, "Guidelines on Confinement, Conditions for CIA Detainees," January 28, 2003)
March, 2003:
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, chief planner of the 9/11 attacks, is captured by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Report, Central Intelligence Agency, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa’ida," July 13, 2004)
May 9, 2003:
The Central Intelligence Agency "files sworn declaration stating that it did not videotape interrogations of Abu Zubaydah." (American Civil Liberties Union, "Torture Tapes," http://www.aclu.org/timelines/torture-tapes)
June 2003:
Concerns arise at the Central Intelligence Agency that the Bush administration might try to separate itself from the CIA’s detention and interrogation operations. (Washington Post, 10/15/2008).
September 16, 2003:
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell are briefed on Central Intelligence Agency interrogation programs. Scott Muller, Central Intelligence Agency general counsel, records that no one expressed concerns. (Report, Central Intelligence Agency, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001- October 2003)," May 7, 2004, PP48, p. 24; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Release of Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel’s Opinions on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program [Rockefeller Report],"Apr. 22, 2009, p 7, intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/olcopinion.pdf)
January 28, 2004:
Canada begins to investigate the case of Maher Arar, a dual citizen of Canada and Syria, who was detained in New York, then transported to Syria. (Cable, U.S. Embassy, Canada to Department of State, January 28, 2004; cable, U.S. Embassy, Canada to Department of State, February 6, 2004)
May 25, 2004:
Central Intelligence Agency Director Tenet establishes a Detainee Working Group. This will "coordinate the Agency’s response to external inquiries concerning its actual and alleged detention, debriefing, interrogation, and rendition practices, especially those relating [redacted] to our worldwide counterterrorist activities." (Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, from George J. Tenet, "Detainee Working Group," May 25, 2004)
August 26, 2004:
Daniel Levin, acting assistant attorney general, responds to a query from John Rizzo, Central Intelligence Agency’s acting general counsel, regarding legality under the Constitution, or any statutes or treaties, of "dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, and abdominal slaps" for the interrogation purposes of "a high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to possess information concerning an imminent terrorist threat to the United States." Levin notes that "[t]his letter confirms our advice that the use of these techniques [redacted] outside territory subject to United States jurisdiction would not violate any of these provisions." (Letter, U.S. Department of Justice, Daniel B. Levin to John A. Rizzo, August 26, 2004)
August 27, 2004:
Executive Order 13355 regulates the intelligence community. (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1945-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 314)
September 24, 2004:
Porter Goss becomes director of central intelligence (DCI). (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 314)
December 6, 2004:
The National Counterterrorism Center is established. (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 314)
December 17, 2004:
The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 is approved, creating a new position, the director of national intelligence (DNI). (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 626; New York Times, 12/17/2004)
March 16, 2005:
At a news conference, President Bush is asked to "explain why you've approved of and expanded the practice of what's called rendition, of transferring individuals out of U.S. custody to countries where human rights groups and your own State Department say torture is common for people in custody?" He responds that in "The post-9/11 world, the United States must make sure we protect our people and our friends from attack. That was the charge we have been given. And one way to do so is to arrest people and send them back to their country of origin with the promise that they won't be tortured. That's the promise we receive. This country does not believe in torture. We do believe in protecting ourselves. We don't believe in torture." (Public Papers of the Presidents: George W. Bush, 2005, bk. 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007, p. 444-445)
April 21, 2005:
John Negroponte becomes the very first director of national intelligence. (Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 314)
June 3, 2005:
A Central Intelligence Agency report notes that "detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of [U.S.] counterterrorism efforts." (Report, Central Intelligence Agency, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War against Al-Qa’ida," June 3, 2005)
June 25, 2005:
A judge in Italy orders 23 alleged Central Intelligence Agency officers arrested in the kidnapping case of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr. The judge’s "extraordinary decision ... to order the arrest of 23 people linked to the Central Intelligence Agency on charges of kidnapping a terrorism suspect here dramatizes a growing rift between American counterterrorism officials and their counterparts in Europe." (New York Times, 6/26/2005)
October 13, 2005:
The Central Intelligence Agency’s National Clandestine Service replaces the Directorate of Operations. (Central Intelligence Agency, "Interactive Timeline," https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-the-cia/interactive-timeline/flash-movie-text.html)
November 2, 2005:
The Washington Post breaks the story of the Central Intelligence Agency’s secret rendition and black prison sites. The piece explains that the "CIA has been hiding and interrogating some of its most important al Qaeda captives at a Soviet-era compound in Eastern Europe," and "[t]he secret facility is part of a covert prison system set up by the CIA nearly four years ago that at various times has included sites in eight countries, including Thailand, Afghanistan and several democracies in Eastern Europe, as well as a small center at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba." (Washington Post, 11/2/2005)
November 9, 2005:
The Central Intelligence Agency’s interrogation videotapes are destroyed. (Cable, Central Intelligence Agency, November 9, 2005)
November 10, 2005:
A Central Intelligence Agency email discusses the destruction of the agency’s interrogation videotapes, apparently on instructions of senior operations official Jose Rodriguez. The email notes that "On the ZUBAYDAH tapes-I am no longer feeling comfortable. While I understand Jose’s ‘decision’ (and believe the tapes were bad news) I was just told by RIZZO that [deleted] DID NOT concur on the cable- it was never discussed with him (this is perhaps worse news, in that we may have ‘improperly’ destroyed something)," and "Apparently Rizzo called Harriet this afternoon and she was livid, which he said was actually unusual for her. Rizzo does not think this is likely to just go away." (Email message, Central Intelligence Agency to Dusty Foggo, November 10, 2005, American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/torture-foia-torture-documents-released-4152010)
December 5, 2005:
Before leaving on a trip to Europe, Condoleezza Rice gives a speech in response to "inquiries from the European Union, the Council of Europe, and from several individual countries about media reports concerning U.S. conduct in the war on terror." She specifically comments on the U.S. use of renditions, and notes that "[f]or decades, the United States and other countries have used ‘renditions’ to transport terror suspects," and "[r]endition is a vital tool in combating transnational terrorism." Rice emphasizes that while "conducting such renditions, it is the policy of the United States, and I presume of any other democracies who use this procedure, to comply with its laws and comply with its treaty obligations, including those under the Convention Against Torture." (Statement, Department of State Office of the Spokesman, "Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice upon Her Departure for Europe," December 5, 2005)
December 30, 2005:
The Detainee Treatment Act is signed into law.
March 17, 2006:
The Venice Commission issues an opinion on renditions and covert detention facilities. It sets forth standards with which Council of Europe member states must act in regard to secret arrests and rendition, overflights, and the transfer of prisoners. (Opinion, European Commission for Democracy through Law, March 17, 2006)
April 5, 2006:
Amnesty International issues a report on the Central Intelligence Agency’s rendition activities. (Report, Amnesty International, "United States of America: Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and ‘Disappearance,’" April 5, 2006)
May 30, 2006:
Michael Hayden becomes director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
September 6, 2006:
In remarks on the "War on Terror," President Bush admits that "a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the United States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency," and states that "specifics of this program, including where these detainees have been held and the details of their confinement, cannot be divulged." (Public Papers of the Presidents: George W. Bush, 2006, bk. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010, p. 1614)
October 2006:
Congress approves the Military Commissions Act.
January 31, 2007:
Germany orders that alleged Central Intelligence Agency operatives in the Khaled al-Masri rendition case be arrested. British Broadcasting Corporation News, 1/31/2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6316369.stm)
February 14, 2007:
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) outlines its findings after "visits to fourteen ‘high value detainees’ transferred to Guantanamo in September 2006." This "covers the period during which these persons were held in the detention program run by the Central Intelligence Agency." (Report, International Committee of the Red Cross, "ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA Custody," Geoff Loane to John Rizzo, February 14, 2007)
June 19, 2007:
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence holds a hearing to consider John Rizzo’s nomination for general counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
December 7, 2007:
News reports reveal that the Central Intelligence Agency destroyed the videotapes of its detainee interrogations. (Washington Post, 12/7/2007; New York Times, 12/7/2007)
January 2, 2008:
Attorney General Michael Mukasey appoints Assistant U.S. Attorney John Durham to carry out a criminal investigation into the Central Intelligence Agency’s destruction of interrogation videotapes. ("Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees," 8/30/12)
January 30, 2008:
The Central Intelligence Agency, according to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, does not presently have the authority to utilize waterboarding.
February 13, 2008:
In a statement to Central Intelligence Agency employees, Michael Hayden states that the CIA’s "decision to employ waterboarding in the wake of 9/11 was not only lawful, it reflected the circumstances of the time." (Statement, Central Intelligence Agency, "Director’s Statement on Lawful Interrogation," February 13, 2008)
February 14, 2008:
President Bush, in an interview with BBC News’ Matt Frei, when asked "But given Guantanamo Bay, given also Abu Ghraib, given renditions, does this not send the wrong signal to the world?" responds by commenting that "It should send the signal that America is going to respect law but is going to take actions necessary to protect ourselves and find information that may protect others." (British Broadcasting Corporation News, 2/14/2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7245670.stm)
January 20, 2009:
Barack Obama is inaugurated president of the United States. Admiral Dennis Blair enters in service as Director of National Intelligence.
January 22, 2009:
On his first day in office, President Obama signs executive orders "ending the Central Intelligence Agency’s secret overseas prisons, banning coercive interrogation methods and closing the Guantánamo Bay detention camp within a year." (New York Times, 1/22/2009)
February 5-6, 2009:
Hearings are held to confirm Leon Panetta as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA). (Hearings, Senate Select Committee Intelligence, "Nomination of Leon Panetta to be Director, Central Intelligence Agency," February 5-6, 2009)
April 9, 2009:
The Central Intelligence Agency shuts down its black prisons. (New York Times, 4/10/2009)
May 14, 2009:
The Central Intelligence Agency is accused of misleading Congress in relation to its interrogation practices. (Statement, Central Intelligence Agency, "Message from the Director: Turning Down the Volume," May 15, 2009)
August 24, 2009:
Attorney General Eric Holder expands John Durham’s mandate to include reviewing whether the Central Intelligence Agency’s interrogation of certain detainees overseas violated U.S. laws. However, a Justice Department statement notes that "the Department would not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel." ("Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees," 8/30/12)
November 4, 2009:
Twenty-three Americans are convicted in a Central Intelligence Agency rendition case in Italy. The judge "handed an eight-year sentence to Robert Seldon Lady, a former [CIA] base chief in Milan, and five-year sentences to the other Americans, including an Air Force colonel and 21 [CIA] operatives." (New York Times, 11/4/2009)
December 30, 2009:
Seven Central Intelligence Agency officers or contract employees are killed in a suicide bomb attack in the Afghan city of Khost (New York Times, 12/30/2009; Christian Science Monitor,12/31/2009)
January 21, 2010:
A Senate Foreign Relations Committee report discussing Al-Qaeda in relation to Somalia and Yemen notes that "Al-Qaeda is not on the run. The group has expanded its recruitment efforts to attract non-traditional followers and adapted its operations," and because of "pressures from U.S. and international intelligence and security organizations, it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence." (Report, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb," January 21, 2010, p. 4-5)
May 20, 2010:
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair steps down. His "departure could strengthen the hand of the C.I.A operatives, who have bristled at directives from Mr. Blair’s office. In recent months, Mr. Blair has been outspoken about reining in the C.I.A.’s covert activities, citing their propensity to backfire and tarnish America’s image abroad." (New York Times, 5/20/2010, )
May 26, 2010:
Jay Bybee, former head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, testifies to the House Judiciary Committee that the Central Intelligence Agency never sought clearance for some of the controversial interrogation techniques they used on detainees. He asserts that at the time he had no first-hand knowledge of what U.S. agents were actually doing in the course of the interrogations. (New York Times, 7/15/2010)
November 9, 2010:
The Department of Justice decides not to file charges against Central Intelligence Agency officers involved in destroying the detainee interrogation tapes. (Statement, Central Intelligence Agency, "Statement by CIA Director Leon E. Panetta on DOJ Announcement," November 9, 2010)
May 1, 2011:
President Obama holds a news conference to announce that Osama Bin Laden has been killed in a U.S. raid. (New York Times, 5/1/2011)
June 23, 2011:
Nomination hearing for David Petraeus to become Central Intelligence Agency director convenes. (Hearing, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Nomination of General David H. Petraeus to be Director, Central Intelligence Agency," June 23, 2011)
May 16, 2012:
The European Court of Human Rights hears the Khaled al-Masri case regarding his kidnapping by the Central Intelligence Agency. (British Broadcasting Corporation News, 5/16/2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18086766)
August 30, 2012:
Attorney General Eric Holder announces the end of John Durham’s investigation into Central Intelligence Agency interrogations, adding that the Justice Department has decided "not to initiate criminal charges in these matters." (Press release, Department of Justice, "Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees," August 30, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-ag-1067.html)
November 9, 2012:
David Petraeus resigns as Central Intelligence Agency director.
March 7, 2013:
John O. Brennan is confirmed as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Washington Post, 3/7/2013)
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